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ABSTRACT 
Four phenomena can be observed in China’s housing market in the past 16 
years.  First, the vacancy rate of new condominium properties has increased 
significantly. Second, housing prices have been increasing very rapidly. In fact, the 
prices have rarely decreased even when strict housing policies have been mandated. 
Third, housing transactions are active, as indicated by the new condominiums that 
have been recently developed and have been sold very quickly. Finally, new 
construction/development had also been very active. Phenomena 2, 3, and 4 are 
inherently consistent, but the coexistence of phenomena 2, 3, and 4 with phenomenon 
1 is very perplexing. Thus, the following research questions can be raised.  1. How 
can housing prices keep increasing despite high vacancy rates?  2. How can new 
condominiums be sold quickly when vacancy rates are high? 3. How can construction 
activities continue when vacancy rates are high?   This is a puzzle. 
This puzzle is connected with another puzzle, the excessive liquidity in 
China’s housing market has been oddly coexisting with insufficient demand in 
China’s consumer market over the past 16 years. The second puzzle can is easily 
observed even though it has been largely ignored over past 16 years.   
The following hypotheses are put forward: Hypothesis 1: At a certain time 
point, higher-income households will spend a lower proportion of their income on 
consumption compared with lower-income households. If this hypothesis can be 
verified, then severe income inequality will lead to an overly-high aggregate savings 
rate and an extremely low aggregate consumption rate; Hypothesis 2: Overly-high 
aggregate savings rates and extremely low aggregate consumption rates caused by 
severe income inequality will induce high investment demand in the virtual sector 
rather than the real sector. As a result, the virtual sector will boom while the real 
sector will decline. Hypothesis 3: Given a declining real sector, investors will prefer 
houses as investments as opposed to other assets in the virtual sector due to their 
unique features. This leads to rapidly rising housing prices and overdevelopment.  
Testing the three hypotheses above is a big challenge because the typical 
measure for income inequality for a country, the Gini Coefficient, announced by 
China’s government is not trustworthy. The data about GDP and per capita disposable 
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income are also not reliable. For this research, a significant amount of effort was 
exerted to collect primary data on these variables. These efforts include establishing 
rapport with officials in the National Bureau of Statistics of China, obtaining special 
access to the database of academic and non-profit research institutes and buying data 
from private institutes in China. Through these efforts, improved quarterly data of 
GDP, housing policy, and monetary supply for 70 cities from 2000 to 2016 were 
obtained. 
The theoretical work in this study includes: 
First, the economic relationship between income levels and consumption rates, 
that is, higher-income households will spend a lower proportion of their income on 
consumption compared with lower-income households, is confirmed by economic 
data. Moreover, the new economic relationship is explained using Modern Portfolio 
Theory and information cost.  
Second, by mathematical proof, it is shown that a more severe income 
inequality will lead to a higher aggregate savings rate as well as a lower aggregate 
consumption rate under this economic relationship.  
Third, a theoretical model further shows that the aggregate savings rate caused 
by income equality will result in investor’s preference for virtual assets rather than 
real assets or consumption goods.    
Fourth, unique feature of houses is found, which can be used to explain why 
houses are preferred over other virtual assets and why housing bubbles can last longer 
than speculative bubbles of other virtual assets, such as commercial properties, stocks 
and mutual funds. The unique feature of housing is that the utility an owner obtains 
from living in his own house is greater than the utility a tenant gets from living in the 
same house if it was leased. Therefore, market rents, which are the “price” of the 
utility a tenant get, does not fully reflect the market fundamentals of a house due to 
the existence of non-rent utility. As a result, house prices lose the signal for market 
fundamentals and, in the case of China, have continuously increased in the long term. 
This is the reason why houses are preferred by investors.  
Finally, a new measure which we call the Ratio of Gross Domestic Income to 
Gross Domestic Product (RGG) is built to replace of the Gini coefficient as a measure 
of  income equality.   Since, the official data are not trustworthy due to the absence of 
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unreported income a, a better measure for income inequality can be obtained. The 
following is the problem-solving process used to create the new measure.  First it is 
basic fact that the high income level families possess nearly all of the unreported 
income in China. Therefore, a high proportion of unreported income in total income 
implies a severe income inequality. Step 2, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be 
equal to Gross Domestic Income (GDI). Hence, when GDI is less than the GDP, the 
gap between the two statistics represents the unreported income in an economy.  As a 
result, a high Ratio of GDI to GDP (RGG) indicates a severe income inequality. In 
this way, a new index RGG is built to be used to measure inequality.  
The empirical study is conducted after the theoretical work and the results 
show the following:  
First, for all of the econometric models and for all of the groupings of the 70 
Chinese cities, the coefficient of RGG, or our measure for income inequality, is 
consistently negative. Since a high RGG implies severe income inequality, the 
negative coefficient shows that the correlation between income inequality and housing 
prices is positive. In other words, the more severe the income inequality the higher the 
housing prices will be. 
Second, for all of the econometric models and for all of the groupings of the 
70 Chinese cities, the housing prices are always significantly affected by RGG. The 
positive correlation between the income inequality and the housing prices is 
confirmed statistically.   
Third, in order to show how important income inequality is to the 
determination of housing prices, the degree of fit (R2) is checked after the 
independent variables are removed one by one from the econometric models. In all 
models, we find that the goodness of fit drops the most when the RGG variable is 
removed. This again shows that income inequality plays the most important role in 
housing prices.  
Finally, the coefficient of Housing Policies（X3）is positive, which means 
the enactment of housing policies is correlated with the high housing prices. This 
result is counterintuitive because the purpose of restrictive housing policies is to 
suppress rapidly rising housing prices. But this result is reasonable. On one hand, it is 
the fact that all housing policies could rarely suppress housing prices in past 16 years 
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in China. On the other hand, releasing the housing policies was actually a reaction to 
the rapidly rising housing prices, and terminating the housing policies is a response to 
the stagnant or slightly decreasing housing prices. In other words, when housing 
prices increased rapidly, the housing policies were enacted but rarely served to stop 
the increasing housing prices.  And, when the housing prices were stagnant or 
decreasing slightly for some reason, the restrictive housing policies were not enacted 
or were terminated and as a result, the relationship between housing prices and 
housing policies is was found to be positive in the models.   
Then the following conclusions are drawn based on the theoretical models and 
the empirical evidences.  
1. At a given point in time, a high-income family will spend a lower
proportion of their income on consumption compared with a low-income
family. As a result, severe income inequality will lead to very -high
aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate.
2. Very high aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate
caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment demand in
the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the
virtual sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.
3. In the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to other
types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the unique features of houses.
Thus, housing prices will increase even though there is a high vacant rate,
increased  new construction and the high transaction volume for the
housing construction. Those phenomena are “weird” but can be observed
everywhere in China in 2017.
The theoretical innovations of this study include: (1) illustrating the new 
relationship between income level and consumption rate which can bridge income 
inequality and the aggregate savings rate; (2) establishing RGG as a new measure for 
income inequality that can be a substitute for the Gini coefficient when there is a large 
amount of unreported income in an economy; (3) determining the unique feature of 
house which can explain why investors prefer houses to the other assets in the virtual 
market.  
As a result, the study has the following theoretical contributions: (1) it 
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provides empirical evidence that rapidly increasing housing prices are positively 
related to income inequality; (2) it adds a new explanation for housing bubbles by 
revealing the linkage between income inequality to the housing bubble; (3) it details a 
new channel through which income inequality can damage the sustainability of 
economic growth in a developing country, thus enhancing the importance of income 
inequality issue in economics.  
At least two implications which are of great significance to developing 
countries can be drawn from this study. First, severe income distribution inequality 
gives rise to the abnormal coexistence of excess liquidity and insufficient demand, 
further  deepening a recession found in the real sector, as well as the an increasing 
prosperity within  the virtual sector of an economy. Secondly, an increasingly 
overheated virtual economy can bring a significant amount of risk to the whole 
financial system of a country. A dwindling economy gradually deteriorates 
employment and further threatens the long-term economic growth potential of a 
developing country and also weakens their competitive advantage in the global 
economy.  
Since many countries, including the U.S., have also been experiencing 
increasing income inequality and real estate bubbles, this research will ultimately 
remind policy-makers to take income inequality into account when they make policies 
to deal with both housing bubbles and the overdevelopment of the housing sector 
fueled by the increased interest in the virtual economy, in particular the housing 
market.  This can lead to instability in the financial markets and unsustainable 
economic growth in both developing countries and developed countries. 
vii 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In many cities in China, a significant number of newly developed condominiums 
have been sold but have remained vacant for several years. For example, from 2006–
2015, condominiums covering more than 18 million square meters were built in a 63.9-
square-kilometer beach area in Rushan Yintan, Weihai, Shangdong Province, China. 
However, over 85% of these condominiums have remained vacant since their 
completion1. 
Similar cases can be observed in other cities in China, such as Ordos, Inner 
Mongolia; Fangchenggang, Guangxi; Chenggong, Yunnan; Shiyan, Hubei; Changzhou, 
Jiangsu; Jiaxing, Zhejiang; Lanzhou New District, Gansu; and Zhumadian, Henan. In 
fact, there are so many vacant condominiums in those cities that those cities are called 
“ghost cities”.  In fact, in 2015 a Chinese institute identified the top 50 “ghost cities” in 
China (see Table 1.1). Although this ranking may not be trustworthy, the cities on the list 
are all identified as “ghost cities” by the data from the Statistical Yearbook of those cities.  
1  http://jingji.cntv.cn/2015/12/20/VIDE1450621076642271.shtml April.2nd, 2017 
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Table 1.1  Top 50 Ghost Cities in China (2015) 
Rank City Index* Province 
Rank City   Index Province 
1 Erenhot 0.2692 Inner Mongolia 26 Xilinhot 0.4719 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2 Alaer 0.2726 Xinjiang 27 Jinchang 0.4731 Gansu 
3 Beitun 0.2825 Xinjiang 28 Fangchenggang 0.4737 Guangxi 
4 Aletai 0.2906 Xinjiang 29 Chengde 0.4773 Hebei 
5 Zhangye 0.2983 Gansu 30 Taicang 0.4885 Jiangsu 
6 Suifenhe 0.3232 Heilongjiang 31 Zhoukou 0.4914 Henan 
7 Qinzhou 0.3524 Guangxi 32 Dehui 0.4918 Jilin 
8 Jiayuguan 0.3591 Gansu 33 Laiwu 0.4997 Shandong 
9 Yumen 0.3594 Gansu 34 Quzhou 0.5023 Zhejiang 
10 Shigatse 0.3843 Tibet 35 Chongzhou 0.5037 Sichuan 
11 Golmud 0.3933 Qinghai 36 Donggang 0.5139 Liaoning 
12 Ruili 0.4004 Yunnan 37 Heshan 0.5173 Canton 
13 Turpan 0.4172 Xinjiang 38 Shulan 0.5201 Jilin 
14 Mishan 0.4214 Heilongjiang 39 Yantai 0.5268 Shandong 
15 Weihai 0.4231 Shandong 40 Korla 0.5294 Xinjiang 
16 Changshu 0.4267 Jiangsu 41 Kashgar 0.5349 Xinjiang 
17 Wuzhong 0.4296 Ningxia 42 Sanya 0.5369 Hainan 
18 Kaiping 0.4393 Guangdong 43 Ordos 0.5372 Inner Mongolia 
19 Fukang 0.4507 Xinjiang 44 Hulunbeier 0.5372 Inner Mongolia 
20 Guixi 0.4577 Jiangxi 45 Taian 0.5388 Shandong 
21 Yichun 0.4579 Heilongjiang 46 Yichang 0.5441 Hubei 
22 Shizuishan 0.4621 Ningxia 47 Xianning 0.5441 Hubei 
23 Chuzhou 0.4628 Anhui 48 Lasa 0.5498 Tibet 
24 Haining 0.4689 Zhejiang 49 Lianyungang 0.5522 Jiangsu 
25 Maoming 0.4717 Guangdong 50 Huoerguole 0.5529 Inner Mogolia 
* The index refers to the population per square kilometers in housing
communities.  Population is measured by 10 thousand. For example, 0.2692 means 
there are living 2692 residents per square kilometers in the housing communities  
     Source:  
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20151117/223123790511.shtml Nov. 17, 2015 
High vacancy rates typically translate to low rents. Theoretically, low rents should 
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result in low housing prices. However, even though the vacancy rates in these cities are 
high, housing prices continue to soar. For example, the average housing price in Sanya, 
China (# 42 in Table 1.1) in 2016 is over 13 times higher than that in 2003, although the 
vacancy rate remained over 40% from 2003 to 20162. 
Furthermore, newly developed condominiums can always be sold quickly despite the 
high vacancy rates. From 2003–2016, an average of more than 93% of the condominiums 
built in China were sold within three months of their completion3. 
1.2 A Puzzle 
There are four phenomena that can be observed in China’s housing market over the 
past 16 years: 
1. The vacancy rate of new condominiums projects has been increasing.
2. Housing prices keep increasing at a rapid rate. In fact, prices have rarely
decreased even when strict housing policies are mandated. 
3. Housing transaction volume is high as evidenced by the low average days on
market. 
4. And, finally, new construction activities have also been very active.
When housing prices are increasing rapidly, investors can profit substantially from 
purchasing and selling home units. In this kind of seller’s market, new and second-hand 
condominiums sell quickly.  When properties trade quickly and money is made, housing 
developers will strive to build more houses. Thus, phenomena 2, 3, and 4 are inherently 
consistent.  
2 Hainan Statistical Yearbook, 2003 and Sanya Statistical Yearbook, 2016. 
3 China Statistical Yearbook (2003–2012).  
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The coexistence of phenomena 2, 3, and 4 with phenomenon 1 is very perplexing. 
Thus, the following research questions, although essentially the same, can be raised:  
1. How can housing prices keep increasing despite high vacancy rates?  
2. How can new condominiums be sold very quickly when vacancy rates are 
high?    
3. How can construction activities keep being very active when vacancy rates are 
high?    
In this study, we attempt to answer these questions in a systematic manner.  
1.3 Exploration  
1.3.1. What Factors Influence the Rapid Increase in House Prices?  
1. Factors Relevant to Houses  
Factors relevant to the value of houses include such things as location, age, floor area 
ratio and water view. These factors certainly influence housing prices. Nevertheless, this 
dissertation focuses on the factors that influence the price dynamics of the entire housing 
market and not on those that affect the price variations of a specific condominium. More 
precisely, the housing prices discussed in this dissertation pertain to housing prices at the 
market level, namely, the average price of all condominiums in a housing market.  
Springer and Worzala (2013)4 contend that, at the market level, aggregated data 
obscure any effect induced by individual properties, thereby isolating the market 
influences on transaction volume. Given the association of property transaction prices 
                                                             
4 Springer T. and E. Worzala (2013). “Time-on-the-market as an Indicator of Housing Market Conditions 
Using a Varying Coefficient Model,” The Journal of the Center for Real Estate Studies, Realtor® 
University, 1:2, 2013 
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with transaction volume, at the market level, the aggregated data may obscure any 
influence of individual properties. Hence, when we consider the market as a whole, 
individual factors are negligible.  
2. Market Fundamentals
Many fundamental factors in the market, like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
disposable income per capita and migration of the population from the countryside to 
cities are all factors that could drive the housing prices up or down. However, almost all 
studies of the Chinese housing market show that these fundamental factors do not fully 
explain the quickly rising housing prices (Kuang, 20085; Wu et al., 20106; Lu, 20107). 
This finding is consistent with a snap shot view of the data.  Housing prices in China 
have increased by 25.3% per year on the average in the first 16 years of the 21st century, 
whereas the average growth rates of GDP and household disposable income were only 
7.5% and 3.7%, respectively, during the same period8.   
3.Housing Policies in China
Housing policies include housing-related tax policies, land supply Policies, home 
loan restriction Policies, and home purchase restriction policies. Studies have shown that 
housing-related taxes, including contract tax, income tax, and value-added tax, property 
tax all can play an important role in the fluctuation of housing prices (Poterba, 19919; 
5 Kuang, Z. (2008). “Does There Exist Bubble in China’s Housing Market?”, World Economy (Chinese), 
Issue 12. 2008.  
6 Wu, J., J. Gyourko, and Y. Deng (2012). “Evaluating Conditions in Major Chinese Housing Markets”, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3). 
7 Lu J. (2010). “Measuring the Bubble in China’s Housing Market”. Economic Review. Issue 6, 2010.  
8 China Statistical Yearbook. (2000–2010)  
9 Poterba. J.M. (1991). House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and Demography. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Vol. 22, Issue 2 pp. 143–183 and 200–203, (1991) Brookings Papers on Economic 
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Harris, 201010; Harris, 201311). Land supply restriction policies may also drive housing 
prices to go up. When land supply constraint policies are enacted, the land supply will be 
reduced and the supply elasticity of the housing market will decrease. Glaeser, Gyourko, 
and Saiz (2008)12 show that cities with a low elasticity housing of supply have higher and 
longer housing bubbles than cities with a high elasticity. Meanwhile, cities with a high 
elasticity of housing supply have fewer and shorter housing bubbles than cities with low 
elasticity. As to China, however, housing-related tax policies and land supply restriction 
policies do not have significant influences on housing markets (Zheng and Zhang, 
201313; Bai, Li and Quyang, 201414).  
Unlike housing-related tax policies and land supply restriction policies, home loan 
restriction policies and home purchase restriction policies play an important role in 
housing markets. Xu and Chen (2012)15 find that China’s home loan constraint policies 
are one important factor behind the dynamics of housing markets. Sun et al. (2016)16 find 
that home purchase restrictions greatly influenced housing prices and housing transaction 
volumes in Beijing, China. “Beijing’s HPR policy triggered a 17%–32% decrease in 
Activity, no.n2, 1991 Fall, p143(61) (ISSN: 0007-2303) 
10 Harris B. H. (2010). The Effect of Proposed Tax Reforms on Metropolitan Housing Prices. Washington, 
DC: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Centre.  
11 Harris B. H. (2013). Tax Reform, Transaction Costs, and Metropolitan Housing in the United States. 
Washington, DC: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Centre.  
12 Glaeser, E. L. and Gyourko, Joseph and Saiz, Albert,2008. Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles. 
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 198-217, September  
13 Zheng H. and Zhang Q. (2013). Property Tax in China: Is It Effective in Curbing Housing Price? 
Economics Bulletin. Volume: 33 (2013). Issue: 4. Pages: 2465–2474 
14 Bai C., Q. Li, M. Ouyang (2014). Property Taxes and Home Prices: A Tale of Two Cities. Journal of 
Econometrics Volume 180, Issue 1, May 2014, Pages 1–15.  
15 Xu, X. and T. Chen (2012). The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Estate Price Growth in China. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. Volume 20, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 62–77 
16 Sun, Weizeng; Zheng, Siqi; Geltner, David; Wang, Rui (2016). “The Housing Market Effects of Local 
Home Purchase Restrictions: Evidence from Beijing”. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.  
Volume 53, issue 3, 364-367   
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resale price, a drop in the price-to-rent ratio of about a quarter of its mean value, and a 
deep (50-75%) reduction in the transaction volume of the for-sale17 market, with no 
significant change in the rent or the transaction volume of rental units.” 
The studies above shows that home loan and home purchase restriction policies have 
significant influences in housing prices and transactions,  so the termination of those 
policies might be one important reason why housing prices increases so rapidly. 
However, the significant influences on housing prices are only “true” in very short 
period, long-term data on house prices in China indicates otherwise. Since 2005, the 
Chinese government has been issuing various housing policies to slow down the rapid 
increase of housing prices. Although these policies were effective within a short period 
(3–12 months) after they were enacted, they did not significantly change the rapidly 
increasing housing prices since 2000. In fact, housing prices have been increasing rapidly 
in the whole period of 2005-2016, expect for very short period, such as Oct. 2007-May, 
2008 and Mar. 2010-May. 2010. Therefore, it is not the termination of housing policies 
that boosts the housing prices in China over the past 16 years. Thus, the question still 
remains: What is the essential reason for rapidly increasing housing prices in China?  
4. Rational Expectations and Psychological Factors
Muth (1961)18 proposes the concept of “rational expectations.” Information is scarce, 
and the market generally does not waste information. The pricing of a market based on 
the expectations that everyone gets and acts on accurate market information is called 
17 “For-sale market” here is used in this article (Sun et al., 2016) , which refers to the market where houses 
are sold or bought. It is distinguished from the rental housing market, where houses are leased or rented.  
18 Muth J. F. (1961) "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements" reprinted in The New 
Classical Macroeconomics. Volume 1. (1992): 3–23 (International Library of Critical Writings in 
Economics, vol. 19. Aldershot, UK: Elgar.) 
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rational expectation. 
Lucas (1972) 19 develops this concept and contends that market participants will 
utilize all available information to make predictions about the performance of the 
investment.  In the long run, investment decisions are always accurate or approximately 
accurate, although bias and error can happen in the short run.  
Rational expectation models have been popular in economics since the 1970s. Recent 
studies still show that rational expectations can effectively explain some housing bubbles. 
Granziera and Kozicki (2012)20 demonstrate that a rational expectations asset pricing 
model effectively describes and emulates the run-up in US house prices from 2000 to 
2006. Gelain et al (2013)21 investigate the behavior of the equilibrium price–rent ratio for 
housing in a standard asset pricing model, which is shown to be capable of approximately 
matching the price–rent ratio volatility if market agents are almost rational.  
Although rational expectation models are widely accepted in economics, few 
researchers in the real estate field believe that the models can sufficiently account for the 
volatility of housing prices. Hamilton and Schwab (1985)22, Case and Shiller (1988, 
1989) 23, Mankiw and Weil (1989) 24, Hosios and Pesando (1991) 25, and Meese and 
                                                             
19 Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, 
Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103–124, April. 
20 Granziera, E. and S. Kozicki (2012). House price dynamics: Fundamentals and expectations, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control, v.60, 2015 Nov, p.152(14) (ISSN: 0165-1889)  
21 Paolo Gelain, Kevin J. Lansing and Caterina Mendicino, 2013. "House Prices, Credit Growth, and 
Excess Volatility: Implications for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy," International Journal of Central 
Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(2), pages 219–276, June. 
22 Hamilton, B. W. and R. Schwab1985. "Expected Appreciation in Urban Housing Markets" Journal of 
Urban Economics, Volume 18, Issue 1, July 1985, Pages 103–118 
23 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, 1988. "The behavior of home buyers in boom and post-boom markets," 
New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 29-46. 
Case, Karl E & Shiller, Robert J, 1989. "The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes," American 
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), 125-137, March  
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Wallace (1994)26 report that housing price movements are often positively self-correlated 
over a considerably long period. Hence, investors often make expectations based on a 
previous price movement and do not make decisions based on all available information. 
Investors do not always make rational expectations even in the long term. They conclude 
that irrational expectations and psychological factors can significantly influence housing 
price dynamics. 
Clayton (1996)27 asserts and tests an asset-based housing price model that explicitly 
incorporates the hypothesis of rational house price expectations. The model fails to fully 
capture observed house price dynamics. Granziera and Kozicki (2012)28 also recognize 
that their rational models cannot emulate the sharp decrease or increase unless “limited-
rational expectation” (e.g., backward-looking expectations (adaptive expectations)  and 
extrapolative-type expectations) are integrated into those models.  
Numerous scholars integrated irrational expectations in their theoretical or empirical 
models. Huh and Lansing (2000)29 illustrate a model with backward-looking expectations 
that explains the fluctuation of housing prices to some extent. Evans and Ramey (2006)30, 
24 Mankiw, N. Gregory and Weil, David N. 1989. “The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust, and the Housing 
Market”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, 235–258. 
25 Hosios, A. J and J. E Pesando. 1991. “Measuring Prices in Resale Housing Markets in Canada: Evidence 
and Implications”. Journal of Housing Economics 1: 303–317. 
26 Meese, R., and N. Wallace. 1994. “Testing the Present Value Relation for Housing Prices: Should I Leave 
My House in San Francisco?” Journal of Urban Economics 35, pp. 245–266. 
27  Jim Clayton(1996).Rational Expectations, Market Fundamentals and Housing Price Volatility. Real 
Estate Economics, Vol. 24 No. 4 Winter 1996 
28 Granziera, E. and S. Kozicki(2012). House price dynamics: Fundamentals and expectations, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control, v.60, 2015 Nov, p.152(14) (ISSN: 0165-1889) 
29 Huh, C.G. and K.J. Lansing (2000). Expectations, credibility and disinflation in a small macroeconomic 
model, Journal of Economics and Business 52, 51–86. 
30  Evans, G.W. and G. Ramey( 2006). Adaptive expectations, underparameterization, and the Lucas 
critique, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 249–264. 
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Lansing (2006, 2009)31, and Huang et al. (2009)32 also incorporate adaptive expectations 
into their empirical models. The researchers find that this model can describe the price 
dynamics in the housing market for specific time intervals.  
Rational and irrational models can explain quickly rising housing prices for some 
time intervals but they cannot explain them in the long run. Moreover, both models share 
the assumption that investors can borrow money without limitation, which holds only for 
partial equilibrium analysis. When the entire market is considered, the money available 
for investment, which comes from the total savings of an economy, is always limited and 
scarce. As the difference between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic 
Consumption (GDC), Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) are always limited and scarce.  
Hence, at the market level, the expectation that housing prices will increase in the 
future will not necessarily lead to an actual increase in housing prices unless the money 
available for investment is sufficient. Hence, neither rational nor irrational expectations 
alone can result in increasing housing prices without sufficient capital. The following 
question should be asked: Where does the substantial capital (investment fund) come 
from?   
1.3.2 How Can Housing Prices Increase very Rapidly When the Housing Rent is 
very Low?  
Although the various studies aforementioned do not perfectly explain the reason for 
31 Lansing K.J. (2006). Lock-in of extrapolative expectations in an asset pricing model, Macroeconomic 
Dynamics 10, 317–348. 
Lansing, K.J. (2009). Time-varying U.S. inflation dynamics and the New Keynesian Phillips curve, Review 
of Economic Dynamics 12, 304–326. 
32 Huang, K., Z. Liu, and T. Zha (2009). Learning, adaptive expectations, and technology shocks, Economic 
Journal 119, 377–405. 
11 
 
the quickly rising housing prices, they do provide very reasonable explanations. 
However, they fail to answer one question: How can housing prices continue to increase 
rapidly when housing rents are low?   
Irrational expectations may explain this issue by assuming that the anomaly only 
occurs because people are irrational or have bias and errors. However, high house prices 
and low rent have coexisted in China for the past 16 years. Investors are unlikely to have 
holding bias or errors for 16 years because irrational behaviors can only occur in the short 
or middle run. As a result, investors must have rational reasons to continuously buy 
vacant houses. The following conclusions can be drawn based on their behaviors.  
First, investors appear to continuously purchase vacant but expensive houses 
because they believe they can make higher returns by investing money on these houses 
than on other assets. Given the low rent, the investors must be anticipating considerable 
profits from the sale. In other words, investors can profit by investing money on vacant 
houses because they expect housing prices to increase. Hence, we return to the original 
question: Why would investors believe that housing prices will increase when the 
housing rent is low?  
A second reason why investors are able to purchase vacant but expensive houses is 
because they can afford them.  That is, they have cash. Such a fact cannot be neglected: 
not only some specific type of houses, but also almost all types of houses have been 
experiencing quickly rising-up prices; not only in some specific areas, but almost all 
areas on mainland China have been experiencing rapidly increasing housing prices. In 
other words, not only some specific individuals, but also almost all the individuals in this 
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whole society love buying vacant and expensive houses. It can be concluded that this 
society has enough money to afford houses.   
The answer to the research question is twofold: 1) capital is substantial, or, sufficient 
for many vacant but expensive houses to be purchased. And, 2) capital can make higher 
returns by being invested in houses than other alternative assets, even though the housing 
rent is low and the vacancy rate is high. 
However, other questions are now raised. First, why is capital substantial, or why is 
investment so high?  Second, how can capital make higher returns from houses than other 
investments, even when there are so many vacant houses and the rent is so low?  
1.3.3 Why Is the Capital/Investment Money So High?   
Based on macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. Samuelson and Nordhaus(2009) 33), 
aggregate product (AP) produced by a country at a specific period is always equal to the 
aggregate income (AI) in this specific period because each product must be distributed to 
someone as income, that is,  
AP=AI                                                              (1.1). 
Aggregate product (AP) produced by a country at a specific period is called Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and aggregate income (AI) in this specific period is called 
gross domestic income (GDI).  So (1.1) can be replaced by:  
 GDP=GDI                                                             (1.2). 
On one hand, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be used either for consumption 
goods or for investment goods, no other choices than there is no remainder. This means,   
33 Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, Economics (19th Edition). McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009 
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GDP=C+I       (1.3) 
where C stands for aggregate consumption and I refers to aggregate investment. 
On the other hand, Gross Domestic Income will be used for consumption or will be 
saved. This means,  
GDI=C+S       (1.4) 
Where S stands for aggregate savings.  
Substituting (1.3) and (1.4) into (1.2) gives, 
C+I=C+S                                                         (1.5) 
This gives, 
I=S      (1.6) 
Equation (1.6) implies that aggregate investment is equal to aggregate savings. 
Therefore, if investment is substantially high, then aggregate savings must also be 
substantially high.  
The reason why investment is so high is because savings is very high. A new 
question emerges at once: why is savings so high?  This is the first key question for this 
study (Question 1).   
1.3.4 Why Can Capital Make More Profit from Houses than Other Assets When the 
Housing Rent is Low?    
High savings is not necessarily “good news” for an economy.  High savings could 
boost economic growth if it is put into the production processes, namely, being spent on 
production factors (land, capital and labor). However, it will retard economic growth if it 
is invested in speculative assets.   
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China has one of the highest savings rates in the world. Over the last 16 years, many 
companies have been suffering from a very weak consumption market, and thus their 
profitability has been decreasing rapidly. As a result, many companies went into 
bankruptcy. In sharp contrast, asset markets (such as the housing market) have been 
experiencing significant growth and substantial returns.  To sum up, high savings has 
contributed less and less to the Chinese overall economy because it has not been spent on 
production factors but it has been invested in speculative assets.  
In order to show the relationship between production factors and speculative assets, 
two concepts, “real assets” and “virtual assets”, are introduced. This is important because 
these asset prices are related to whether or not the high savings can support the economic 
growth.  Real assets are production factors and virtual assets are speculative assets.  Why 
are real assets and virtual assets introduced in place of production factors and speculative 
assets?  The answer is that it is much easier to uncover the relationship between real 
assets and virtual assets, but it is very hard to find the relationship between production 
factors and speculative assets.  
Real assets are the production factors used in the production process, including land, 
factories, machines, facilities, and raw materials. As an extension of “real assets,” assets 
used for household consumption, such as cars and houses, are also real assets. Although 
buyers cannot earn profits from these assets, they can obtain consumption utility from 
them and thus save substantial living expenses. For example, owner-occupied housing 
allows the owner to save home rent expenses and car owners can save on other 
transportation costs. In economics, expenses saved are equivalent to profits earned. Thus, 
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an asset used for household consumption implies profits or returns to the owner in the 
future. Thus, it is also considered a real asset in this analysis. Therefore, in this 
dissertation, real assets refer to the production factors.  
Virtual assets are rights to claim returns in the future and include stocks, bonds, 
funds, and shares. These assets are not necessarily connected with the production or 
consumption process. In other words, as rights to claim returns, benefits, or yields in the 
future, they are not production factors or consumption goods. For example, a small 
shareholder of Apple Inc. has the right to claim the dividend from Apple Inc., but he/she 
cannot use or operate the machines and other facilities in an Apple factory.  
Houses are real assets when they are bought for consumption or production. Houses 
are virtual assets when they are bought as an investment in order to receive returns in the 
future. In a similar manner, asset markets can be divided into two market, real asset 
market and virtual asset market.   
 Real asset investors make profit by producing and selling products. Virtual asset 
investors make money from holding period returns (rents, dividends, interest) and capital 
gains (the difference between buying and reselling those assets). In other words, virtual 
assets are return-oriented capital, but real assets are profit-oriented capital.  
If there are no bubbles in the asset markets, namely, the asset prices can always 
reflect market fundamentals, the return from virtual assets will be very close to the profit 
from real assets. An investor has two ways to invest.  In other words, an investor makes 
almost the same profits no matter whether he buys the production factors and then creates 
a new company, or purchases the stock of this company after other people create it.   
16 
However, the asset prices do not always reflect market fundamentals. In this case, 
the return from virtual assets will be different from the profit from real assets. The prices 
of real assets are always connected to the profit from them in the future, but the prices of 
real assets can deviate very far from its income returns (dividend, rent, or interest). Profit 
is the only return for real assets, but income return and the appreciation or capital gain 
when the asset is sold are both returns for the virtual assets. When the holding-period 
return is very low, the price of virtual assets can be very high as long as the capital gain is 
very big. This is the unique feature belonging to virtual assets.  
As to houses, when the rent is very low, housing prices can be very high if investors 
expect the appreciation or capital gains from houses to be very big in the future. Why can 
capital make more profit from houses than from other assets although the housing rent is 
low? The answer is as follows: the houses can bring the investors very high capital gains 
but other assets cannot.  
Capital gain is the difference between the current purchase price and the future resale 
price. Large capital gains for houses mean that future resale prices are much higher than 
the current purchase prices. In other words, large expected capital gains mean that 
housing prices are expected to increase rapidly. What makes housing prices increase 
rapidly?  First, there is sufficient money available for investment. This is because, as said 
before, the savings rate is very high. Second, investors “love” houses so they invest a lot 
of money into the housing market. In other words, investors prefer houses to other virtual 
assets due to the high expected capital gains. That is, the high savings of the Chinese are 
invested into the housing markets and housing prices increase despite low rent.  
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Two new questions emerge. Why can’t the real assets bring investors high profits 
and then attract the savings? Why don’t the prices of other assets than houses increase 
rapidly and bring investors high capital gains, and then attract savings to pour in? In other 
words, first, why do investors prefer virtual assets to real assets? Second, why do 
investors prefer houses to other virtual assets?   
Currently, one possible answer for the first question is that the virtual assets are more 
profitable than real assets for some reason. One possible answer for the second question 
is that the houses have some unique features that make investors believe that houses will 
continue to appreciate.    
1.4 Research questions 
Now we put the questions discussed above together. 
Quesion1: Why are aggregate savings high? This key question will be the focus of 
subsequent discussions.  
High aggregate savings will not necessarily lead to asset bubbles if high aggregate 
savings can come into the real asset market as a productive investment. Thus, we must 
also ask: why are high aggregate savings invested in the virtual asset market rather 
than the real asset market? This key question will also be answered.  
Finally, various types of assets exist in a virtual asset market, such as bonds, stocks, 
mutual or hedge funds, houses, and so on. Why do high aggregate savings prefer 
houses to other virtual assets in a virtual asset market and potentially causing 
housing bubbles? This key question will be discussed.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Consumption and Savings  
2.1.1 Neoclassical Economics: Interest Rate Determines Savings and Consumption 
In the neoclassical economics framework (Marshall, 189034; Fisher, 193035), the 
interest rate can adjust capital supply (CS) and capital demand (CD), as well as savings 
and consumption.  
Figure 2.1 shows that CS exhibits an upward curve, whereas CD is a downward one. 
Because CS comes from savings, the capital suppliers or lenders, households must reduce 
their consumption to supply the capital given their income. The negative utility of the 
capital lenders increases when consumption is reduced. Lenders will ask for a high 
34 Marshal A (1890). Principles of Economics (Palgrave Classics in Economics). Palgrave Macmillan; 8th 
edition (January 7, 2014) 
35 Fisher R. (1930). The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and 
Opportunity to Invest It. Porcupine Press (June 1930).  
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Figure 2.1: Capital Demand and Capital Supply 
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interest rate to compensate for their utility loss, which causes the interest rates to 
increase. Hence, the CS curve shifts upward. Meanwhile, CD is determined by the 
marginal returns of capital. When capital increases, marginal returns of capital will 
decrease. Hence, the CD curve goes downwards.  
The intersection point of CD and CS (E) is the equilibrium point, where the marginal 
return to capital borrowers is equal to the marginal negative utility of capital lenders. In a 
similar manner, Q and i are called equilibrium capital quantity and equilibrium capital 
price (interest rate), respectively.   
What if a distraction from equilibrium occurs, such as when interest rate is currently 
at i1? In this case, the current interest rate is higher than the equilibrium interest rate. 
Thus, capital supply will increase while capital demand will decrease. Capital is 
oversupplied, then the interest rate will drop. Eventually, the interest rate will return to 
the equilibrium interest rate i0.   
If some event, such as strong economic growth, causes investments to be profitable, 
CS 
CD 
 i 
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Q0 
i0 
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EN 
i1 
Figure 2.2: Interest rates and transaction adjustment caused by higher capital demand     
i2 
CDN 
E 
ET 
20 
the investment demand for capital will increase and CD will moves to CDN. Capital 
supply cannot increase immediately, then the interest rates will increase from the 
previous i0 to i1, and the equilibrium will rise from E to ET. When the interest rates 
increase, households will reduce their consumption to increase savings, which increases 
capital supply. Along with increasing capital supply, the interest rates will decrease 
gradually and finally arrive in i2, and the equilibrium will drop from ET to Es. In this new 
equilibrium, the interest rate and capital quantity are higher than before, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. This new equilibrium also means that households save more and consume less 
than before because the capital supply is more than before.  
To sum up, neo-classical economics holds that interest rate determines household 
saving rate and consumption rate. When interest rate goes up, households will save more 
and consume less, which means a high saving rate and a low consumption rate.  
2.1.2 Keynesian Economics: A Psychological Law (Marginal Propensity to 
Consume) Determines Consumption and Savings  
 However, Keynes (1936)36 goes in a different direction by considering an important 
concept, Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC). MPC refers to how much a household 
will consume with $1 added to its income (marginal income). For example, if one 
household’s income increases by $100 and this household’s consumption rises by $70, 
then the MPC of this family is 0.7.  
By this concept, if MPC=0.9, 90% of any increase in the current income will 
translate to an immediate increase in consumption. But why does this happen? Namely, 
36 Keynes J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, And Money. Create Space 
Independent Publishing Platform (November 15, 2011) 
21 
 
why does a household always spend 90% of any increase in the current income on 
consumption?  Keynes attributes it to human being’s psychological structure, that is, a 
psychological law. Precisely, it is because of such a psychological law that the household 
always spends 90% of any increase in the current income on consumption.   
So Keynes argues that it is MPC, not the interest rate that determines the savings and 
consumption. The proportion of increased income spent on consumption, represented by 
c, is called the MPC. Therefore, (1-c) is called Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS). In 
Keynes’s theory, when a person makes decisions between consumption and savings, he 
does not consider the interest rate but merely follows the MPC, a psychological law.  
2.1.3 Life-cycle Hypothesis (LCH) and Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH): Life-
cycle Income or Permanent Income Determines Consumption and Savings  
Keynes’ argument about MPC is not convincing for many economists. Then they 
subsequently investigated the factors that determine consumption and savings. They 
generally draw upon a common theoretical framework by assuming that consumers base 
their expenditures on a rational and informed assessment of current and future economic 
circumstances. The rational optimization framework provides two main approaches. 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)37 posit the Life-cycle Hypothesis and propose that the 
spending decisions of households are driven by household members’ assessments of 
expenditure needs and income throughout the remainder of their lives. In this approach, 
household members consider predictable events, such as a precipitous drop in income 
                                                             
37 Modigliani F. and Brumberg R. (1954). Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function. An essay in 
Modigliani, Franco, Andrew B. Abel, and Simon Johnson (1980). The collected papers of Franco 
Modigliani. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.  
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upon retirement. The standard version of the life-cycle model assumes that consumers 
prefer to spend all their resources before they die (i.e., a bequest motive is not expected). 
Life-cycle hypothesis are most commonly employed by micro-economists to model 
household-level data on consumption, income, or wealth.  
Macroeconomists tend to use a simplified version of the optimization framework 
called the Permanent Income Hypothesis, whose origins can be traced back to Friedman 
(1957)38. The permanent income hypothesis omits the detailed treatment of demographics 
and retirement included in the life-cycle model. Instead, it focuses on the aspects that are 
essential in macroeconomic analysis, including predictions about the nature of the 
consumption function, which relates consumer spending to factors such as income, 
wealth, and interest rates, among others.  
Both models focus on individuals and their life span, specifically, the factors that 
determine their consumption and savings throughout their lives. Modigliani states that an 
increase in the total life income of an individual will raise consumption in each period, 
while Friedman states that the increase of permanent income elevates consumption.  
LCH and PIH are much more convincing that Keynesian MPC theory because they 
base their arguments on the individual’s rational, NOT psychological, consumption 
decision. Therefore, LCH and PIH are widely employed to model household 
consumption behavior.  However, neither LCH nor PIH has ever considered such 
question: at a point when people with different income levels have very stable 
expectations about their life-cycle income or permanent, will they have the same 
                                                             
38 Friedman M.(1957). Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton University Press (August 17, 2008).  
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propensity to consume?  In fact, LCH and PIH both assume the propensity to consume is 
homogeneous for households at different income level. But the economic data will show  
it is not the fact.  
2.2 Savings, Investments and Product  
2.2.1 Production Function in Neoclassical Economics: More Savings can Bring out 
More Products  
Will More Savings can Bring out More Products? Neoclassical economics maintain 
the truth in this statement. First, effect capital market will adjust the capital supply 
(household savings) to be equal to capital demand (Firm investment), then more savings 
can always lead to more investments. Second, more investments, including capital and 
labor, can always bring out more products because the partial derivative of products (P) 
with respect to capital(K) or labor (L) is positive.     
The production function39 in neoclassical economics is:  
),( LKfP = 0>
∂
∂
K
P 0>
∂
∂
L
P
                                                 
(2.5) 
where P is products, K is capital (includes land), L is labor, and f is the production 
function that can also be affected by the technological level.  
0>
∂
∂
K
P
 
and 0>
∂
∂
L
P  imply that products are positively correlated with capital and 
labor. Thus, more savings will result in more products through more investments.  
Increased savings will lead to high production by neoclassical production function. 
However, it is not always true because the production will not always continue to 
                                                             
39 Samuelson P. and W. Nordhaus (2009). Economics (19th Edition). McGraw-Hill/Irwin  
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increase when savings keep rising. Along with increasing savings, the marginal return 
decreases although the total returns increase. After some time, the decreasing marginal 
return will finally cause the total return to decrease. This phenomenon is called the “Law 
of Diminishing Marginal Returns.”40 
2.2.2 Solow Growth Model:  More Savings does not Necessarily Lead to More 
Products due to the Existence of Optimal Savings Rate   
Solow (1956, 1957) 41and Swan (1956)42 show the existence of an optimal savings 
rate. On one hand, when capital stock K increases, output f(k) rises at a diminishing rate. 
As a proportion(s) of output, savings sf(k) will also increase at a diminishing rate. On the 
other hand, when capital stock K increases, investment depreciation kδ , as a proportion of 
capital stock K(t), will also increase. The relationship between kδ  and sf(k) will bring 
about three outcomes.  
When )(ksfk >δ , capital stock will reduce because the newly added capital is less 
than the lost capital. 
When )(ksfk <δ , capital stock will increase because the newly added capital is 
more than the capital loss because of depreciation. 
When )(ksfk =δ ，the capital stock will be stable because the newly added capital 
                                                             
40 See Footnote 42.  
41 This model was introduces developed in the following several papers.  
Solow R.M.(1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 70, No. 1. pp. 65–94 Solow, Robert M. (1957). "Technical change and the aggregate 
production function". Review of Economics and Statistics. The MIT Press. 39 (3): 312–320. 
Swan, Trevor W. (November 1956). "Economic growth and capital accumulation". Economic Record. 
Wiley. 32 (2): 334–361.  
 Solow, Robert M. (1957). "Technical change and the aggregate production function". Review of 
Economics and Statistics. The MIT Press. 39 (3): 312–320. 
42 Swan, Trevor W. (November 1956). "Economic growth and capital accumulation". Economic Record. 
Wiley. 32 (2): 334–361 
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is equal to the capital loss due to depreciation   
The aggregate consumption should be maximized in order to realize the maximal 
welfare. That is,     
)}()({ ksfkfMax −                                                                        (2.6) 
Sustainable capital stock )(ksf  is always equal to )(kfδ  . Thus, the problem above 
becomes: 
})({ kkfMax δ−                                                                                                 (2.7) 
Its first-order condition is: 
δ=
dk
Ldf )(                                                                         (2.8) 
Let ∗k be solution of this equation, ∗k  be the optimal capital stock, )( ∗kf  be the 
optimal Output, )( ∗ksf be the optimal savings, and s is the optimal savings rate.   
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Figure 2.3: Solow-Swan Growth Model 
where 
)(tk  Capital stock,      
S,  savings rate,        
δ   Depreciation rate,      
)( ∗kf  Optimal output,     
f(k(t)) output, 
sf(k(t)) savings (investments), 
∗k  Optimal capital stock, and   
)( ∗ksf  Optimal savings (investments). 
Sources: Acemoglu, Daron (2009). "The Solow Growth Model". Introduction to 
Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 26–76.  
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The Solow–Swan growth model (Figure 2.3) shows that an optimal savings rate 
exists. If an economy’s savings rate is higher than this optimal level, the output will also 
be high. However, the output increases slower than the investments and the aggregate 
consumption of the economy will drop. This economy does not maximize aggregate 
consumption, which is supposed to be the welfare target of the economy.    
Furthermore, when the savings rate is too high, substantial social resources will be 
wasted because a high savings rate means high investments or excessive input of land, 
raw materials, machine and facilities, and labor. Due to the very low output or zero 
output, all those social resources are wasted.   
2.2.3 The Consequences of Overly-high Savings Rate  
The analysis can be extended further. Aside from all the consequences above, an 
overly-high savings rate gives rise to other consequences for the entire economy both at 
the micro- and macro-levels. When the savings rate is high, the consumption rate is low 
and the money available for consumption funds will be less. Therefore, the demand for 
commodities will weaken and a high savings rate will lead to high profits in the asset 
markets because the demand for the assets is strong. Meanwhile, a high savings rate will 
result in low profits in the consumption market because the demand for consumption 
becomes weaker and weaker. Consequently, the asset markets will be increasingly 
prosperous while the consumption markets will become more and more recessive. Since 
the demand for production factors (machine, facilities, raw materials, factories) are driven 
by the demand for consumption goods, the production factor markets will also be 
recessive.  In other words, the virtual economy (the virtual asset market) will be 
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prosperous, but the real economy (the consumption market plus the asset market) will be 
recessive.  
Prosperous asset markets and recessive consumption markets will bring out further 
consequences. First, through time, firms in the consumption market will not be interested 
in the products they specialize in as they transfer their money to the housing market. The 
asset market will become more prosperous while consumption markets become more 
recessive. Second, the core competency of a country lies in its manufacturing, high-
technology, and other modern service industries, all of which can be considered 
fundamental industries. If the fundamental industries grow weaker in time, the core 
competency of the country will considerably falter.  
As stated before, an economy is divided into the asset market and the consumption 
market. The former includes monetary, exchange, financial derivative markets, and 
mutual and hedge funds, among others. The latter includes all the markets of various 
types of products and the services that different industries, such as manufacturing, high-
technology, entertainment, and medical industries, provide for people’s consumption or 
other firms’ production.  
Theoretically, asset markets are supposed to be channels through which firms 
(including project initiators) can borrow money to finance their projects.  For example, 
firms can borrow money from the stock market. When a considerable amount of money 
pours into an overly-heated asset market, will the money finally go to firms that produce 
products or provide services for society in the consumption market? If so, an overly-
heated asset market is not entirely a negative phenomenon because substantial capital can 
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be brought into the consumption market.  
However, this situation does not occur in actual settings. A high savings rate means a 
low consumption rate, so the high demand for assets is always accompanied by the low 
demand for consumption goods. High demand for assets will lead to high profit in the 
asset market, while low demand for consumption goods will result in low profit in 
consumption market and the production factor market. So the money placed into the 
consumption market or production can only earn low profits and even suffer losses. 
Consequently, investors become unwilling to invest their money into the real assets in the 
consumption markets and production factor market.     
 Furthermore, they are reluctant to buy any virtual assets whose returns closely 
depend on the operating performance of the companies in the consumption markets or the 
production markets. For example, they would shy away from buying the stock of a 
manufacturing company. First, the dividend from this company will not be considerable 
due to the poor performance of this company. Second, the stock price of this company 
cannot increase in the long run for the same reason, which means the capital gains from 
an investment in this company would not be considerable, either. So, the overall return 
from the stock of this company will low. The virtual assets, whose returns depend on the 
operational performance in the consumption market or the production factor market, can 
be called “normal assets” because those assets are consistent with popular economic 
theories.    
What types of assets do investors prefer over “normal assets”? The answer is they 
prefer “abnormal” assets, or those whose returns primarily come from appreciation (buy–
30 
 
sell–price difference or capital gains) and not from regular dividends. “Abnormal” assets 
have limited correlations to a firm’s performance in the consumption market. In this 
research, we will call this type of asset a “virtual” or speculative asset. When a 
prosperous asset market coexists with a recessive consumption market we propose 
investors will choose speculative assets, which means that investment funds (or savings) 
will not go into real economies or the industries in consumption markets but will be 
invested into other assets that are speculative.    
2.3 Income Inequality and Aggregate Savings  
The basic argument in this study is that income inequality will affect asset prices 
through aggregate saving rate, so the studies about the relationship between income 
inequality and aggregate savings be reviewed.   
2.3.1 Income Level and Household’s Savings Rate   
Venieris and Gupta (1986)43 find that poorer households have the lowest savings 
propensities from aggregate data for 49 countries. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004)44 
employ new empirical methods applied to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US. They 
find a strong positive relationship between savings rates and lifetime income and a 
weaker but still positive relationship between the marginal propensity to save and lifetime 
income.  Those studies show that the families with high lifetime income will save more 
than the families with low lifetime income.  
                                                             
43 Venieris and Gupta (1986). Income distribution and sociopolitical instability as determinants of savings: 
a cross-sectional model. Journal of Political Economy 94, 873–883 
44 Dynan, Skinner,  Zeldes (2004). Do the Rich Save More? Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, 
no.2  
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Gan（2013）45 conducts a survey in 2011 with a sample of 8,438 households and 
29.450 individuals. This study reports that Savings rates across income levels differ. The 
Top5 percent income households (the highest income level group) have an average 
savings rate of 73.5 percent in 2010, which is the highest saving rate among all the 
income-level groups. In fact, about 45 percent of households saved nothing in 2010. This 
study based on China’s data draw similar conclusion that high income level household 
saves more than low income level households.  
The findings in the above studies are significant. They show that the relationship 
between savings and income of the households at different income levels at the same 
point in time, and they show that households at different income levels have different 
propensities to consume. Results from these studies are in contrast to the assumptions in 
the Keynesian’s MPC theory, LCH and PIH, where households are assumed to have the 
same propensity to consume at different income levels. However, the researchers do not 
provide a convincing explanation for this phenomenon.  
2.3.2 The Relationship between the Income Level and the Aggregate Savings Rate 
1. Significantly Positive Relationship   
Brady and Friedman (1947)46 argue that the percentage of income saved at each 
income level turns out to be closely related to the income distribution throughout the data 
from all the recent sample surveys. They conclude that “In general, the smaller the 
percentage of families in the higher income brackets, the greater the percentage of 
                                                             
45 Li Gan. Income Inequality and Consumptions in China.  
https://international.uiowa.edu/sites/international.uiowa.edu/files/file_uploads/incomeinequalityinchina.pdf 
46 Brady and Friedman, 1947. "Part IV: Savings and the Income Distribution," NBER Chapters, in: Studies 
in Income and Wealth, pages 247-265 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
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income saved.”(p248)  The smaller percentage of families in the higher income brackets 
indicated more severe income inequality, so this study shows that the more equal the 
income distribution, the greater the aggregate savings rate.  
Based on data on 65 industrial and developing countries for the year 1975, Sohota 
(1993) 47   finds a positive relation between the aggregate savings rate and the Gini 
coefficient.48 Cook (1995)49 uses several inequality measures and tests the relationships 
of these measures to the savings rate (GDS/GDP) in the 1970’s in 49 less developed 
countries. He reports that inequality has a positive and significant impact on the savings 
rate.    
Bunting(1991)50 uses 1984 Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) data with 9,401 
households to estimates marginal propensities and shows that the propensity to save 
increases when the quintile income share of highest income groups increases. He 
concludes, “Aggregate savings statistics do not accurately measure household savings 
behavior. They implicitly reflect the distribution of income and largely describe the 
economic behavior of the highest income groups”.(p157) The increasing quintile share of 
income indicates more higher saving rate. 
Smith (2001)51 conducts a cross-sectional and panel regression and shows that 
                                                             
47 Sahota, G., 1993. Savings and distribution. In: Gapinski, J.H. Ed.., The Economics of Savings. 
KluwerAcademic Publishers, Boston. 
48 Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical income or wealth dispersion.  A Gini coefficient of zero 
expresses perfect equality. Gini coefficient of one expresses maximal. See:    
Gini, Corrado (1921). "Measurement of Inequality of Incomes". The Economic Journal. Blackwell 
Publishing. 31 (121): 124–126.  
49 Cook, C., 1995. Savings rates and income distribution: further evidence from LDCs. Applied Economics. 
27, 71–82. 
50 David Bunting(1991). Savings and the Distribution of Income. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 
Vol. 14, No. 1, 3-37 
51Smith (2001). International Evidence on How Income Inequality and Credit Market Imperfections Affect 
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income inequality has a robust, positive effect on private savings rates that depends on 
financial market development and the quality of credit available to the private sector. In 
other words, credit market imperfections are the likely reason for the income inequality 
and the private savings positive correlation.   
Li and Zou (2004) 52  employ a panel data of 49 industrial and developing 
countries to examine the relationship between savings and income inequality. Their 
empirical examination renders weak support for a very weak negative association 
between them. But, subsamples of OECD countries and Asian countries show that 
income inequality and the savings rate can be very  positively and significantly 
associated.  
Scheuermeyer and Bofinger (2014) 53 provide a new understanding about the 
relationship between savings rates and income inequality. Using panel data from 21 
developed economies from 1970-2007, the authors show that while the marginal impact 
of income inequality is positive at low levels of inequality, the relationship becomes 
negative after some point of time. This study argues that the positive relationship between 
income inequality and aggregate savings might only exist in some specific time interval.  
2. Insignificant Relationship  
There are also studies showing that the relationship between income inequality 
and aggregate savings is uncertain. Schmit-Hebbel and Serven (2000) 54  provide no 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Private Savings Rates. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 64 2001. 103–127 
52 Hongyi Li and Heng-fu Zou(2004). Savings and Income Distribution. Annals of Economics and Finance 
5,  245–270  (2004) 
53 Scheuermeyer, Philipp; Bofinger, Peter (2016) : Income Distribution and Household Savings: A Non-
Monotonic Relationship. Applied Microeconomics II, No. F01-V2 
54 Klaus Schmit-Hebbel, Luis Serven(2000). Does income inequality raise aggregate savings? Journal 
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support for the notion that income inequality has any systematic effect on aggregate 
savings. Della Valle and Oguchi (1976)55 and Musgrove (1980)56 find that the effect of 
income distribution on savings is not statistically significant using a cross country 
dataset. Edwards (1996)57 reaches similar conclusions from a panel data of developing 
countries and OECD countries for the years 1970-1992. Using the data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Kruger and Perri (2006)58 contend that the increase in 
income inequality in the United States has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise 
in consumption inequality. In their opinion, this means the relationship between income 
inequality and aggregate consumption is insignificant. But their explanation for a 
negative relationship is not clear.  Why is the relationship insignificant? Preliminary test 
shows there might be problems with the selection of control variables.  
Although some studies show that the relationship between income inequality and 
saving rate is insignificant, most studies above shows that the positive impacts of income 
inequality on the aggregate savings rate exist.  However, those studies do not give a 
reasonable explanation for this positive relation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of Development Economics. Vol. 61.  417–446. They have drawn those conclusion in 1996, see Klaus 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Luis Serven(1996). Income Inequality and Aggregate Savings. The Cross-
Country Evidence. Policy Research Working Paper. The World Bank. Policy Research Department 
Macroeconomics and Growth Division, January 1996. 
55 Della Valle, P., Oguchi, N., 1976. Distribution, the aggregate consumption function, and the level of 
economic development: some cross-country results. Journal of Political Economy 84, 1325–1334 
56 Musgrove, P., 1980. Income distribution and the aggregate consumption function. Journal of Political 
Economy 88, 504–525. 
57 Edwards, S., 1996. Why are Latin America’s savings rates so low? An International Comparative 
Analysis Journal of Development Economics 51 (1), 5–44. 
58 Dirk Kruger and Fabrizio Perri(2005). Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? 
Evidence and Theory. The Review of Economic Studies, 2006. Vol. 73 ,Issue 1, 163-193  
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2.4 Income Inequality, Asset Prices and Economic Growth  
After the studies on the relationship between income inequality and saving rate 
are reviewed, the next is to review the studies and income inequality and asset prices. As 
an extension of this sector, the studies between income inequality and economic growth 
are reviewed.      
2.4.1 Income Inequality and Asset Prices  
1. Positive Relationship  
Zhang (2013)59 builds a model based on the hypothesis that a market with high 
income inequality will imply that only the top small percentage of the population (the 
1%) can buy stocks.  This underpins the ability of investors to hedge risks.  The trading 
illiquidity of the securities then increases the risk of making a stock investment and will 
also increase the return. Zhang measures the stock market aggregate performance using 
the market average Price/Dividend (P/D) ratio and predicts that the rate of return on 
stocks in a highly unequal society would be higher due to a lower rate of market 
participation.  This research was based on panel data from 154 countries from 1950 to 
2008. Zhang found that a rise in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 is associated with up to a 2% 
lower stock price/dividend ratio. This finding suggests that an increase in income 
inequality increases the rate of return in the stock market due to a lower overall price 
level. The author also shows that the risk-free rate of a country is positively related to the 
income inequality variable. Each additional unit of income inequality is accompanied by 
a 0.18% increase in the risk-free rate.  
                                                             
59 Zhang, Yilin, Income Inequality and Asset Prices: A Cross-Country Study (August 1, 2013). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021287 
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Nguyen (2013)60 measures income inequality by the share of national income 
going to the wealthiest 10% of the nation in the U.S..  He tests the relationship between 
income inequality and stock market returns in the U.S. from 1927 to 2012. By utilizing 
the Fama-French three factor model,61 he obtains the inequality beta coefficient and the 
inequality risk premium.  He finds that the income inequality factor is correlated with the 
rate of market participation which in turn increases returns on the stock market.  
 2. Uncertain Relationship  
Johnson (2012)62 argues that the relationship between income inequality and asset 
prices can be either positive, negative or zero. According to his model, the asset (A1) that 
the rich prefer is different from asset (A2) that the poor prefer. The increase in the price 
of A1 will bring about higher income inequality and an increase in the price of A2 will 
lead to a lower income inequality.   
3. Negative Relationship  
Määttänena and Terviöc (2014) 63 build an assignment model to investigate the 
relationship between the distributions of income and house. In this model, households are 
heterogeneous by incomes and houses by quality. Each household is potentially both a 
                                                             
60 Nguyen (2013). Income Inequality and Stock Pricing in The U.S. Market. LAP LAMBERT Academic 
Publishing (August 2, 2013)  
61 The Fama and French Three Factor Model is an asset pricing model that expands on the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) by adding size and value factors to the market risk factor in CAPM. This model 
considers the fact that value and small-cap stocks outperform markets on a regular basis. By including these 
two additional factors, the model adjusts for the outperformance tendency, which is thought to make it a 
better tool for evaluating manager performance. It was developed in the following two papers:  
Fama, E. F.; French, K. R. (1993). "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds". Journal of 
Financial Economics. 33: 3.  
Jump up ^ Fama, E. F.; French, K. R. (1992). "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns". The Journal 
of Finance. 47 (2): 427.  
62 Johnson (2012) “Inequality Risk Premia.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 59(6), 565-580  
63Niku Määttänena and Marko Terviöc(2014). Income distribution and housing prices: An assignment 
model approach. Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 151, May 2014, Pages 381–410 
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buyer and a seller because everyone owns one house and wishes to live in one house. 
This model tries to show how the impact of more severe income inequality on housing 
prices depends on the shapes of the distributions. The empirical study shows that income 
inequality between 1998 and 2007 is negatively correlated with average house prices in 
six US metropolitan areas.  
Although some studies draw a different conclusion, like Johnson (2012) and 
Määttänena and Terviöc(2014), most studies show that the income inequality has positive 
influences on asset prices. But  Johnson(2012) shows that the relationship is not clear.   
2.4.2 Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
Treeck and Sturn (2012)64 try to find the relationship between income equality 
and the Great Recession. They discuss the macroeconomic effects of income distribution 
in China and Germany. In their opinion, both China and Germany experienced 
pronounced declines in the share of wages and household income in national income, 
strong increases in income inequality, rising savings rates, weak private consumption 
demand and strong improvements in the current account before the Great Recession. In 
other words, severe income inequality, high savings rates and weak consumption are all 
positively correlated. Furthermore, all the conditions are a signal for an economic 
recession. They finally conclude that reducing income inequality is of great importance to 
overcoming macroeconomic instabilities.    
Goda and Lysandrou (2014) 65  investigated the relationship between income 
                                                             
64 Till van Treeck; Simon Sturn(2012). Income Inequality as a Cause of the Great Recession? A Survey of 
Current Debates. Working paper. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 39 
65 Thomas and Lysandrou (2014). The contribution of wealth concentration to the subprime crisis: A 
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inequality and crisis by comparing Marxian, Post Keynesian and Mainstream Crisis 
Theories. Marxist theory focuses on overproduction. Capitalists try to make the most 
profit by producing more and paying the workers less. Accumulating output will finally 
become “product excess” due to the declining demand resulting from the wage reduction, 
thus the economic crisis will emerge.   
Conclusions in the two studies above are very insightful, thus are highly valued 
by this study. Both of them points out that severe income inequality will result in weak 
consumption while leading to high savings, as a result, severe income inequality, high 
savings rates and weak consumption are all positively correlated. However, those studies 
have not given an explanation why this phenomenon can happen.  
2.5 Real Estate Asset Market and Real Estate Consumption 
Market   
Is the housing market an asset or a consumption market? DiPasquale and Wheaton 
(1992)66 argue that the real estate market is a consumption market when properties are 
rented. It is an asset market when properties are bought or sold. These two markets are 
closely connected. Their interactions can be described in one model.  
1) The demand for space and the stock of real estate R determine the rent R. Hence, 
rent is determined in a real estate consumption market, )(SfR = (Quadrant I).  
2) Rent R and discount rate i in a real estate asset market determine the real estate price 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
quantitative estimation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 38(2):301-327 • March 2014 
66 Denise DiPasquale1 and William C. Wheaton (1992). The Markets for Real Estate Assets and Space: A 
Conceptual Framework. Real Estate Economics. Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 181–198, June 1992 
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P. Hence, price is determined in the real estate asset market, 
i
RP =  (Quadrant II). 
3) Given the construction supply functions, real estate price P determines new 
construction C, )(PgC =  (Quadrant III).  
4) New construction C and the depreciation rate determine the stock of real estate, 
which can be stable only if the newly developed real estate C is equal to the depreciation 
( Sδ , where δ  is the depreciation rate) of the real estate stock. As CS =δ , we then have 
δ
CS =  (Quadrant IV). 
The relationship above is shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
The four-quadrant model is an insightful model in real estate because it uncovers the 
basic operating mechanisms of real estate markets. This model combines the real estate 
Rent: R 
New Construction: C 
I II 
III IV 
Asset Market  
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Figure 2.4: DiPasquale-Wheaton Four-Quadrant Model of Real Estate Market  
δ: Depreciation Rate 
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consumption market with the real estate asset market in the history of real estate studies.  
This model also has some limitations because of its strict assumptions. For example, 
the rent and discount rate determine the prices in commercial property. However, this 
condition does not apply for houses.  Rent reflects all the utility users receive from 
commercial properties, but it does not fully reflect all the utility that users receive from 
housing properties. In addition to the rent and discount rate, other factors, such as 
expected capital gains, also influence housing prices.   
Nonetheless, the four-quadrant model clearly shows that real estate has the features 
of consumption goods as well as assets (investments).   
2.6 Explanations for Asset Bubbles and Housing Bubbles 
By Thornton (2006)67, there exist three basic views of bubbles that are held by 
economists. The first view, held by the Chicago school and the proponents of Supply-side 
economics, is to deny the existence of bubbles. Keynesians and the proponents of 
Behavioral Finance advocate the second view that psychological factors lead to bubbles. 
The third view is espoused by the Austrian school, which sees bubbles as consisting of 
real and psychological changes caused by manipulations of monetary policy. The second 
theory and the third theory are essentially the same, so they could be put into one type. In 
addition, there also exists a fourth view, which is the rational bubble (Blanchard and 
Watson,1982)68  
                                                             
67 Thornton (2006), “The Economics of Housing Bubbles 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250052991_The_Economics_of_Housing_Bubbles  
68 Blanchard and Watson (1982), Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets, in Paul Wachter 
(ed.) Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, pp. 295ñ315 
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2.6.1 No Asset Bubbles  
Chicago school economists contend that the assertion of the existence of a bubble 
is a violation to the rationality of “economic man”. Even if it exists for some irrational 
factors, it will be ruled out very quickly because rational market agents could profit by 
arbitrage activities (Hülsmann, 1998).69 
As the former Chairman of Federal Reserve, Greenspan (2002) 70 argues that 
housing bubbles rarely happen due to the unique features of real estate. “The analogy 
often made to the building and bursting of a stock price bubble is imperfect. First, unlike 
in the stock market, sales in the housing market incur substantial transactions costs and, 
when most homes are sold, the seller must physically move out. ……Thus, while stock 
market turnover is more than 100 percent annually, the turnover of home ownership is 
less than 10 percent annually--scarcely tinder for speculative conflagration. Second, 
arbitrage opportunities are much more limited in housing markets than in securities 
markets. ……the housing market is better understood as a collection of small, local 
housing markets.  These factors certainly do not mean that bubbles cannot develop in 
housing markets and that home prices cannot decline……. But because the turnover of 
homes is so much smaller than that of stocks and because the underlying demand for 
living space tends to be revised very gradually, the speed and magnitude of price rises 
and declines often observed in markets for securities are more difficult to create in 
markets for homes.”   
                                                             
69 Hülsmann. 1998. Toward a General Theory of Error Cycles. Quarterly Review of Austrian Economics. 4 
(winter): 1-23. 
70 This was said by Greenspan, Alan at Joint Economic Committee Meeting (April 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/business/22leonsidebar-web.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  
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As the housing price was reaching its peak, Greenspan (2005)71 admits there are 
some“bubbles”, but only in some local housing markets. Basically, in 2005, he still 
argues that housing market conditions are good. Shortly after he left office in 2005, he 
maintained that housing prices would not go down even though the housing boom was 
over. As another former Chairmen of Federal Reserve, Bernanke (2006a)72 admits that it 
is possible for housing prices to go down, but just slightly”. Bernanke (2006b)73 also 
believes that the mortgage market is more stable and the appraisal practice is better than 
before.    
2.6.2 Irrational Asset Bubbles  
Keynesian economists, like Paul Krugman, and the economists of behavioral 
finance, such as Robert Shiller, hold that the real estate cycles are the ebb and flow of 
aggregate emotions and consciousness. They recognize the role of fundamental factors, 
but they prefer the psychological factors in that they are the main reason for deviations in 
the real estate cycles.  
Shiller (2004)74 lists three main psychological factors that boosted the most recent 
housing bubble of the 2000’s in the US. First, the anxiety and insecurity emanating from 
the burst of the technology bubble and the terrorist attack of 9/11 pushed money into 
                                                             
71 Greenspan, Alan. 2005b. Mortgage Banking. Speech to the American Bankers Association Annual 
Convention, Palm Desert, California (via satellite), September 26. Available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2005/200509262/default.ht 
72 Bernanke, Ben S. 2006a. Reflections on the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy. Remarks before the 
Economic Club of New York, March 20. Available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2006/20060320/default.htm. 
73 Bernanke, Ben S. 2006b. Speech to the Independent Community Bankers of America National 
Convention and Techworld, Las Vegas, Nevada, March 8. Available at:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2006/20060308/default.htm 
74 Shiller (2004), "Macro Markets: Managing Risks to National Economies," in Public Finance in a 
Globalizing World: Innovations in Theory and Practice, New York: United Nations Development Program. 
132-147 
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tangible and thus safe assets, houses. Second, the growth in global communications has 
upgraded the attraction of living in the world’s leading cities such as New York, San 
Francisco. Third, there is “the speculative contagion that underlies any bubble”.  (p134) 
Krugman (2005a)75 points out, “in parts of the country there's a speculative fever 
among people who shouldn't be speculators that seems all too familiar from past bubbles 
- the shoeshine boys with stock tips in the 1920's, the beer-and-pizza joints showing 
CNBC, not ESPN, on their TV sets in the 1990's”. In another articles, Krugman (2005b)76 
distinguishes Zoned Zone with Flatland. The former refers to the coast areas while the 
latter refers to the middle of the country. Housing bubbles often emerge in the Zoned 
Zone rather than the Flatland. “In the Zoned Zone, which lies along the coasts, a 
combination of high population density and land-use restrictions – hence ‘zoned’ – makes 
it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses, 
say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing 
houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become 
willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher, and so on. In other words, the 
Zoned Zone is prone to housing bubbles. And Zoned Zone housing prices, which have 
risen much faster than the national average, clearly point to a bubble” (in 2005). 
However, “In Flatland, which occupies the middle of the country, it’s easy to build 
houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don’t 
                                                             
75 Krugman (2005a). Running Out of Bubbles. New York Times. May 27. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/27/opinion/27krugman.html?ex=1274846400&en=ee73a0d5d3c35710&e
i=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
76 Krugman (2005b). “That Hissing Sound”. New York Times, August 8. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/opinion/08krugman.html?ex=1281153600&en=7125767d2baf3fae&ei
=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. He repeated this point in 2007. “The two Americas”, available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/the-two-americas/?_r=0  
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really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are 
basically determined by the cost of construction. In Flatland, a housing bubble can’t even 
get started.” (p58)  
 Browne and Case (1992) 77  argue that construction of office buildings, is 
inherently cyclical after they examine how the glut of commercial real estate space 
developed. They further report that the cycle of the 1980s was magnified by tax and 
institutional changes and by a faith that real estate was a high-return, low-risk investment. 
The banks were severely damaged as a consequence. 
As Case and Shiller (2003)78 point out, the term "bubble" is widely used but 
rarely clearly defined. They believe that the term, in its widespread use, refers to “a 
situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases causes prices to 
be temporarily elevated. During a housing price bubble, homebuyers think that a home 
that they would normally consider too expensive for them is now an acceptable purchase 
because they will be compensated by significant further price increases.  They will not 
need to save as much as they otherwise might, because they expect the increased value of 
their home to do the savings for them. First-time homebuyers may also worry during a 
housing bubble that if they do not buy now, they will not be able to afford a home later. 
Then, they argue that “the basic questions that still must be answered are whether 
expectations of large future price increases are sustaining the market, whether these 
expectations are salient enough to generate anxieties among potential homebuyers, and 
                                                             
77 Browne, Lynn E. and Karl E. Case (1992). How the Commercial Real Estate Boom Undid the Banks. 
Federal Bank of Boston Conference Series, Volume 36, Page 57-113.  
78 Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller (2003). Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market? Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity.2003, No. 2.   
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whether there is sufficient confidence in such expectations to motivate action”. (p194)  
White (2009)79 analyzes the reason for 1920-1926 housing bubble. He contends 
that fundamental factors such as a post-war construction catch-up, low interest rates and a 
“Greenspan put”80 ignite the boom in the twenties.  
However, mortgage securitization, a reduction in lending standards (subprime 
loans) and weaker supervision are factors that produced the housing bubble in first 
decade of 21st century.  
Levitin and Wachter (2013)81 explore the factors boosting the commercial bubble 
between 2004 and 2008. They argue that it is the shift in the commercial mortgage 
securitization market that caused the commercial bubble. The securitization has been a 
main channel through which the commercial market was financed since 1998. 
Commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) are quickly replaced by collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs). Savvy, sophisticated, experienced commercial mortgage 
securitization investors were outbid by investors who merely wanted “product” to 
securitize. The result was a decline in underwriting standards in commercial mortgage 
backed securities (CMBS).   
Holt (2009) 82  maintains there were four primary factors that resulted in the 
housing bubble in the first decade of 21st century: low mortgage interest rates, low short-
                                                             
79 Eugene N. White(2009). Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s. 
Available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.nber.org/ContentPages/19997974.pdf 
80 The "Greenspan put" refers to the monetary policy approach that Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman 
of the United States Federal Reserve Board, and other Fed members exercised from late 1987 to 2000. 
81 Adam J. Levitin and Susan M. Wachter(2013). The Commercial Real Estate Bubble. Harvard Business 
Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 83-118  
82 Holt (2009). A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit Crisis: A 
Non-Technical Paper. Journal of Business Inquiry: Research, Education & Application, 8(1), P120  
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term interest rates, relaxed standards for mortgage loans, and irrational exuberance. 
Shiratsuka (2003)83 argues that Japan’s experience of asset price bubble is characterized 
by euphoria, that is, excessively optimistic expectations. Thornton (2006)84 contends that 
the 2000-2008 housing bubble is a case of government failure. The effort that the 
government attempts to improve home ownership through the policy of “easy finance” 
eventually leaves many Americans in an economic pitfall.   
2.6.3 Rational Asset Bubbles  
Steimetz (2008)85 points out: “To see how prices might persistently deviate from 
traditional market fundamentals, imagine that you are considering an investment in the 
publicly held firm Bootstrap Microdevices (BM), which is trading at fifty dollars per 
share. You know that BM will not declare any dividends and have ample reason to 
believe that one year from now BM will be trading at only ten dollars per share. Yet you 
also firmly believe that you can sell your BM shares in six months for one hundred 
dollars each. It would be entirely rational for you to purchase BM shares now and plan to 
sell them in six months.  If you did so, you and those who shared your beliefs would be 
“riding a bubble” and would bid up the price of BM shares in the process”.  
                                                             
83 Shiratsuka (2003). Asset Price Bubble in Japan in the 1980s: Lesson for Financial and Macroeconomic 
stability. A chapter in Real Estate Indicators and Financial Stability, 2005, vol. 21, pp 42-62 
83 Thornton, Mark(2006), “The Economics of Housing Bubbles”    
84 Thornton, Mark(2006), “The Economics of Housing Bubbles”  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250052991_The_Economics_of_Housing_Bubbles  
85 Steimetz, Seiji S. C. (2008). "Bubbles". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty. He also points out: “Economists 
often refer to these types of bubble conditions as “bootstrap equilibria.” High prices are thought to be held 
high by self-fulfilling prophecies, just as one might attempt to hold himself high off the ground by pulling up 
on his bootstraps.” 
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Steimetz (2008)86 further argues: “This example illustrates that if bubbles exist, 
they might be perpetuated in a manner that would be difficult to call irrational. The key to 
understanding this is in recalling that an asset’s fundamental value includes its expected 
price when sold. If investors rationally expect an asset’s selling price to increase, then 
including this in their assessment of the asset’s fundamental value would be justified. It is 
possible, then, that the price of such an asset could grow and persist even if the viability 
of its issuing company is unlikely to support these prices indefinitely. This situation can 
be called a ‘rational bubble’.” (p148)  
From the studies about bubbles, the following conclusions can be drawn:  
First, Chicago school economists do not deny the existence of asset bubbles. What 
they contend is that asset bubbles cannot exist in the long term due to human being’s 
ration. In a very short term, asset bubbles can exist.  
Second, Keynesian economists follows the “tradition” of John M. Keynes and 
emphasize the role psychological factors play in the investors’ decision-making process. 
So they contend that the asset bubble can often appear and last for a while because human 
beings are not always rational. However, they also agree that assets bubbles cannot exist 
in the long term because investors cannot be always irrational in the long term. In this 
sense, they are in accordance with Chicago school economists.  
Third, rational bubbles theory argues it is “ration” that drives asset prices to go up 
                                                             
86 Steimetz, Seiji S. C. (2008). "Bubbles". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty. He also points out: “Economists 
often refer to these types of bubble conditions as “bootstrap equilibria.” High prices are thought to be held 
high by self-fulfilling prophecies, just as one might attempt to hold himself high off the ground by pulling 
up on his bootstraps.” 
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and create asset bubbles. It is rational to buy assets when asset prices is expected to 
increase and it is also rational to ask for a much higher resale prices because only a much 
higher resale prices can compensate the very high risk that asset prices will go down. 
Since investors love to buy assets and ask for a much higher asset prices in order to 
compensate the risk, the asset prices will rise very quickly. However, if investors know 
that assets have been overprices but still want to “fish in troubled water”, they are not 
irrational. Therefore, rational bubbles theory is not convincing. What this theory does is 
actually to explain asset bubble by psychological factors, which is what Keynesian 
economists has done. 
To sum up, although Chicago school economists and Keynesian economists hold 
different viewpoints about assets bubbles, they both agree that asset bubbles can appear 
within some time interval for the sake of investors’ irrational factors, but they will 
disappear in the long term. Their difference or dispute only lies in how long the time 
interval is. Chicago school economists hold that the bubbles can only exist in very short 
time, that is, the time interval is very short. Keynesian economists insist that the bubbles 
can exist not only in the short time, but also in the middle time, that is, the time interval is 
pretty long.  
However, neither Chicago school economists nor Keynesian economists can 
explain the housing bubbles happening in China. Although China’s stock market has 
experienced three-time bubble rising and breaking in past 16 years, the housing prices 
have been continuously increasing in the same period of time. The housing bubbles 
happening in China is obviously long-term bubbles, but all current bubbles theories deny 
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long-term bubbles. Therefore, it is an important task for this study to give an satisfactory 
explanation for this long-term housing bubbles in China.    
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CHAPTER 3: KEY CONCEPTS, RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESIS AND FRAMEWORK 
 From Chapter 1, we can find that whether high savings can contribute to 
economic growth really depends on what the high savings is spent on. If high savings is 
spent on productions factors, it will boost economic growth of a country. By contrast, if 
high savings is invested in speculative assets (like non owner-occupied housing), it will 
not lead to economic growth but could also create an asset bubble. In order to analyze the 
relationship between production factors and speculative assets in one research 
framework, the concept “Real Assets” and “Virtual Assets” should be introduced.87 In 
order to explore the source of high savings, the concepts of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI), Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) and 
Gross Domestic Savings (GDS), Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) and Marginal 
Propensity to Save (MPS), Average Propensity to Consume (APC) and Average 
Propensity to Save (APS) will be used. Therefore, all these key concepts should be 
clarified. Next, three hypotheses are put forward based on the discussion in Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2. And, finally, the research framework of this study is built.       
                                                             
87 It is often risky for a study to introduce new concepts. After due consideration, I still decide to introduce 
two new concepts, “real assets” and “virtual assets”. It is very hard to discuss the relationship between 
production factors and speculative assets, but the relationship between real assets and virtual assets can be 
clarified very easily in the paradigm of neoclassical economics. By doing so, the relationship between 
production factors and speculative assets is uncovered, and the reasons and consequences of preference in 
speculative assets is expounded.     
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3.1 Key Concepts 
3.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI)  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents the total currency value of all goods and 
services produced during a specific time period in an economy. 88  It is also called 
“aggregated product of an economy.” A similar concept is gross national product (GNP), 
which represents the total value of all the final products and services produced in a given 
period through the production owned by a country's citizens.89 GNP is an economic 
statistic that is equal to GDP plus any income earned by citizens from overseas 
investments minus the income earned within the domestic economy by overseas 
citizens.90  Many countries do not declare their GNP because this statistic is difficult to 
collect and calculate.   
Gross Domestic Income (GDI) represents the total income received by all sectors of 
an economy. It includes the sum of all wages, profits, and taxes minus subsidies. It can 
also be called “aggregated income”(AP) of an economy. In theory, all income is derived 
from production including the production of services. Thus, the GDI of an economy 
should be exactly equal to its GDP. In reality, however, GDI is often lower than GDP 
because underground or grey income exists and not all income is reported. As a result, the 
difference between GDI and GDP is actually the measure of 
underground/invisible/unreported income.    
                                                             
88 Coyle, Diane (2014). GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History. Princeton University Press. Mankiw, N.G.; 
Taylor, M.P. (2011). Economics (2nd ed., revised ed.). Andover: Cengage Learning. 
89 Mankiw, N.G.; Taylor, M.P. (2011). Economics (2nd ed., revised ed.). Andover: Cengage Learning. 
90 Dawson, Graham (2006). Economics and Economic Chenge. FT / Prentice Hall. p. 205  
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3.1.2 Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) and Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) 
Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) represents the total consumption of all 
households of an economy. It can also be called “Aggregated Consumption” of an 
economy  
GDS represents the total savings of all households of an economy. It can also be 
called “aggregated savings” of an economy. GDC+GDS=GDI. Thus, GDS=GDI-GDC. 
We also have GDS=GDP-GDC when GDI=GDP. 
3.1.3 Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC), Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS), 
Average Propensity to Consume (APC), Average Propensity to Save (APS) 
Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) measures the proportion of extra income 
that is spent on consumption 91 . It is equal to ΔC/ΔY, where ΔC is the change in 
consumption (Marginal Consumption) and ΔY is the change in income (Marginal 
Income). Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS) measures the proportion of extra income 
that is held as savings. It is equal to ΔS/ΔY, where ΔS is the change in savings (Marginal 
Savings) and ΔY is the change in income (Marginal Income). Marginal Income=Marginal 
Consumption + Marginal Savings. Thus, MPC+MPS=1 or MPS=1-MPC.   
Average Propensity to Consume (APC) refers to the percentage of income spent on 
consumption (goods and services) rather than on savings. Average Propensity to Save 
(APS) refers to the proportion of income that is saved rather than spent on consumption. 
What is the relationship between MPC and APC? When there exists autonomous 
                                                             
91 Hall, Robert E.; Taylor, John B. (1986). "Consumption and Income". Macroeconomics: Theory,  
Performance, and Policy. New York: W. W. Norton. pp. 63–67. ISBN 0-393-95398-X. 
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expenditure92, APC will be bigger than MPC.  When there does not exist autonomous 
expenditure, APC will be equal than MPC.  This argument can be shown by a simple 
mathematical proof.   
Keynes’ consumption function93 can be expressed by,    
cYaC +=                                                             (3.1) 
where C denotes consumption, Y denotes income, a denotes and c denotes a coefficient.  
Then by definition, APC is can be calculated as:  
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Y
cYaAPC +=+=                                                  (3.2) 
In order to calculate MPC, assume that consumption increases from C0 to C1 when 
income increases from Y0 to Y1, Then,  
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Therefore, when there exists autonomous expenditure(a≠0 ),   
MPCcc
Y
a
Y
cYaAPC =>+=+=                                                  (3.4) 
Therefore, when there does not exists autonomous expenditure (a=0 ),   
MPCc
Y
cYaAPC ==+=                                                  (3.5) 
In this study, “a” is assumed to be 0, then MPC=APC. Given that they are equal, 
                                                             
92 Autonomous consumption (also exogenous consumption) is consumption expenditure that does not vary 
with changes in income. Generally, is the income for life necessities because it always exists even if the 
income level of one household is zero. Autonomous consumption contrasts with induced consumption 
which systematically fluctuate with income. See: Colander, David C. (2004). Macroeconomics (Fifth ed.). 
Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. pp. G–1 & G–4 (Glossary).  
93 Samuelson, P. and W. Nordhaus. Economics (19th Edition). McGraw-Hill/Irwin: The Columbia 
University Press, 2009. 
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“Propensity to Consume（PC）” can be used to represent both of them.      
3.1.4 Real Assets and Real Asset Market, Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Market  
1. Real Assets and Real Asset Markets 
An asset is any economic resource that can produce value in the future. It is a 
resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future 
economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity94. 
All asset returns (benefits, profits, gains) come from production or operation 
activities of economic entities. An asset that directly serves the production or operation 
process of an economic entity is called a real asset. Examples of real assets include 
tangible assets (land, raw and processed materials, machines and equipment, 
manufacturing plant, inventory, and human resources) and intangible assets (patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, and business methodologies). The money possessed by a 
production entity and the money borrowed from banks or raised from capital markets are 
also real assets, because all the money will serve the production or operation process. 
Assets used for long term household consumption, such as cars, houses, and other 
durable goods, are also real assets. Although buyers cannot earn profit from these assets, 
they can gain consumption utility from them and thus save on living expenses. For 
example, home owners can save on home rental expenses and car owners can save on 
transportation costs. In economics, expenses saved are equivalent to profits earned. In 
this sense, an asset used for household consumption can bring buyers the profits or 
returns in this future; thus, it can be also called a real asset. In most situations, real assets 
                                                             
94 O'Sullivan, Arthur; Sheffrin, Steven M. (2003). Economics: Principles in Action. Upper Saddle River, 
New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 272. ISBN 0-13-063085-3.  
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refer to production factors. In fact, a real asset is a right. It is the right to possess and use.  
Real asset markets are the markets where real assets are exchanged. Real assets 
include factors of production and durable goods for consumption. Thus real asset markets 
include factor markets and durable goods markets. Factor markets include raw material 
markets, machine and equipment markets, commercial real estate markets, and 
intellectual property rights. Durable goods markets include owner occupied housing 
markets and auto markets (Figure 3.1.) 
 
Source: Author 
2. Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Markets 
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A virtual asset refers to an asset that is essentially a right to claim the return of real 
assets in the future. Examples of virtual assets include stocks, funds, bonds, and the 
ownership of real estate and gold.  
The difference between real assets and virtual assets is whether they serve the 
production process directly. Real assets are factors of production, and their value will be 
transferred into the final products or services. Virtual assets do not serve the production 
process directly, and their values will not be transferred into the final products or 
services. Their values are equal to the discounted values of all the future returns of the 
associated real assets. 
Virtual asset markets are the markets where virtual assets are exchanged. Thus, the 
stock market, bond market, funds market, and gold market are all virtual asset markets.  
3. The relationship between real assets and virtual assets 
Real assets are closely related to virtual assets. First, all virtual assets depend on real 
assets. When a company issues stocks or bonds, it creates virtual assets based on its real 
assets. Second, in theory, the values of virtual assets are determined by the profit earned 
by real assets and the discount rate. Given the discount rate, the values of virtual assets 
will increase when real assets are expected to earn more profit. Third, in practice, the 
values of real assets are not determined by their production cost but by the values of 
virtual assets.  
A factory is usually managed and operated by its owner. This owner is a real asset 
investor as well as a virtual asset investor, because he can use and operate the machine or 
facilities in this firm, meanwhile he has the right to claim the profit earned from this 
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factory. Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and 
management. All shareholders are not willing or able to commit themselves to corporate 
management except perhaps for some of the large shareholders. Small shareholders have 
the right to claim the dividends from this corporation and eventually the capital gain or 
loss when the stock is sold.  Large shareholders have the rights to the dividends and 
because of their larger stake they may choose to take a management role.   Thus, small 
shareholders only have virtual assets, whereas large shareholders have both virtual and 
real assets. 
If an investor buys a piece of land, a factory building, or a machine but does not 
include this asset in the production process, he or she has three ways to deal with these 
assets. First, the investor leases these production factors to a company and the investor 
becomes the  lessor. Second, the investor can give them to a company and become a 
small shareholder.  Third, the investor merely holds these assets for a while and then 
resells them. In all these situations, land, factory buildings, and machines are not real 
assets but virtual assets for the investor, because the investor does not include these assets 
in the production process and make a profit from them but instead the investor takes them 
as pure rights to claim annual earnings or capital gains or both over time. These assets are 
seen as real assets only for large shareholders who use them as production factors. 
3.1.5 Real Sector (Economy) and Virtual Sector (Economy)   
1. Real Sector: The consumption market and the factor market (the real asset market)  
Firms in the consumption market provide people with the necessary goods and 
services. To produce the necessary goods and services, firms buy factors of production 
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from the factor market. Thus, both the consumption market and the factor market are 
indispensable in people’s daily lives and are real economic sectors.    
2. Virtual Sector: The virtual asset market  
The virtual asset market is the market where rights to claim returns are exchanged 
because virtual assets are the rights to claim the future returns. When the rights are 
exchanged, money is transferred from a buyer to a seller, but no new goods or services 
are created because the money does not directly go to the production process. The virtual 
asset market is also called the virtual sector of the economy.  The difference between the 
real sector, the virtual sector, the real asset and virtual asset markets are detailed in Figure  
3.1.6 Houses: Real Assets or Virtual Assets?  
We end this section with a discussion on the housing markets. Is a house a real 
asset or a virtual asset? 
When a house is bought to possess or use, namely, live in or occupy, it is a real 
asset. On the contrary, when it is bought in order to make profit by renting it out and 
potentially reselling it at higher prices in the future, it is a virtual asset.  
So a house is both a real asset and a virtual asset because the home owner not 
only has the right to possess and use it, but also has the right to claim the rent and capital 
gain from it. Therefore, a house is not a “pure” real asset although it is “very” tangible.  
In current China, such a phenomenon can be observed very easily: a person buys 
a house, but he neither uses it nor leases it to a tenant. Rather, he holds it and keeps it 
vacant for several month or years, then reselling it at a potentially higher price. When he 
buys this house, he knows he will never live in it. His purpose is to make money, which is 
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very “pure”.  For some people, this purpose is so “pure” that they never stay in the house, 
never see it and never know its exact location before and after buying it. They only know 
that they own a house somewhere in this city and can potentially make money from 
owning this house. In this situation, although a house is tangible, it has the same 
investment characteristics as a stock, a bond, or a fund share because it has become an 
investment, a mechanism to make money. Therefore, it has become a pure virtual asset, 
or a speculative asset.  To sum up, when a house is taken as a speculative asset, it loses its 
identity as “a real asset” and becomes a pure virtual asset.    
Similarly, gold is not necessarily a real asset. In most situations, gold is a virtual 
asset because it is bought not to possess and use, but to make money by reselling it in the 
future. Only when gold is bought to produce rings, earrings or other ornaments is it a real 
asset.   
3.2 Research Hypothesis 
The excessive liquidity of China’s housing market oddly coexists with a 
contradictory phenomenon, which is the insufficient demand for consumption goods. The 
former attracts significant attention, but the latter has been overlooked for a long time. 
Thus, one question that needs to be answered is as follows: Why do these two seemingly 
conflicting phenomena coexist? The following hypotheses are drawn. 
Hypothesis 1: At a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower proportion of 
its income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other words, the 
higher the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the lower the 
proportion of its consumption is accounted for in its income. 
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This hypothesis is about the interactive relationship between consumption and 
income, one that has never been investigated by classical consumption theories (theory of 
MPC, life cycle theory, and permanent theory). Although previous empirical studies 
identified this relationship, they did not provide satisfactory explanations for this 
relationship based on economic theories. The studies did not expound the implication of 
the relationship to total savings rates, asset prices, and economic growth.         
If this hypothesis can be verified, severe income inequality will lead to very high 
aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate. 
Hypothesis 2: Very high aggregate savings rates and very low aggregate 
consumption rates caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment 
demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the virtual 
sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.  
Hypothesis 3: In the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to 
other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the unique features of houses. Thus, 
housing prices will increase.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
 Base on the 3 hypotheses above, the theoretical Framework for this study can be 
built, which is presented in Figure 3.2.  
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Income Inequality 
Weak Consumption Demand 
Strong Investment Demand 
Capital Escapes from Consumption Markets and Flows 
into Housing Markets   
Further Declining Consumption Markets and Production Factor Mark 
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Upper-Class Families Benefit, 
Low & Middle-Class Families 
Suffer, the Income Inequality 
is Deepened  (Note 4)  
The Riskiness of the Financial Market 
and Whole Macro Economy Grows;  
The Core Competency of this Country 
Declines 
Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework of This Study 
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High Return in Virtual Asset Markets 
Declining Consumption Markets and Production Factor Mark 
Fluctuating Non-House Asset Prices, Periodically Booming Non-House Asset Markets 
Continuously Increasing Housing Prices, Continuously Booming Housing Markets     
  
(Note 1)      
(Note 5) 
Declining Consumption Markets and Production Factor Markets 
Increasing Asset Prices and Booming Virtual Asset Markets 
 
 
Low Consumption 
High Savings  
 
(Note 3)  
   (Note 2)  
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Next, Note 1-5 should be clarified one by one.  
Note 1. As previously mentioned, the causality chain between income inequality and 
consumption depends on Hypothesis 1, that is, the new relationship between income 
inequality and aggregate savings rate: more severe income inequality will lead to high 
aggregate savings rate.   
Note 2. The causality chain between high savings and increasing assets prices 
depends on Hypothesis 2, that is, overly-high aggregate savings rates and overly-low 
aggregate consumption rates caused by severe income inequality will induce high 
investment demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector.   
Note 3.  The causality chain between increasing asset prices and rapidly rising 
housing prices depends on Hypothesis 3, that is, in the context of a declining real sector, 
investors prefer houses to other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the features 
of houses.  
Note 4. A declining consumption market is indicative of low profits and low wages, 
which further contributes to the overall decline in the income of low- and middle-income 
families.  Most investors in the virtual asset markets are wealthy people belonging to 
upper-income families who have high accessibility to capital and loan markets. Thus, 
their income and wealth rapidly increase, at least until the virtual asset market fails. Low-
income and middle-income families do not have sufficient capital for investment, which 
makes borrowing money from capital or loan markets difficult for them. As a result, these 
families do not benefit from the asset market. Furthermore, when real estate prices 
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increase, they suffer significantly because real estate is a necessity for them to live.  That 
is their real housing costs go up if the housing market in general goes up.  
Note 5. The chain indicates that a self-intensifying mechanism exists: income 
distribution inequality will exacerbate the inequality in income distribution by causing 
the decline of consumption markets and the rise of the virtual asset markets, particularly 
housing. The by-product of this mechanism is that the risk for the financial markets and 
the entire economy will adversely affect the core competency of the country.   
3.4 Basic Logic 
3.4.1 The Assumption 
Three types of families exist in a country. 
1) High-income families, denoted by H, whose total wealth is WH, total consumption 
is CH and total savings is SH. The proportion of the total wealth spent on consumption 
and savings is denoted by Hc and Hs, respectively.  
2) Middle-income families, denoted by M, whose total wealth is WM, total 
consumption is CM and total savings is SM. The proportion of the total wealth spent on 
consumption and savings is denoted by Mc and Ms, respectively. 
3) Low-income families, denoted by L, whose total wealth is WL, total consumption 
is CL and total savings is SL. The proportion of the total wealth spent on consumption 
and savings is denoted by Lc and Ls, respectively.   
Naturally, 
WH>WM>WL                                                              (3.6) 
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3.4.2 Starting the Model with the First Hypothesis  
Recall the first hypothesis, at a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower 
proportion of its income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other 
words, the higher the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the 
lower the proportion of its consumption accounted for in its income. Thus,  
Hs>Ms>Ls                                                                (3.7) 
This relationship should be carefully explained theoretically and tested empirically 
because it is the foundation of this dissertation. 
Given (3.7) and a fixed Y or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, we can 
obtain  
)(Gfc =   where 0<
dG
dc
                                                   
(3.8) 
where G is the Gini coefficient, which is an index of income inequality; and c is the 
proportion of the aggregate income spent on consumption goods and services.  
Equation (3.8) shows that when G is large, c is small. In other words, a negative 
relationship exists between income inequality and the aggregate savings rate; when 
income is unequal, the aggregate consumption rate is low. 
The aggregate consumption is equal to Y times the aggregate consumption rate: 
YGfcYC )(==                                                           (3.9) 
The aggregate savings (S) is equal to the Y minus the aggregate consumption: 
YGfYGfYcYYS ))(1()( −=−=−=                                     (3.10) 
 When G increases, f(G) decreases and then S rises.  
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3.4.3 Extending the Model with the Second and Third Hypotheses  
Recall the second hypothesis: very high aggregate savings rate and very low 
aggregate consumption rate caused by severe income inequality will induce high 
investment demand in the virtual sector rather than the real sector. Hence, we obtain  
15.0))(1( <<−== ααα whereYGfSIV                                   (3.11) 
Where Iv is the investments into the virtual sector, and α  is the proportion of Iv of the 
aggregate investment, which is equal to aggregate savings.  
Recall the third hypothesis: under the context of a declining real sector, investors 
prefer houses to other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the features of houses, 
a preference that increases housing prices. Those features might include: 
        1. Stocks and mutual funds are pure assets that do not have consumptive features. 
By contrast, food and clothes are pure consumption goods that do not have asset features. 
However, houses can be considered both an asset and consumption good. The asset 
features of houses can bring buyers investment returns in the future that regular 
consumption goods cannot. The consumptive features of houses bring buyers more 
security than the pure assets can.  
       2. As an asset, a house is also a consumption product. An owner can rent his house to 
himself (owner-occupied) or rent the house to a tenant for an income stream. In the first 
case, the owner gets utility from housing. In the second way, he receives rent. 
Theoretically, the value of the utility should be equal to the rent. In practice, however, the 
owner considers the value of the utility to be much more than the rent. A detailed analysis 
will be done in the following chapters. Rent cannot fully reflect the returns of self-
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occupied houses and thus will not be an effective signal for the market fundamentals of 
houses. Consequently, even if the rent is very low, a home buyer can still think the market 
fundamentals of houses are not bad and expect that the house prices will go up.   
       3. The scarcity of land convinces investors that the supply of real estate is limited. In 
a developing country undergoing the process of urbanization, such belief is significant. 
As a result, the price of real estate is expected to increase quickly, bringing investors 
considerable profit even though returns from rent are low.  
Aside from real estate, some “concept” stocks, including financial derivatives, gold 
and antiques, can also be invested in as virtual assets. However, the two characteristics 
discussed above make houses preferred virtual assets among investors.   
In response to the increasing house prices, overdevelopment will emerge and a series 
of negative consequences will occur.  
Hence, we obtain  
15.0))(1( <<−=== ββαβαβ whereYGfSII Vh                            (3.12) 
Where hI  is the aggregate investment into the housing market, and α  is the proportion of 
vI in the aggregate investment into the virtual sector, which is the demand for houses.  
3.4.4 Finalizing the Model  
According to neoclassical economics, real estate, as a real asset, is priced (P) by its 
expected returns (R) and discount rate or expected return (i). Keeping R and i constant 
and using a simple perpetuity valuation model:  
i
RP =                                                                    (3.13) 
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In the virtual housing market, the investment return will depend on the perceived 
benefits gained from buying the house at a low price and hopefully selling it at a high 
price. The return heavily depends on the capital gains benefits and the return from the 
rent is negligible for these investors.  
Price changes in the past have become an overwhelming important factor in the 
decision-making process of investors and cannot be ignored. Based on the price changes 
in the past, additional money is invested into the housing market and the higher the 
housing prices. That is, the money significant investment into housing market is an 
amplifier that strengthens the relationship between price changes in the past and the 
expected price changes in the future. 
Thus, we obtain the following equation:  
dt
dPIgP rhr )(=                                                            (3.14) 
      where )( hIg is a monotone increasing function of hI (social savings). 
In a linear manner, we can set hh IIg g=)( , where 0>g . Thus, 
dt
dPIP rhr g=                                                       (3.15) 
The solution for this equation is  
)exp(
h
I
t
r I
teP h
g
g ==                                                     (3.16) 
Substituting (3.12) into (3.16) gives:   
)
)))(1(
exp()exp(
YGf
t
I
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h
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t
r
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−
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gβδg
g                             (3.17) 
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A positive relationship exists between real estate development and real estate prices. 
In a linear manner, we obtain,  
)
)))(1(
exp()exp(
YGf
t
I
tePD
h
I
t
r
h
−
====
gβδ
κ
g
κκκ β                       (3.18) 
Where D is the new construction quantity, and g  is the positive coefficient.  
Driven by the increase in housing prices, real estate developers construct an 
increasing number of houses. Therefore, as long as the money to support construction is 
sufficient, investors in housing markets can profit. Investors will also turn to housing 
markets, which will result in the development of numerous houses.  
This process, however, is not sustainable. The capital invested into the housing 
market is limited by the national wealth, which increases only when the economy of the 
country rises. Given that economic growth is always limited, the growth rate of the entire 
national wealth is likewise limited. The limited growth rate cannot sustain the continuous 
increase of housing prices.  
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CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION: A NEW 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
4.1 Previous Research: Propensity to Consume is 
Homogeneous for Different Income Level Household  
Chapter 2 reviewed several classical consumption theories, namely, the theory of 
Marginal Propensity to Consume (Keynes 1936), the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani, 
1966), and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957).  
All these theories are helpful because they resulted in breakthroughs in the research 
on consumption. However, the real concern is as follows.  For a specific household, what 
happens to consumption if the household income increases? The underlying assumption 
behind these theories is the proportion of their consumption in its income is 
homogeneous for everyone at a specific time point. One question that has never been 
asked: At the same time point, do families of different income levels have a 
heterogeneous propensity to consume?  
4.2 Economic Data: Propensity to Consume is Heterogeneous 
for Different Income Level Households 
High-income-level households spend more money on both consumption and 
investment than low-income-level families. Our question is this: will high-income-level 
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households spend a lower proportion of income on their consumption or a higher 
proportion of their income on investment than low-income-level families?  
Considering that the previous studies did not address this question, the relationship 
uncovered by this question can be called a new economic relationship between 
consumption and income. This new relationship will contribute to consumption and 
income theories in economics if proven by empirical studies and explained by economic 
theories.   
The new economic relationship between income level and the proportion of 
household income spent on consumption is easy to demonstrate using data.  
First at all, we use China’s expenditure and income data(2006-2012)  to demonstrate 
this new relationship, see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1。    
Table 4.1: Ratio of Average Annual Expenditures to Average  Annual Income of 
Households by Income Quintiles in China (2006-2012) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Lowest 
20 
percent 
89.8% 90.2% 88.5% 86.7% 84.3% 85.1% 81.7% 
Second 
20 
percent 
80.9% 80.0% 78.4% 77.7% 76.0% 75.0% 73.3% 
Third 
20 
percent 
77.0% 75.5% 74.0% 73.4% 73.2% 71.8% 70.1% 
Fourth 
20 
percent 
72.7% 70.6% 69.2% 71.2% 69.6% 68.7% 66.5% 
Highest 
20 
percent 
67.1% 65.5% 64.3% 64.2% 64.0% 62.6% 61.4% 
Source: China Statistical Abstract (2007-2103), National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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Table 4.1: Ratio of Average Annual Expenditures to Average Annual Income of Households 
by Income Quintiles in China (2006-2012)
 
Source: the same to Table 4.1  
These results from table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 confirm the new economic relationship 
between consumption rate and income level, that is, at a certain point, a high-income 
family spends a lower proportion of its income on consumption compared with a low-
income family.  
This new economic relationship is not specific relationship only for China. It can 
also be confirmed by U.S. expenditure and income data. See Table 4.2 and figure 4.2.  
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Table 4.2: Ratio of Aggregate Average Annual Expenditures to Aggregate Average 
Annual Income by Income Quintiles of Income In U.S. (2006 To 2012) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Lowest 
20 
percent 
203.4% 195.5% 218.3% 221.6% 209.3% 221.4% 217.5% 
Second 
20 
percent 
113.5% 112.6% 116.3% 116.2% 112.8% 118.4% 118.5% 
Third 
20 
percent 
92.3% 92.1% 90.1% 89.2% 90.1% 92.0% 90.9% 
Fourth 
20 
percent 
78.2% 79.0% 79.1% 77.7% 75.6% 77.7% 79.1% 
Highest 
20 
percent 
62.7% 61.0% 61.1% 59.9% 58.9% 58.6% 59.5% 
Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxashar.htm 
 
Figure 4.2: Ratio of Aggregate Average Annual Expenditures to Aggregate Average Annual 
Income by Income Quintiles of Income In U.S. (2006 To 2012) 
 
Source: the same to Table 4.2  
Again, these results based on U.S. data confirm the new economic relationship 
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between consumption rate and income level: high-income families spend a lower 
proportion of their income on consumption compared to low-income families. In fact, the 
ratio of expenditure to income for the lowest-income 20% families was so high that it 
was always greater than 1 from 2006 to 2012, which means that the expenditure of the 
lowest-income 20% families is more than what they earned, namely, their income. The 
reason for that is because they received a great deal of income transfer payment from 
U.S. governments. As to China, since the bottom income-level families received very less 
transfer payment government, the ratio of expenditure of bottom income-level families to 
income is less than 1.       
4.3 Theoretical Explanation by Modern Portfolio Theory and 
Information Cost 
After we prove the new relationship, the next step is to explain why this law holds by 
modern economic theories. We cannot just attribute the reasons why this law can hold to 
the psychological factors.     
Modern Portfolio Theory(MPT) can help to explain this law. According to modern 
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952, 195995), investors base their asset-selection decisions 
not only on the returns generated by investment opportunities but also on the risk 
contained in these opportunities. Most importantly, MPT was the first theory to clearly 
and rigorously show how the variance of a portfolio can be reduced through the impact of 
diversification. 
                                                             
95 Markowitz, H.M. (March 1952). "Portfolio Selection". The Journal of Finance 7 (1): 77–91 
Markowitz, H.M. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
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Covariance can also be expressed in terms of the correlation coefficient as 
follows: 
( )Cov ,i j ij i j ijr r r σ σ σ= =                                                  (4.3) 
where ijr  is the correlation coefficient between the rates of return on security i, ir , and 
the rates of return on security j, jr ; and iσ  and jσ represent the standard deviations of ir  
and jr  respectively. Therefore,  
( )
1 1
Var
n n
p i j ij i j
i j
r w w r σ σ
= =
=∑∑                                             (4.4) 
However, information is a “commodity.” To construct a fully diversified portfolio, 
investors have to spend “searching cost,” including time and money, on new assets 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 198096). Most importantly, searching cost is almost fixed and can 
thus be considered a fixed cost for a specific investor, though the return coming from this 
searching is marginal. 
For example, $1000 spent to find the true information about a new asset can result in 
a 1% increase of the portfolio return.   
                                                             
96 Grossman, S. J. and Stiglitz, J. E. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets." The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, (June 1980), pp. 393–408 
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What does this outcome imply for high-income and low-income families?  
 H: $200,000 is available for investment.  
Net profit=$200,000×1%-1000=$1000 
Do it! 
L: $ 50,000 is available for investment 
Net profit=$50,000×1%-1000=-$500 
Give it up!  
Hence, low-income families have a significantly lower motivation to search for and 
invest on new assets compared with high-income families. As a result, the portfolio of 
high-income families will be more diversified than that of low-income families. The point 
further implies that the portfolio of low-income families has a greater risk than that of 
high-income families. That is,  
)()( HP
L
p RVarRVar >                                                                     (4.5) 
However, based on the Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1994),  
σ
fi RRS
−
=
                                                                          (4.6) 
Where iR  is the return of the asset or portfolio i, fR  is the return on a benchmark asset 
or risk-free return rate, and σ is the standard deviation of this return of the asset or 
portfolio and measures the risk.  
Investors require a higher return rate for a high-risk portfolio than for a low-risk 
portfolio because S is almost constant in an open or fully arbitrary market.  
As a result, the return rate required by a low-income family will be higher than that 
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required by a high-income family:  
)()( Hp
L
P rErE >                                                                     (4.7) 
Alternatively, 
H
p
L
P RR >                                                                           
(4.8) 
When the required return (subject discount rate) increases, the present value of a 
fixed amount of future benefit will decrease. This result implies that low-income families 
do not like savings and investing, but will rather spend a large proportion of their income 
on current consumption.  
High-income families like to save and invest and tend to spend a large proportion 
of their income on savings and investments. If the nominal return of a portfolio is the 
same for H and L, but )()( Hp
L
P rVarrVar > ，then the real return for L will be lower than 
that for H. 
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On the basis of the two-period consumption model (Fisher, 1930),97 it is easy to 
establish that the current consumption will increase while the real return will decrease or 
that the slope of the budget constraint line will decrease.  See figure 4.3。 
                                                             
97 Fisher R. (1930). The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and 
Opportunity to Invest It. Porcupine Press (June 1930).  
C2 C1 
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0 
Figure 4.3: Intertemporal Choice of Investors 
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CHAPTER 5: INCOME INEQUALITY: A NEW 
MEASURE 
 
5.1 Income Inequality Measures or Metrics 
5.1.1 Importance of Income Inequality Measure 
Income inequality metrics are used by economists, sociologists, and other social 
scientists to measure the distribution of income among individuals in a particular 
economy.  
Income distribution is a key concept in economic theory and economic policy. 
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo, were 
mainly concerned with the distribution of income between land owners, laborers, and 
capitalists, who respectively supply the production factors land, labor, and capital. The 
most popular topic related to this issue is the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth. 98 
However, good inequality metrics are the prerequisites to conducting research on 
income inequality. Research about income inequality attempts to explain how income 
inequality occurs and what income inequality will bring about. However, income 
inequality metrics simply provide a system of measurement to determine the dispersion 
of incomes.    
                                                             
98 See Ricardo, David (1937). The principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London. p. 73. And 
Malthus, Robert. T. (1951). Principles of Political Economics. New York. p. 317. 
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Income inequality is distinct from poverty and fairness. Poverty is severe income 
inequality. Complete income equality or complete fairness, however, does not exist, 
either. Thus, moderate income inequality is always seen as unfairness and not poverty. 
Additionally, income inequality metrics are used not to measure poverty or fairness but to 
measure the unequal extent of income distribution.  
A close and similar concept to income inequality is wealth distribution. They are 
tightly related. High income can be accumulated to gain substantial wealth, and 
substantial wealth will produce “income.” However, these concepts are not the same. 
Income is what an individual or a family earns within a time interval (e.g., one month or 
one year), but wealth is what an individual or a family owns at some time point. Income 
is a flow, whereas wealth is a stock. On one hand, income cannot be accumulated into 
wealth if the income is overspent. In other words, if income is high but the consumption 
is higher, the wealth growth can be negative. On the other hand, if wealth is high but 
wealth is non-productive, considerable wealth cannot bring about income. Hence, income 
inequality metrics are not the same as wealth inequality metrics.   
5.1.2 Defining Income and Its Components 
In measuring income inequality of a country in this study, “income” refers to all 
kinds of income.  
1. Wages and Salaries. Those are the main source of income.  
2. Profits and Dividends. For sole proprietorships, the profist made are the income 
of the owner. For a Limited Liability Company or Stock Corporation, the dividend from 
the profit made by the company or corporation is the income of the shareholder.  
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3. Rents. Two types of rent exist. One is movable-property rent and the other is 
real (immovable) property rent. The former includes rents from leasing machines, 
vehicles, and tools (movable property), while the latter includes rents from leasing houses 
or commercial properties (real property). Rent is the income to the owner for renting out 
the movable property or real property.   
4. Interest Payments. Interest is the income to the capital supplier. Interest 
includes bank interest and bond interest. The former is paid by the bank, and the latter is 
paid by the companies or governments that issue those bonds.    
5. Capital Gains. The difference between the purchase price at time point A and 
the resale price at time point B is called the capital gain. Different assets have different 
capital gains but essentially they are the same idea and represent the appreciation or 
depreciation in value over the holding period.   
Note that not all capital gains are calculated into the National Income Account. 
Financial asset transactions in the secondary market will not add more products or 
services to the economy and will, therefore, not improve the Gross Domestic Product or 
the Gross Domestic Income. A financial asset transaction is essentially a process of social 
wealth transfer. In the example of a secondary stock market, the money the stock seller 
receives is equal to the money the stock buyer pays. When a stock price continuously 
goes up, all participants seem to make profits from the buying and–holding–selling 
strategy. However, when the stock price drops from its highest points to the original 
purchase price, all the profit the previous investors earned is actually coming from the 
one who buys the stock at the highest price. Regardless of the frequency of transactions 
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and the number of people earning or losing, the aggregate payment is always zero in the 
absence of a transaction tax and commissions. The result is very similar to a casino, 
where the winner’s benefit is always equal to the loser’s loss, so the aggregate profit is 
always zero (when the casinos do not charge the winners or the losers). When transaction 
taxes and commissions exist, all the profit the previous investors earned is lower than the 
loss the one who buys the stock at the highest price suffered. Therefore, the aggregate 
payment would be negative. Similarly, when the casinos charge the winners or the losers 
some money, the winner’s benefit is lower than the loser’s loss, so the aggregate profit 
will be negative.  
The same thing goes with real estate and gold. For example, a person bought a 
house at $100,000 and then sold it in two years at $168,000. The price difference of 
$68,000 is his capital gain. Obviously, $68,000 comes from the buyer. This transaction 
did not add a $1 value to the house. Similarly, a person who bought 10 ounces of gold at 
$15,000 and sold it at $17,000 after six months will have capital gains of $2,000, which is 
paid by the buyer. However, their transaction did not add any value to the gold.   
Given this fact, do we still need to calculate capital gains into an individual’s or a 
family’s income? The answer is yes, because capital gains have a huge influence on 
income distribution even though they never affect Gross Domestic Income. In many 
developing countries, including China, the stock market has actually been a critical factor 
that has worsened the income distribution because the stock market is a “legal” tool by 
which a small group takes money from a large number of small investors. This topic will 
be discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
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6. Goods and Services. One form of income is the total amount of goods and 
services that a person receives; money or cash is not necessarily involved. Services like 
public health and education are also counted. 
7. Unreported Income. As discussed in the following sectors, the unreported 
income is a major source of income for China’s upper-income class. There are several 
types of underground income.  
a) Bribery and embezzlement. Government officials, high-position employees in 
the public sector, senior managers of state-owned companies, and some senior managers 
of private-owned companies might be the recipient of bribery and/or embezzlement cash.  
b) Unreported income from supplemental employment. Employees in the public 
sector or those of state-owned companies might be the recipient of this kind of income. 
Strictly speaking, income from supplemental employment is not underground income 
because it is derived from legal activities. However, because most of those activities are 
not allowed by the employers, the income from supplemental employment will never be 
reported to the employer.    
c) Consumption that is taken into the cost account of the company. The owners of 
private-owned companies or the senior managers in state-owned companies might be the 
receiver of those kinds of income.99    
d) Other illegal or criminal income, such as drug sales and money laundering.  
Numerous researchers defined “income” as “the taxed income per individual or 
per household.” Such a definition is not applicable to China and many other developing 
                                                             
99 An example about (c) is given 5.4.3.  
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countries because underground, grey, or illegal income is a considerable part of the GDI. 
To show income inequality accurately, all types of incomes should be taken into account.     
5.2 Gini Coefficient: A Well-Known Measure for Income 
Inequality 
5.2.1 Lorenz curve 
Max O. Lorenz (1905)100 developed a graphical representation of the distribution of 
income or wealth. The curve is a graph showing the proportion of overall income or 
wealth owned by the bottom x% of the people. In detail, it shows for the bottom x 
(0%≤x≤100%) households what percentage y (0%≤y≤100%) of the total income they 
have. The percentage of households is plotted on the x-axis, and the percentage of income 
is plotted on the y-axis (Figure 5.1).  
                                                             
100 Lorenz, M. O. (1905). "Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth". Publications of the 
American Statistical Association, Vol. 9, No. 70. 9 (70): 209–219. 
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The points on the Lorenz curve represent statements that the bottom x of all 
households have y of the total income. For instance, Point B indicates that the bottom 
35% of all households has 10% of the total income.  
A Lorenz curve always starts at (0,0) and ends at (1,1). It cannot rise above the line 
of perfect equality. If the variable being measured cannot take negative values, then the 
Lorenz curve, which cannot sink below the line of perfect inequality, increases. Note, 
however, that a Lorenz curve for net worth starts out by going negative owing to the fact 
that some people have a negative net worth because of debt. 
A perfectly equal income distribution is one in which every person has the same 
income. In this case, the bottom x of society will always have x of the income. This case 
can be depicted by the straight line y=x (0%≤x≤100%, 0%≤y≤100%), which is called the 
"line of perfect equality."  
100% 
100% 
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Cumulative Share of people from 
lowest to highest income 
Cum
ulative share of incom
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Line of Perfect  
Equity (450) 
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Figure 5.1: Lorenz Curve and the Line of Perfect Equity  
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By contrast, a perfectly unequal distribution is one in which one person has all the 
income and everyone else has none. In that case, the curve will be at y=0% for all 
x<100% and at y=100% when x=100%. This curve is called the "line of perfect 
inequality." 
The Lorenz curve for a probability distribution is a continuous function. However, 
Lorenz curves representing discontinuous functions can be constructed as the limit of 
Lorenz curves of probability distributions, the line of perfect inequality being an 
example. 
5.2.2 Concept of the Gini Coefficient 
Gini (1912)101 put forward a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent 
the income or wealth distribution of a country. This measure became so famous in 
economics and sociology that it was called the Gini coefficient.  
The Gini coefficient is defined mathematically based on the Lorenz curve. It is equal 
to the ratio of the area that lies between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve 
(marked M in the diagram) over the total area under the line of equality [marked (M+N) 
in the diagram], i.e., G = M / (M + N) (Figure 5.2). 102 
                                                             
101 Gini, C. (1909). "Concentration and dependency ratios" (in Italian). English translation in Rivista di 
Politica Economica, 87 (1997), 769–789. 
102  Sen, Amartya (1977), On Economic Inequality (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179 
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There are two extreme cases of the Gini coefficient.  
Case 1: G=0 means perfect income equality.  
When the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality are the same, the income 
distribution of this country is perfectly equal. In this situation, M=0, and thus 
G=M/(M+N)=0. On the other hand, if G=0 then M=0. This case means the Lorenz curve 
is overlapped with the line of perfect equality. The income distribution is perfectly equal.  
Case 2: G=1 means perfect income inequality.      
When the Lorenz curve is so convex to F that it becomes a broken line, O-F-E, the 
income distribution of this country is perfect unequal. In this situation, N=0, and  
M=M+0=M+N. As a result, G=M/(M+N)=1. On the contrary, if G=1, then M=M+N and 
N=0. This case means that the Lorenz curve becomes the broken line O-F-E. The income 
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distribution is perfectly unequal. 
In the regular case, when G is bigger, the income inequality is more severe.     
 
5.3 Other Income Inequality Measures 
The Gini coefficient, although used very widely, is only one of the metrics used to 
measure inequality. Others include the 20:20 ratio, the Palma ratio and the Hoover index.   
5.3.1 The 20:20 Ratio 103 
The 20:20 or 20/20 ratio defined as the wealth owned by the top 20% of the 
population divided by the wealth held by the bottom 20% of the population. The measure 
is used by the United Nations Development Program as one of their Human Development 
Indicators. Because this ratio ignores the middle 60% population, it is too simple to 
reflect the true level of income distribution in a country.   
5.3.2 The Palma Ratio 
The Palma ratio is equal to the ratio of the wealth share of the top 10% of the 
population divided by the bottom 40% of the population. It was put forward by Gabriel 
Palma (2011),104 who found that the wealth share owned by the middle class was always 
50% with the rest split between the upper class the bottom class.  
Since the middle class wealth is about 50%, the Gini coefficient will be very 
sensitive to changes in the wealth share of the middle class, and will be every insensitive 
                                                             
103  Baltagi, Badi H. Panel Data Econometrics: Theoretical Contributions And Empirical Applications.  
In  Badi H. Baltagi and Professor Efraim Sadka,  Contributions to Economic Analysis. Emerald Publishing, 
Volume 286, Pages 1-216 (2008) ISSN: 0573-8555 
104 Palma, José Gabriel (January 2011). "Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the 
'Inverted-U': the share of the rich is what it's all about" (PDF). Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
(CWPE) 1111. Cambridge University. Retrieved 19 March 2013. 
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to changes in the wealth shares of the upper and bottom classes.  Hence, the Palma ratio 
can more accurately reflect the true wealth distribution of a society. 
However, the income share of middle class is not always equal to 50%. In many 
countries, the share might be much less than 50%.  As a result, the Gini coefficient might 
not be overly sensitive to changes in the income share of middle class.  The suggested 
advantages of the Palma ratio might not exist.  
By contrast, the disadvantage of the Palma ratio might be very evident for many 
countries. First, it ignores the income share of middle class of the country. Second, in 
many countries, the top 5% of the population might own over 80% of total wealth, while 
the other 95% own less than 20% of total income. In this instance, the Palma ratio might 
not be a good measure for the income distribution.  
5.3.3 Hoover Index 105 
The Hoover index is the proportion of all income that has to be redistributed to 
achieve the perfect income equality. If the income distribution is perfectly equal, no 
income needs to be redistributed to achieve equal distribution, so the Hoover index is 0. 
If the income distribution is perfectly unequal, all income needs to be redistributed to 
achieve equal distribution, so the Hoover index is 1. Thus, the Hoover index ranges 
between 0 and 1. 
However, how is the Hoover index calculated?  In order to get how much income 
that has to be to be redistributed to achieve the perfect equality, the percentage of total 
income owned by x% of population should be calculated. When the percentage of total 
                                                             
105 Edgar Malone Hoover jr. (1936) The Measurement of Industrial Localization, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vola 18, issue 4 162-171  
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income owned by x% of population is found, the Gini coefficient comes out immediately. 
In this situation, the Hoover index is not needed any more.   
5.4 A New Measure for Income Inequality: The Ratio of Gross 
Income and Gross Domestic Product  
5.4.1 Limitations of the Gini Coefficient 
Across all measures for income inequality, the Gini coefficient is most widely used. 
The reason for that is because it includes much more information than the others. 
However, as all measures including the Gini Coefficient are actually summing an entire 
distribution of incomes into a single index, detailed information on the measured 
inequality is always reduced.  
Furthermore, the Gini coefficient is a relative measure. The Gini coefficient of a 
developing country can rise while the number of people in absolute poverty decreases 
because the Gini coefficient measures relative, not absolute, income. Two countries might 
have the same Gini coefficient although one country is very rich but the other one is very 
poor.  
In addition, the Gini Coefficient has the following shortcomings. First, different 
income distributions may have the same Gini coefficient; Second, identical income 
distributions can have different Gini coefficients and third, the income inequality can be 
extreme but the income Gini coefficient can be very low.  
5.4.2 The Gini Coefficient Announced by China’s Government is Not Trustworthy 
The Gini coefficient is a widely accepted measure for income inequality. Many 
counties in China announce their Gini every year. The Chinese government has 
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announced China’s Gini since 2005 (Figure 5.1).  
 
Data Source:  
https://www.statista.com/statistics/250400/inequality-of-income-distribution-in- 
china-based-on-the-gini-index/ 
 
The Gini coefficients in the table above are not reliable. Various reports by widely 
respected economists estimate that the Gini coefficient was above 0.6 in 2010 and has 
been increasing since 2010. In fact, even the trend reflected in the table is not reliable 
because the income distribution has been getting worse since 2000. However, the 
information from the government tells us that China’s Gini coefficient has been 
decreasing since 2005.      
The answer lies in the politics of a non-democratic country. A high Gini coefficient 
indicates high income inequality, something a non-democratic country is not likely to 
admit to. Socialism theory by Karl Marx argues that capitalism must lead to severe 
income polarization, while socialism will create a society with income equality. Karl 
Marx and his followers insist that income equality is actually a unique advantage owned 
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by socialist countries. Declaring that China is a socialist country, China’s Communist 
Party has to show that the income  of China is much more evenly distributed than that of 
capitalist counties. A specific leader of a communist party will think it is his big 
achievement that the Gini coefficient has decreased during his tenure. This can explain 
the fact that although almost all Chinese people think that the income inequality has 
become more severe over the past 16 years, but the data shows that income inequality has 
actually been continuously decreasing.   
If the Gini Coefficients announced by the Chinese government are not trustworthy, 
how do we find the true Gini Coefficient? It is very hard to do so. The true Gini 
Coefficients can only be determined after the true household income is measured, but the 
data on true household income is hard to collect due to the existence of substantial grey 
income. Grey income will never be reported by its beneficiaries because most of it is 
illegal.  As a result, other indices or coefficients need to be developed to measure the true 
income equality of a country.   
5.4.3 Why is Gross Income Lower than Gross Domestic Product? Who Owns the 
Unreported Income?  
According to macroeconomic fundamentals, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a 
country must be equal to the Gross Domestic Income (GDI) of this country. Therefore, if 
the GDI is less than the GDP, invisible income or underground income that is not 
detected by census must exist, which is called unreported income. The question is who 
owns the unreported income.   
It is a basic fact that almost all the people in the upper income levels are 
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businessmen in U.S, European countries, Japan, Canada, Australia and other democratic 
and market-oriented countries. However, wealthy businessmen are only a very small 
proportion of the upper income class in China. It is a basic fact that government officials, 
high & middle-position employees in public sectors and state-owned companies are the 
main part of the upper income class in China. However, it is also a basic fact their salary 
(visible income) are very low. Therefore, those people with low visible income and high 
total income can be called “invisible millionaires” or “the invisible wealthy”.  
Similar to government officials, high & middle-position employees in public sectors 
and state-owned companies are also they groups with low visible income but high total 
income.  We discuss their salary and other underground income one by one.   
1. Government Officials  
China’s officials have a very strict hierarchical system. There are totally 12 levels 
from the lowest to the highest in this system, which are Banshiyuan, Keyuan, Vice Ke, 
Ke(Town Governor), Vice Chu, Chu(County Governor), Vice Ju, Ju(City Governor), Vice 
Bu, Bu(Provinces Governor), Vice Guo, and Guo(President or Prime Minister). 
According to the Salary Standardization Rates of China’s Government Employees 
(2016)106, the total salary of lowest-level official is less than ￥3000 (434.78.50) per 
month. It is too low to believe, but it is the truth. The total salary of the highest-level 
official, President or Prime Minister, is ￥11,385 (about $1,830) per month or ￥136,620 
($21,960) per year.107  
                                                             
106 http://www.chachaba.com/news/html/peixun/zhiyepx/20121018_94168.html 
107 For comparison, US president Barack Obama earned $400,000 a year, and Hong Kong’s controversial 
chief executive earns about $545,000 a year.  
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Although China’s officials’ salary (visible income) is very low, they lead very 
luxurious lives. They consume the most expensive food and clothes. Furthermore, they 
have very luxurious purses, watches, gold, diamonds, and luxury cars. They not only own 
the most expensive houses in the cities where they are working but also in China’s main 
large cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. That is the reason why they are 
called “invisible millionaires” or “the invisible wealthy”. 
How can this happen? The only answer is that they have numerous sources of 
invisible income apart from their salary (visible income). In fact, Every Chinese knows 
that their salary is only a very small part of their total and real income, and every Chinese 
knows why they would not like to report their invisible income.    
Where does their unreported income come from? Their unreported income is from 
bribery and embezzlement. In addition, they also have another kind of income, which is 
their personal expenditure but paid not by themselves. They always have dinner in the 
best restaurants in a city, but the bills are often paid by the individuals or corporations 
that want to bribe them or by the government budget. The same goes for their car, gas, 
insurance, domestic or overseas luxury travel, entertainment or erotic activity in night 
clubs, and gambling in casinos. This is also a basic fact in China.  
2. Employees in Non-government Public Sectors   
1) Employees in Non-government institutions with public power or functions 
There are many non-government institutes or organizations that have the public 
power in non-government public sectors. Many employees in those institutes or 
organizations are also “visible millionaire”. Here several examples are taken.     
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A. Office of Public Notary 
The Office of Public Notary is a monopolistic non-government public institution. 
Chinese laws require that many civil activities can only be done through public notary 
services. As the only institution to provide public notary services, the Office of Public 
Notary can profit by charging high prices but not taking any responsibilities. However, 
this high profit does not go into government accounts, but are rather shared by the 
employees in the office.     
B. Construction Quality and Safe Supervision Office 
Similar to the Office of Public Notary, the Construction Quality and Safe 
Supervision Office has the power to supervise the construction process but never has the 
responsibility for the construction quality and safety. Whether this office confirms to the 
construction quality and safety only depends on how much money the contractors will 
bribe the office.  
C. Red Cross Society of China 
Red Cross always refers to the humanitarian institution or movement worldwide. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the oldest and most honored 
organization within the movement and one of the most widely recognized organizations 
in the world, having won three Nobel Peace Prizes in 1917, 1944, and 1963. The 
American Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, British Red Cross, German Red Cross, and 
other countries’ Red Cross always provide the society with charitable services.  
The exception is China’s Red Cross Society. Although China’s Red Cross Society 
is a non-government and non-profit organization by law, it is actually affiliated to the 
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National Health and Family Planning Commission of China. All senior managers of Red 
Cross Society in different area of China are designated by the local government, and all 
employees have the same salary, medical insurance, pension as government officials.   
The Chinese government controls the Red Cross Society in order for the 
government to take possession of the large amounts of money donated by the society. To 
accumulate more and more money, the government requires that only the donation given 
to Red Cross from companies is tax deductible. Although some charitable organizations 
exist in China, those organizations have big difficulties to raise charitable money because 
people or companies cannot claim tax deductions if they donate their money to those 
organizations. As a result, Red Cross Society became the richest charitable organization 
in China.  
The visible salary of the employees of China’s Red Cross Society is also very low. 
Their luxurious lives are supported not by their basic salary but by their underground 
income, which comes from donations from society. A typical example is “Red Cross 
Scandal with Guo Meimei” that happened in Juen, 2011.108 Although Red Cross of China 
has declared many times that Red Cross of China was totally innocent, they have never 
shown any convincing evidences that can refute what Guo Meimei said.    
2) Teachers of Elementary school, middle school, and high school  
Some teachers of Elementary school, middle school, and high school have a great 
deal of unreported income, which is Buke (Out-of-School Classes) Income. It should be 
emphasized here that Buke Income is just unreported income, not illegal income.  
                                                             
108 http://time.com/3078429/yunnan-earthquake-red-cross-society-of-china-guo-meimei-sex-scandal/  
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It is the biggest dream for most parents in China to have their children to be 
enrolled to the best universities in the country. Thus, in current China, each parent 
employs all means possible to improve their children's grades and thus increase their 
chances of getting into a leading university. Such competition begins in kindergarten. 
Many parents want their children to go to the best kindergartens, the best elementary 
schools, middle schools, and high schools. They consider this the best way to ensure their 
children go to the best universities. 
 Before 2000, middle school and high school students learned at school. To 
improve the students’ grades, every school tries to extend the study time of students. 
Then, many key schools started enforcing a boarding system from the beginning of the 
first year of middle school, in which students can only go home once a week and rest one 
day. Upon reaching their third year in middle school, the students only go home every 
two weeks and rest one day. While in high school, the students go home only once a 
month and rest one day. Under such circumstances, students have a longer time to study, 
and the parents do not need to find tutors for their children because the children have 
almost no time outside of school. 
  After 2000, the Chinese Ministry of Education began the so-called education 
reform, which aimed to shorten the learning time of students and lighten their burden. 
According to the new policy, students can only have a maximum of eight classes a day up 
to five days a week. On Saturday and Sunday, students must be allowed to rest. From 
Monday to Friday, students must be allowed to go home after 4 p.m. 
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  This education reform, reasonable at first sight, ignored a basic fact. As long as 
academic pressures continue to exist, students and parents will use up all the possible 
time to study because they understand that entering a leading university with only eight 
hours a day of learning is impossible. Then, when students’ study times are forcibly 
shortened, parents will absolutely not allow students to rest for a long time outside school. 
They will start searching for excellent teachers outside school to make up lessons for 
their children. 
The competition for good tutors is so fierce that the incomes of many excellent 
teachers for making up lessons outside school can reach up to ￥2,000 per hour 
(US$300). In Shanghai, many of these teachers can earn $10,000 per week because they 
have so much time from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. Monday to Friday, and from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. 
Saturday to Sunday).  
In fact, many parents look for teachers to give extra classes to their children such 
that almost all teachers have the opportunity to teach out-of-school classes. Although the 
regular teachers do not get paid so well, they can still make big money.    
3) Professors in universities and colleges 
Unlike teachers in elementary school, middle school, and high school, professors 
in universities and colleges do not have opportunities to receive bribes or teach out-of-
school classes. Owing to their low salaries, many professors have been living on very 
tight budgets in China. Nonetheless, there are some very rich professors in China’s 
universities and colleges. Obviously, their luxurious lives are not supported by their 
salaries. What supports their luxurious lives?  
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A. Research Grant. Strictly speaking, a research grant is not a grey or 
underground income. In the United States and European countries, some proportion of a 
research grant is the professor’s income. However, in China, any cent in the research 
grant cannot be paid to the professor. Therefore, no matter how many grants a professor 
receives, no one cent of these grants is counted into his/her income. However, his/her 
salary is so low that he/she has to figure out some ways to transfer the money from his 
grant to his own bank account or spend some money from the grant for his/her personal 
consumption. The grant money that is transferred to his/her personal income or spent on 
personal consumption is the grey or underground income.     
B. Income from Part-time Jobs. Many professors in China are unwilling to 
commit themselves to teaching and research because of the low salary. They have 
considerable free time due to their very light teaching and research tasks such that they 
can regard their profession as unimportant. Consequently, many professors take a second 
job out of campus. In fact, those professors spend more time in this second job than in 
their jobs in the universities. By doing so, they earn a large amount of money. However, 
because universities forbid professors from engaging in jobs outside of campus, these 
professors will never report the income from their second job. The big money is also the 
grey or underground income for these professors.  
It should be emphasized here that the income above is just unreported income, not 
illegal income.    
4) Doctors in hospitals  
Doctors in hospitals also have very low incomes, a situation that is very similar to 
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those of professors. Some doctors live frugally, though very rich doctors also exist in 
China. Where does their extra money come from?  
A. Bribery. Doctors are always the persons to whom medicine companies want to 
give bribes to. The form of bribery used is kickback. For example, the acceptable price of 
a heart stent is $1,200 for a medicine company. The salesman of this medicine company 
will tell doctors that his company will pay 20%, that is, $240, back to doctors if they 
choose to buy the heart stents for their patients from their medicine company. If a doctor 
has 200 patients a year, and each patient needs two stents on average, then this doctor can 
earn 200×2×240=$96,000.  
B. Out-of-Hospital jobs. Doctors have many opportunities to provide medical 
service for other hospitals. For example, excellent surgeons are often invited by other 
hospitals to perform surgery for patients there. Although surgeons are paid very little in 
their own hospitals, they are paid much higher by other hospitals. For example, an 
ophthalmic surgeon is only paid ￥300 ($43) for an extracapsular cataract extraction in 
Shanghai Changhai Hospitals. However, if this surgeon is invited to a hospital in Suzhou, 
Jiangsu Province, he will be paid ￥1800 ($258).  
Again, the income above doctors earn is just unreported income, not illegal 
income.        
3. Senior Managers of State-Owned Companies 
Two kinds of state-owned companies exist. The first is monopolistic state-owned 
companies, including State Grid Corporation of China, Water Supply Companies, China 
Gas Holdings Ltd., China Grain Reserves Corporation, China National Petroleum 
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Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. The second is non-
monopolistic state-owned companies, including the Big Three mobile operators (China 
Mobile Co. Ltd., China United Telecommunications Co. Ltd., China Telecommunications 
Co. Ltd.), the Big Four state-owned commercial banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China), 
Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, and China Poly Group Corporation.  
The first kind of companies earns significantly more than the second kind owing 
to monopoly. In fact, many of the first kind are semi-government companies. For 
example, the China Railway Corporation Ministry of Railways is affiliated with the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China. 
Similar to the government officials in China, the senior managers of state-owned 
companies also live very luxurious lives even though their salaries are very low. How can 
this happen?  
State-owned companies do not have one owner or one person who is actually 
responsible for it, although they have a nominal one, say, the company board. In reality, 
the senior managers become the true controller of the company. In other words, the senior 
managers often make almost all of the decisions without supervision. This is the big 
problem with state-owned companies worldwide.  
As a result, senior managers can easily take advantage of their power to make 
extra money in addition to their salaries. In fact, numerous cases like these can be found 
in China. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. They could make extra money in 
the following ways.   
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A. Senior managers could “steal” money from state-owned companies. For 
example, they could fake the company’s profit, give a portion of the profit to the 
government, and then keep the remaining portion for themselves.   
B. Senior managers could include all of their personal consumption expenses into 
the company’s cost account. In other words, all of their personal consumption could be 
paid by their companies. A portion of the consumption of their spouse, parents, and 
children can also be paid by the companies. In fact, they could use company money to 
bribe important persons, for example, the presidents of a good high school. Their children 
could go to this school even if their children are not qualified.   
C. Senior managers could earn money by selling their power. Unlike the owners 
of private-owned companies, the managers of state-owned companies do not try to 
maximize the company’s profits. What they always do is to try to maximize their own 
profits. Here we have two examples.  
Example 1: A state-owned housing development company has 200 newly 
developed condominiums for sale. However, senior managers have the power to give 
10% discount to some persons. For example, if one condo is $1,000,000, then the senior 
managers have the power to give $100,000 to some persons. Only the persons who give 
bribes to the managers can get this discount. Some managers give a bribery amount, for 
instance, $30,000, which means the person who gives $30,000 to the manager could buy 
the condo at a 10% discount.   
Example 2: A state-owned mobile service company plans to build a new signal 
station in a city. The total budget for this new signal station is $1,000,000. The general 
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manager has the power to choose the contractors. If three contractors want to undertake 
the project, the one who gives the largest bribe to the general manager will be chosen.  
4. Owners of Small or Middle Private-owned Companies 
Owners or senior managers of private-owned companies have very few 
opportunities to conduct bribery and embezzlement. Do they also have grey income, just 
like officials do?  
First, there is no tax return/deduction of personal income for personal 
expenditure. In U.S. and many other western countries, some specific expenditure, for 
example, the monthly payment for a housing loan, are income-tax-free. In other words, 
they could result in income tax reduction. However, in China, no expenditure could result 
in an income tax return.  
Second, the tax rate on corporate income is at least 25% in China. The simple 
formula is Corporate Tax = (Corporate Earning - Corporate Cost)× 25%. This equation 
means that if the corporate cost rises because of corporate earnings, the corporate tax will 
go down.      
Third, in China, no clear boundary exists between the owner’s personal 
expenditure and the company’s cost because neither the content of tax law nor the 
execution of tax law is strict.    
Thus, owners of private companies can easily include their personal expenditures 
into the cost accounts of their companies. In this way, on the one hand, they will not 
spend their own salaries on their expenditures, and thus save a lot of money. On the other 
hand, their companies will save tremendously on corporate tax. 
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Owners can and will take their expenditures into the accounts of their companies. 
The companies will have higher costs and lower profits before tax and then lower profit 
after tax, because the owners include their expenditures into the accounts of their 
companies. The owners’ dividend (their income) will also go down because the profits 
after tax are lower. As a result, their nominal income is much lower. We take an example 
below.  
Assume that Mr. Li is the only owner of H Company, and all his income comes 
from the after-tax profit of the company. He used a credit card to pay his expenditures 
within a year. At the end of this year, he will use his income to pay back the credit card. 
We also assume the following:  
Total expenditure of Mr. Li in 2016: ￥300,000   
Total earnings of H Company: ￥2,000,000 
Total cost of H Company: ￥1,200,000 
In China, the corporate tax rate is 25%.  
 Scenario 1: Mr. Li does not take all his expenditures into the cost account of H 
Company.  
The tax paid by H Company: (2,000,000-1,200,000)×25%=200,000 
His income will be: (2,000,000-1,200,000)×(1-25%)=600,000 
If we conduct a survey about income, we will obtain the result that Mr. Li’s 
income in 2016 is ￥600,000.  
Scenario 2: Mr. Li includes all his expenditures into the cost account of H 
Company.   
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If Mr. Li includes all his expenditures into the cost account of H Company, then 
the cost of H Company will be: 1,200,000+300,000=1,500,000 
The tax paid by H Company:(2,000,000-1,500,000)×25%=125,000 
His nominal income will be: (2,000,000-1,500,000)×(1-25%)=375,000, which is 
also his actual income.  
 Then the corporate tax he saved is: 200,000-125,000=75,000 
His nominal income is: 375,000 
His actual Income is: 375,000+300,000=675,000 
If we conduct a survey about income, we will obtain the result that Mr. Li’s 
income in 2016 is ￥375,000. This income is severely underestimated.    
5.4.4 Ratio of Gross Domestic Income and Gross Domestic Product (RGG): A New 
Measure for Income Inequality 
1. Why is RGG constructed as a new measure?  
As previously mentioned, all high-income individuals in China, except the owners or 
senior managers of big private-owned companies, have very low salaries (their visible 
income). Therefore, their high income does not come from their salary but from 
underground or grey income.   More precisely, most of the grey income is earned by the 
high-income class, which includes officials, employees in public institutions, senior 
managers of state-owned companies, and owners of private-owned companies. Grey 
income brings them to the high-level-income class because their salary is insufficient.  
As indicated in Chapter 1, GDP should be equal to GDI because every dollar in GDP 
produced in China must belong to someone in this economy. As a result, if all the income 
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of the high income class, including the small salary (nominal income) and the big 
underground income, can be uncovered, collected and calculated, then the national total 
income or GDI will be equal to the nation’s total product or GDP. By contrast, if one 
cannot account for the underground income, then the GDI will be based on salary and 
will be less than the GDP.          
Given the difficulties in collecting underground income, the data on average 
individual income that the China National Bureau of Statistics announces or that other 
data-service companies in China own are all only based on the salaries, capital gains, and 
other types of reportable income. Thus, the data on China’s average individual income is 
actually visible income. Then the GDI can be much lower than the GDP.  
Although the GDI has disappointed numerous researchers because it is inaccurate, it 
can still deliver crucial information about China. All underground income is earned by 
the high income class. Thus, the lower the GDI is than the GDP, the more evidence of the 
grey income earned and the more severe the income inequality will be as detailed in 
Figure 5.5.  
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Consequently, along with the Gini coefficient, we can use the ratios of GDI and 
GDP, what we will call RGG, to be a measure of the income inequality of China. 
Therefore, although salary-based GDI is inaccurate, the ratio of GDI and GDP can 
indicate the severity of China’s income inequality.   
2. The Process of Calculating RGG   
In order to make RGG easier to understand, the calculation process of RGG should 
be showed step by step. 109  
                                                             
109 In China, GDP can be used not only for the whole country, but also a province or a city. In U.S., GDP is 
often used for the whole country. The aggregate product of a metropolitan area is called Gross Metropolitan 
Product(GMP). In the process of calculating, “GDP” means the aggregate product of different cities, which 
is equivalent to GMP in U.S. In fact,  GDP in this whole study including empirical study(chapter 8), is 
always equivalent to GMP in U.S.  
Bigger Difference between GDI 
and GDP 
 
More Unreported Income Possessed 
by High-level-income Class 
 
Bigger Part of Gross Domestic 
Income is owned by High-level-
income Class  
More severe Income Inequality  
 
Figure 5.4: Why RGG can be a Measure for Income Inequality  
Bigger Ratio of GDI and GDP 
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Step 1: The quarterly GDP of four municipalities in China from 2000 to 2003 is detailed 
in Table 5.3. 
  Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Chongqing 
2000 Q1 449.10 335.18 985.30 354.94 
2000 Q2 595.00 409.03 1104.48 349.09 
2000 Q3 649.30 426.56 1109.32 410.84 
2000 Q4 1467.60 468.64 1572.07 676.13 
2001 Q1 550.50 376.66 1081.86 386.99 
2001 Q2 683.17 459.31 1221.08 393.42 
2001 Q3 736.63 478.43 1268.93 441.79 
2001 Q4 1740.20 512.27 1638.25 754.66 
2002 Q1 584.50 426.95 1159.53 424.18 
2002 Q2 762.30 488.87 1363.81 451.38 
2002 Q3 806.10 534.77 1378.81 500.02 
2002 Q4 2177.50 572.01 1838.88 857.28 
2003 Q1 666.30 490.57 1325.86 478.23 
2003 Q2 849.80 588.74 1499.84 517.06 
2003 Q3 945.87 620.46 1584.12 568.36 
2003 Q4 2561.83 687.17 2284.41 992.07 
    Table 5.1 Quarterly GDP of Four Cities   
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Step 2: The quarterly disposable income per capita of four municipalities from 2000 to 
2003 is obtained.  
  Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Chongqing 
2000Q1 2727.79  1796.61  2594.68  1232.10  
2000Q2 2526.09  1874.50  2674.27  1298.31  
2000Q3 2382.61  1840.40  2721.65  1353.20  
2000Q4 2576.59  1891.33  2804.26  1361.30  
2001Q1 3000.57  1981.00  2885.93  1392.22  
2001Q2 2778.70  1943.20  2931.70  1429.04  
2001Q3 2884.41  1951.25  3029.53  1466.45  
2001Q4 2894.53  2040.55  3098.44  1532.44  
2002Q1 2938.09  2060.44  3146.94  1588.07  
2002Q2 2979.81  2097.56  3234.24  1632.59  
2002Q3 3023.99  2160.64  3391.21  1689.23  
2002Q4 3152.30  2398.69  3466.45  1744.98  
2003Q1 3292.08  2692.22  3526.03  1765.23  
2003Q2 3317.42  2777.15  3615.81  1779.73  
2003Q3 3348.30  2844.96  3684.43  1804.02  
2003Q4 3494.41  3000.32  3767.24  1848.76  
Table 5.2  Quarterly Disposable Income per capita of Four Cities 
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Step 3: The quarterly residential population data of the four municipalities from 2000 to 
2003 is gathered.  
Population         
  Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Chongqing 
2000 Q1 937.42 998.50 1605.75 2675.53 
2000 Q2 991.00 999.29 1617.34 2678.61 
2000 Q3 1047.65 1000.09 1629.01 2681.68 
2000 Q4 1107.53 1000.88 1640.77 2684.76 
2001 Q1 1170.84 1001.67 1652.61 2687.84 
2001 Q2 1237.76 1002.47 1664.54 2690.93 
2001 Q3 1308.51 1003.26 1676.55 2694.02 
2001 Q4 1383.31 1004.06 1688.65 2697.11 
2002 Q1 1393.19 1004.84 1691.26 2706.65 
2002 Q2 1403.13 1005.62 1693.88 2716.23 
2002 Q3 1413.15 1006.40 1696.50 2725.84 
2002 Q4 1423.24 1007.18 1699.12 2735.48 
2003 Q1 1431.46 1008.21 1704.43 2745.92 
2003 Q2 1439.72 1009.24 1709.76 2756.40 
2003 Q3 1448.03 1010.27 1715.10 2766.91 
2003 Q4 1456.39 1011.30 1720.46 2777.47 
Table 5.3 Quarterly Residential Population of Four Cities 
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Step 4: The quarterly population is multiplied with the quarterly disposable income per 
capita to obtain the GDI.   
  Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Chongqing 
2000 Q1 255.71 179.39 416.64 329.65 
2000 Q2 250.34 187.32 432.52 347.77 
2000 Q3 249.61 184.06 443.36 362.89 
2000 Q4 285.37 189.30 460.11 365.48 
2001 Q1 351.32 198.43 476.93 374.21 
2001 Q2 343.94 194.80 487.99 384.54 
2001 Q3 377.43 195.76 507.92 395.06 
2001 Q4 400.40 204.88 523.22 413.32 
2002 Q1 409.33 207.04 532.23 429.84 
2002 Q2 418.11 210.93 547.84 443.45 
2002 Q3 427.34 217.45 575.32 460.46 
2002 Q4 448.65 241.59 588.99 477.34 
2003 Q1 471.25 271.43 600.99 484.72 
2003 Q2 477.62 280.28 618.22 490.56 
2003 Q3 484.84 287.42 631.92 499.16 
2003 Q4 508.92 303.42 648.14 513.49 
Table 5.4 Quarterly Gross Domestic Income of Four Cities 
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Step 5: GDP is divided by GDI to derive the RGG.  
  Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Chongqing 
2000 Q1 0.339893 0.46445 0.378356 0.794392 
2000 Q2 0.323245 0.463525 0.369109 0.802042 
2000 Q3 0.309673 0.446045 0.361998 0.798015 
2000 Q4 0.344568 0.433764 0.36132 0.749404 
2001 Q1 0.401249 0.462453 0.390527 0.803794 
2001 Q2 0.381504 0.432274 0.384967 0.792031 
2001 Q3 0.397394 0.421426 0.383654 0.784626 
2001 Q4 0.407266 0.424696 0.374435 0.791359 
2002 Q1 0.409237 0.437079 0.38838 0.830476 
2002 Q2 0.392522 0.428291 0.387122 0.806338 
2002 Q3 0.381049 0.423762 0.395937 0.820933 
2002 Q4 0.392477 0.444698 0.392027 0.789722 
2003 Q1 0.394192 0.481641 0.379606 0.801267 
2003 Q2 0.384962 0.474051 0.372682 0.77743 
2003 Q3 0.381521 0.475 0.368307 0.76622 
2003 Q4 0.386711 0.483889 0.373248 0.768325 
Table 5.5 Quarterly Ration of GDI to GDP of Four Cities 
3. The Comparison between RGG and Gini Coefficient  
In order to clarify the feature of RGG, a comparison is made here between RGG and Gini 
Coefficient.   
(1) Common Features of Gini Coefficient and RGG 
First, they are both nonnegative.  
Second, they are both bounded by 0 and 1. 
Third, they are both a proportion, not an absolute value.    
(2) Differences between Gini Coefficient and RGG  
First, they are calculated differently and based on different economic information.  
Second, RGG is suitable for a country where the majority of the income of the 
upper class is coming from grey income. It is not a good measure for a country where the 
112 
 
proportion of grey income in a household’s income for every class is very low. The Gini 
coefficient can be used everywhere, but it is very hard to get the true Gini coefficient 
when there is a large amount of grey income in the economy.    
Third, there exists a negative relation between RGG and income inequality. In 
other words, a smaller RGG means more extreme income inequality, or a larger RGG 
means less income inequality. However, the relationship between the Gini coefficient and 
income inequality is positive.  
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSMISSION MECHANISM FROM 
INCOME INEQUALITY TO RAPIDLY RISING 
HOUSING PRICES 
6.1 Under the New Economic Relationship, Increasing Income 
Inequality will Cause High Aggregate Savings Rate 
In the literature review in Chapter 2, many studies have been conducted on income 
inequality and gross savings rate. However, the relationship between the two are rarely 
examined.  
Research on the relationship between income inequality and the gross savings rate is 
rare because most previous studies assume that the MPC and MPS are both homogeneous 
for all households at different income levels. If households at different income levels 
have the same MPC and MPS, then income inequality will have no effect on the gross 
savings rate. As a result, the relationship between income inequality and the gross savings 
rate has been ignored.  However, income inequality is crucial to the gross savings rate if 
the MPC and MPS are heterogeneous, that is, households at different income levels have 
different MPCs and MPSs.   
Under the new law, a more severe income inequality will increase the gross savings 
rate. The proof is as follows.  
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6.1.1 The Proof that More Severe Income Inequality Leads to Higher Gross Saving 
Rate: Discrete Income-level  
1. Two income levels and two different propensities to save  
Assumptions: there are two income-level household in an economy. One is high-
income household, the other is low-income household.  Let 1α 2α  be the proportion of 
total income of high-income and low-income households in Gross Domestic Product, 
respectively. Obviously, 21 αα >  and 121 =+αα . The bigger 1α , the more severe 
income inequality.  
Let 1c 2c be the propensity to consume for high-income and low-income households, 
respectively.  According to the new economic law discussed in Chapter 4, we know
10 21 ≤<< cc .       
Denote Y to be Gross Domestic Products and denote S to be aggregate saving rate.  
We have:   
Y
cYcYS )1()1( 2211 −+−= αα                                                                   (6.1) 
Want to show:  S  will increase if 1α increases, in other words, more severe income 
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.   
Proof:  
121 =+αα  gives 21 1 αα −= . Then,   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )211122112211 11111
)1()1( cccc
Y
cYcYS −−+−=−+−=−+−= αααααα
        
(6.2) 
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Therefore,  ( ) ( ) 011 1221
1
>−=−−−= cccc
d
dS
α
             (6.3) 
This means that the aggregate saving rate will increase when income inequality 
becomes severe.  
2. Three income levels and three different propensities to save  
Assumptions: there are three income-level household in an economy: high, middle 
and low.  Let 1α 2α 3α be the proportion of total income of high-income, middle-income, 
low-income households in Gross Domestic Product, respectively. Obviously, 
321 ααα >>  and 1321 =++ ααα .  
Let 1c 2c 2c be the propensity to consume for high-income, middle income and low-
income households, respectively. According to the new economic law discussed in 
Chapter 4, we know 10 321 ≤<<< ccc .  
Denote Y to be Gross Domestic Products and denote S to be aggregate saving rate.  
We have:   
Y
cYcYcYS )1()1()1( 332211 −+−+−= ααα                                              (6.4) 
When income inequality becomes severe, we have the following scenarios: 
Scenario 1: 1α becomes bigger  
Want to show:  S  will increase if 1α increases, in other words, more severe income 
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.   
Proof:   
Sub-scenarios 1: 1α becomes bigger, both 2α and 3α become smaller 
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So  0
1
2 <
∂
∂
α
α
     
Since 12 αα ∆≤∆ ,  Then 1
1
2 ≤
∂
∂
α
α
                              (6.5) 
Sub-scenarios 2: 1α becomes bigger, 2α become smaller, 3α does not change 
So  0
1
2 <
∂
∂
α
α
      
Since 12 αα ∆=∆ ,  Then 1
1
2 −=
∂
∂
α
α
     
Sub-scenarios 3: 1α becomes bigger, 2α does not change, 3α become smaller 
So  0
1
2 =
∂
∂
α
α
 
 
Sub-scenarios 4: 1α becomes bigger, 2α becomes bigger, 3α become much smaller 
So  0
1
2 >
∂
∂
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α
      
  
Then,  
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−+−+−
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(6.6) 
Since 321 ccc <<  
we have:   
013 >− cc    023 >− cc    2313 cccc −>−   
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For Sub-scenarios 1, we also know  1
1
2 ≤
∂
∂
α
α  
Then we have:   
0)()()()( 23
1
2
1323
1
2
13
1
>−
∂
∂
−−=−
∂
∂
+−=
∂
∂ ccccccccS
α
α
α
α
α               
 (6.7)  
Sub-scenarios 2:   We also know 1
1
2 −=
∂
∂
α
α
     
Then we have:   
0)()()()( 21231323
1
2
13
1
>−=−−−=−
∂
∂
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∂
∂ ccccccccccS
α
α
α               
 (6.8)  
Sub-scenarios 3:   We also know 0
1
2 =
∂
∂
α
α
     
Then we have:   
0)()( 1323
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2
13
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∂
∂
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    (6.9)  
Sub-scenarios 4:   We also know 0
1
2 >
∂
∂
α
α
     
Then we have:   
0)()( 23
1
2
13
1
>−
∂
∂
+−=
∂
∂ ccccS
α
α
α               
     (6.10)  
This means that the saving rate will go up when income inequality become severe.   
 
 Sub-scenarios 5: 1α becomes bigger, 2α becomes much smaller, 3α become bigger 
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Since 321 ccc <<  
we have:   
013 >− cc    023 >− cc     
We also know 0
1
3 >
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Scenario 2: 1α does not change, 2α becomes bigger, 3α become smaller  
In this scenario, When  2α  increases,  the income inequality becomes more severe.   
Want to show:  S  will increase if 2α increases, in other words, more severe income 
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.   
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Proof:   
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Since 321 ccc <<  
We have:   
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2
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∂
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 (6.13)  
This means that the aggregate saving rate will go up when income inequality 
become severe.   
6.1.2 A Simple Simulation on the Relationship between Income Inequality and 
Aggregate Saving Rate at Discrete Income-level  
In order to show the relationship between income inequality and aggregate saving  
rate at Discrete Income-level, a simple simulation is run here.    
  General Assumptions:   
1. The population is 100 
2. Total income is $5,000,000 in a specific year 
3. Three income level: Low, Middle and High  
120 
 
  There are four scenarios. 
1. Scenario 1: Income Inequality 
Assumptions: 
1) There are 10 low-level income families, 80 middle-level income families, 10 
high-level income families. 
2)  Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income 
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income family earns  $90,000 this year.  
3)  The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%;   The 
Propensity to Consume of  middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to 
Consume of  high-level income families is 40%.  
The results are shown in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 1)  
Population: 100  Total Income: $ 5,000,000      
  Population 
Income     
Per 
Capita 
($) 
Total 
Income of 
Each Class 
Propensity 
to 
Consume  
Consumption 
Per Year  ($) 
Propensity 
to Save  
Savings        
Per Year  
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 10 10000 100000 100% 100000 0% 0 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 80 50000 4000000 80% 3200000 20% 800000 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 10 90000 900000 40% 360000 60% 540000 
Sum  100   5000000   3660000   1340000 
 
Aggregate Consumption Rate  
 
Aggregate Savings Rate  
 
0.732 
 
0.268 
Table 6.1 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.268 when income distribution is equal.    
2. Scenario 2: Not Severe Income Inequality  
Assumptions: 
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1) There are 70 low-level income families, 20 middle-level income families, 10 
high-level income families. 
2)  Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income 
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income families earn  $330,000 this year.  
3)  The Propensity to Consume of  low-level income families is 100%;   The 
Propensity to Consume of  middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to 
Consume of  high-level income families is 40%. (Same as before) 
The results are shown in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 2)  
Population: 100  Total Income: $ 5,000,000      
  Population 
Income     
Per 
Capita ($) 
Total 
Income of 
Each Class 
Propensity 
to 
Consume  
Consumption 
Per Year($)  
Propensity 
to Save  
Savings        
Per Year 
($) 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 70 10000 700000 100% 700000 0% 0 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 20 50000 1000000 80% 800000 20% 200000 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 10 330000 3300000 40% 1320000 60% 1980000 
Sum  100   5000000   2820000   2180000 
 
Aggregate Consumption Rate  
 
Aggregate Savings Rate  
 
0.564 
 
0.436 
Table 6.3 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.46 when income inequality is not severe.    
3. Scenario 3: Severe Income Inequality 
Assumptions: 
1) There are 90 low-level income families, 8 middle-level income families, 2 
high-level income families. 
2)  Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income 
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family earns  $50,000; Each high-level income family earns  $1,850,000 this year.  
3)  The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%;   The 
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to 
Consume of high-level income families is 40%. (Same as before) 
The results are shown in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 3)  
Population: 100  Total Income: $ 5,000,000      
  Population 
Income     
Per Capita 
($) 
Total 
Income of 
Each Class 
Propensity 
to 
Consume  
Consumption 
Per Year  
Propensity 
to Save  
Savings       
Per Year  
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 90 10000 900000 100% 900000 0% 0 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 8 50000 400000 80% 320000 20% 80000 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 2 1850000 3700000 40% 1480000 60% 2220000 
Sum  100   5000000   2700000   2300000 
 
Aggregate Consumption Rate  
 
Aggregate Savings Rate  
 
0.54 
 
0.46 
Table 6.3 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.46 when income inequality is severe.    
4. Scenario 4: Very Severe Income Inequality 
Assumptions; 
1) There are 70 low-level income families, 10 middle-level income families, 20 
high-level income families. 
2)  Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income 
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income family earns  $180,000 this year.  
3)  The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%;   The 
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to 
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Consume of high-level income families is 40%.  (Same as before)  
The results are shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 4)  
Population: 100  Total Income: $ 5,000,000      
  Population 
Income     
Per 
Capita ($) 
Total 
Income of 
Each Class 
Propensity 
to 
Consume  
Consumption 
Per Year  
Propensity 
to Save  
Savings        
Per Year  
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 70 10000 700000 100% 700000 0% 0 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 10 50000 500000 80% 400000 20% 100000 
Low-Level 
Income 
Families 20 180000 3600000 40% 1440000 60% 2160000 
Sum  100   4800000   2540000   2260000 
 
Aggregate Consumption Rate  
 
Aggregate Savings Rate  
 
0.529 
 
0.471 
Table 6.4 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.471 when income inequality is very 
severe.    
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6.1.3 The Proof that More Severe Income Inequality Leads to Higher Aggregate 
Savings Rate: Continuous Income-level  
 
Assume that Lorenz Curve is expressed by:  
axY =    10 ≤≤ x  1≥a       (6.14)                    
  Y: the percentage of income, or the proportion of overall income possessed by the 
bottom x of the people.  
If we assume the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of this country is equal to 1, Y is 
also the total income possessed by the bottom x of the people.  
x: The bottom x of the people 
Then we have:  
Lorenz Curve 
100% 
Income Proportion Y 
Income Level x 
 
0 Highest Income Lowest Income  
100% 
Consumption Proportion 
y 
Figure 6.1: Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient   
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                          x=                                        1=a            
           Y         
ax=                 1>a  
                                    0   10 <≤ x  
           =                 ∞=a  
                                     1        1=x  
(6.15) 
 So,  axY =  is a function that describes Lorenz Curve very well. We also see that “a” 
is the coefficient that represents the income inequality.  
The Gini coefficient G, can be obtained by:  
 dxxdxxG aa ∫∫ −=−=
1
0
1
0
215.0/)5.0(                                                              (6.16) 
we have:       
Gx
a
a 5.05.0
1
1 1
0
1 −=
+
+         (6.17) 
 
G
G
G
a
−
+
=−
−
=
1
12
1
1
         (6.18)                                        
Obviously, when G is bigger, a is bigger. So, “a” represents the income inequality. 
When G=0, a=1, which means the income is totally equal for all people in this country.  
When G=1, ∞=a , which means the income is the most extremely unequal, or the 
wealthiest one possesses all the wealth of this country.  
As said before, when we assume this country’s GDP is equal to 1, Y is the income 
owned by the bottom x of the people, that is, the accumulated income owned by the 
A diagonal Line    
A curve convex to (0,1)   
A broken Line   
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bottom x of the people. Then the derivative of Y is the income owned by the xth person, 
which is denoted by y.  
That is: 1−== aaxdx
dYy          (6.19) 
 The savings of the xth person, s, is a proportion of y:  
1)()( −== aaxxbyxbs         (6.20) 
Where b is the savings rate 
We know that, s becomes larger when x becomes larger due to the new economic 
relationship established in Chapter 4.  That is:   
)(xfb =  with  0>
dx
db
        
 (6.21)   
Let us assume b and x have a positively linear relation and the savings rate for the 
most lowest income level and most highest income level are 0 and m (m is less than 1 but 
very close to 1), respectively.   
Then we have:  mxb =  10 << m  
When x=0, b=0, which means the savings rate for the lowest income family is 
equal to 0, that is, b(0)=0. When x=1, b=m, which means the savings rate for the highest 
income family is m, that is, b(1)=m. All these conclusions are exactly consistent with the 
assumptions.  
Substituting mxb =   into (6.21)  gives:  
aaaxmxbys max))(( 1 === −       (6.22) 
Then the aggregate savings rate, which is also equal to total savings of this 
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economy because Y=1, is the integral of s, that is,   
11
max 10
1
1
0 +
=
+
== +∫ a
amx
a
amdxS aa       (6.23) 
Substitute 
G
Ga
−
+
=
1
1  into (6.23) gives:   
)1(5.0
1
1
1
1
1
Gm
G
G
G
G
mS +=
+
−
+
−
+
×=
      
 (6.24) 
Since m>0, S will increase when G increases. In other words, when income 
inequality becomes more severe, the savings rates will go up. This is exactly what we 
want to prove.   
Let’s end this discussion by adding consumptions curve and savings curve to 
Lorenz curve.  
Denote c to be the consumption of the xth person. We know 
aaaxmxbys max1 =×== −        (6.25)    
we have： 
aaa amxaxaxmxybc −=×−=−= −− 11)1()1(     (6.26)  
The accumulated consumption C of the bottom x of the people is the integral of 
c, that is,  
  ( ) 10100
1
11
++−
+
−=
+
−=−= ∫ aaxaxa
x aa x
a
maxz
a
mazdzamzazC
 
 (6.27)  
128 
 
The accumulated savings , S of the bottom x of the people is: 
11
1
)
1
( ++
+
=
+
−−=−= aaaa x
a
max
a
maxxCYS     (6.28) 
The consumption curve and saving curve are shown in Figure 6.2.  
 
6.2 High Gross Savings Rate Will Cause High Demand for 
Virtual Assets and Low Demand for Real Assets 
A high gross savings rate is not necessarily a negative thing. By contrast, a high 
gross savings rate is a good signal for a country in most situations. According to 
neoclassical theories, the basic production function is as follows:  
Lorenz Curve 
100% 
Consumptions Curve 
Income Proportion Y 
Income Level x 
 
0 Highest Income Lowest Income  
100% 
Consumption Proportion 
y 
Savings Curve 
Figure 6.2: Lorenz Curve, Savingss Curves and Consumptions Curve 
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),( LKfY =         0>
∂
∂
K
Y
      0>
∂
∂
L
Y
                                                                            
(6.30) 
where Y denotes production, K denotes capitals, and L, denotes labor.  
The equations show that production will rise when capital increases because the 
latter will increase when the gross savings rate increases given the GDP. Therefore, a 
high savings rate will bring about high production and, consequently, boost the economic 
growth of this country. This result is a mainstream viewpoint in economics.  
The underlying assumption for this viewpoint is that all savings can be transferred to 
production capital. Thus, a high savings rate will increase production capital. However, it 
is not necessary for all savings to be transferred to production capital under some 
conditions.  
Companies base their product supply decisions on how much profit they will earn 
from the product. If the demand for consumption goods is strong, the prices of 
consumption goods will go up and then the benefit to the companies will increase. As a 
result, the company will produce and supply more. When demand, supply, and 
transactions all increase, the prosperity of the consumption market increases.  
The demand for production factors (materials, machines, assembly lines, facilities, 
land, and labor) is a derivative demand from the consumption market. In other words, the 
demand for production factors is caused by the demand for consumption goods. For 
example, the demand for cotton, sewing machines, and spinning mills will rise when the 
demand for clothes, quilts, and sheets is high. Consequently, the production factor market 
will be prosperous if the consumption market is strong. By contrast, if the consumption 
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market is weak, the production factor market will be recessive. 
In addition, profits will go up if both prices and transactions increase. Assuming that 
a country’s GDP is Y and the total savings is S, then the consumption C is 
SYC −=                                                                   (6.31) 
Obviously, when C becomes bigger (demand line shifts right), both the prices (P) 
and transactions (Q) of goods will increase. On the other hand, when the C becomes 
smaller (demand line shifts left), both the prices (P) and transactions (Q) of goods will 
decrease (Figure 6.3).  
 
Denote sales revenue by H, then H=PQ, which is the measure for the consumption 
market’s prosperity. Since P and Q are both increasing functions of C, then H is also a 
increasing function of C. That is, 
)(CfH =      0)( <′ Cf                                                         
(6.32) 
We know C=Y-S. When Y is fixed, we have:  
 
D0 
 D2’ 
 D1
’
 
 P 
 Q 
Q0 
P0 
Q1 Q2 
P1 
P2 
Figure 6.3 Both Demand and Transaction will Change When C Changes  
131 
 
1−=
dS
dC
                                     (6.33) 
Given (6.32) and (6.33), we have,   
0<−=⋅=
dc
dH
dS
dC
dC
dH
dS
dH
                    (6.34)
 
Assume the cost per product is stable. Then profits will go up if H becomes larger. 
Let π be the profit. We then have  
)(Hg=π         
0)( >′ Hg
                                                      
(6.35) 
Combining (6.32) and (6.35) gives:   
))(())(( SKfgCfg −==π                                           (6.36) 
Since    0<
dS
dH
 and 0>
dH
dπ
                                    
we have 
0<×=
dS
dH
dH
d
dS
d ππ
                                             (6.37) 
We find that the profits will decrease if savings, S, increases. Then, companies will 
reduce their supply instead of extending production. Therefore, the consumption markets 
and production factor markets will be recessive. In other words, when savings increases, 
the increased savings will not transfer into production capital and boost the real sector to 
be prosperous, which is an opposite conclusion to that expected for mainstream 
economies.   
When the savings continuously increases but is not invested into the real sector, 
where will those savings go? The answer is that they will go to the asset markets. In other 
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words, they will be used to buy stocks, bonds, funds, gold, houses, and so on. 
If the return from an asset market, say, the stock market, can totally reflect the 
performance of consumption markets, then the return from asset markets is always the 
same as or very close to that from consumption or factor markets. Then, the return from 
asset markets will not be higher than that from consumption or factor markets, and high 
savings will not be motivated to pursue after assets.  
However, the return from asset markets does not always reflect the performance of 
consumption markets. The prices of assets depend on the expected return of consumption 
or factor markets, not the current return of consumption or factor markets. Consequently, 
the prices of assets actually depend on the prices of consumption goods or factors 
expected in the future, not the current prices of consumption or factors goods. Asset 
prices do not always reflect the performance of consumption markets because 
expectations are not always accurate. In fact, investors often build their expectation on 
what has happened in the past. That is, the asset prices built on the expected return will be 
affected by the historical trend of the asset prices. For example, when asset prices 
continuously increase in the past 12 months, people will often predict that asset prices 
will also go up in the next 3 months. 
Even if we admit that the return from asset markets does not always follow the 
return from consumption or factor markets very closely, we cannot conclude that the 
return from asset markets is higher than that from consumption or factor markets. For 
example, if the return from asset markets is lower than the return from consumption or 
factor markets, then why will savings still flow into the asset markets?   
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The reason lies in the unique feature of asset markets. When a person spends his/her 
money founding a manufacturing company (real assets) and then manages this company, 
his/her return is determined by the profits the company earns. However, when a person 
invests money into the stock (virtual assets) of a manufacturing company, his/her return 
not only depends on the holding period returns (dividends) coming from the profits but 
also on the difference between purchase prices and expected resale prices (capital gains). 
When the capital gains are high, the investor will prefer the virtual assets to real assets 
even if the ratio of dividends/price of virtual assets is much lower than that of 
profit/investment of real assets (a company).  
However, how can the capital gains be high if the D/P ratio of virtual assets is 
extremely low? The answer is the difference between the purchase price and the expected 
sale price, because the capital gains will be determined by the price trend. If the asset 
prices are expected to increase, then the capital gain will increase by expectation. 
Consequently, even if the dividend of one asset is very low, the asset can still be 
attractive if investors expect the prices to increase, that is, the expected capital gains will 
increase. Hence, once investors expect that the price will rise for some reason, they will 
transfer their money into this asset market. Once a huge amount of money hits this asset, 
the asset price will go up, thus confirming the investors’ expectation. They will transfer 
more money into this asset market when their expectations are confirmed. Consequently, 
the asset price will continue to rise, and the positive feedback cycle appears.    
If there is any factor that helps investors build the expectation that asset prices will 
go up, then savings will pour into this asset market and push the asset prices up. The 
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increasing asset prices will confirm the expectation and then attract more savings to this 
market, further boosting the asset prices to rise.  
This mechanism is called a self-reinforcing or self-actualizing mechanism. Owing to 
this mechanism, when the savings increase and the consumption and factor markets are 
recessive, the savings will flow into the asset markets. As long as there is information that 
helps investors build the expectation that the asset prices will go up, the savings will pour 
into the asset markets and lead to the prosperity of these markets.  
Next, when savings increased, the savings will not flow to the consumption markets 
but will flow into the asset markets instead. The reason is that the high savings caused by 
income inequality is always accompanied by low consumption, which will lead to a very 
weak demand for consumption goods and recessive consumption and factor markets. 
Recessive consumption and factor markets reap low profits, which stifles the new savings 
from coming in and chases the capital out of the market.    
6.3 High Demand for Virtual Assets and Increasing Housing 
Prices: Why Are Houses Preferred to Other Assets? 
The previous part has concluded that high savings caused by income inequality will 
flow into the asset markets. The next question is this: In China, why are houses preferred 
over other assets given that high savings result from severe income inequality?  
There are many types of assets in capital markets: 
1. Stocks   
2. Bonds 
3. Commercial Real Estate (Office, Retail, Industrial, and Other Commercial Real 
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Estate) and Real Estate Investment Trusts  
4. Gold 
5. Houses  
To answer the question, we can analyze the different types of assets one by one.  
1. Stock  
Theoretically, a stock value is determined by the present value of all expected 
dividends from the company in the future. In practice, however, a stock price is 
determined by the present value of the expected dividends before sale and the expected 
price at sale.  
In the short run, the stock price often deviates from the market fundamentals because 
the expected price at sale is affected by the previous price. The stock prices, however, 
have rarely been away from the market fundamentals in the long run.  
Given that the expected dividend is coming from the profit the company is expected 
to earn in the future, a stock price relies on the profits the company is expected to earn 
and the expected price when it is sold. The expected price essentially relies on the 
expected profit the company is expected to earn in the long run. Therefore, the stock price 
is essentially determined by the expected profit of the company in the future, which is 
called the market fundamentals of this stock. If the consumption markets are recessive, 
the profit from consumption markets will decrease, and then the stock price will go down 
due to the low expected profit and the low expected price at sale. 
Therefore, only when the market fundamentals are very good will investors conduct 
a long-term investment on this stock. If the market fundamentals have a poor 
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performance, investors will take a short-time strategy of buying stocks and then selling 
them in very short time. This behavior has thus become a pure speculation behavior and 
the market has become a speculative market.  
When severe income inequality leads to high savings and low consumption, the 
consumption markets will be recessive and will bring investors a poor market 
fundamental. The stock market will become a speculative market, which is always a very 
risky market. Therefore, when the market fundamentals are poor, the stock market 
becomes a very risky market. A very risky market is less attractive and prevents investors 
from investing into this market. This is the reason the stock market is not preferred by 
investors under the condition of severe income inequality.  
2. Bonds 
In practice, a bond price is determined by the present value of the interest paid by 
the company before sale and the expected price at sale.
  
However, the interest payments 
from a bond are typically all equal to the fixed value by the bond contract.  The discount 
rate is the determining factor for bond prices. Future discount rates are hard to predict.  
The same goes for bond prices. When bond prices are unpredictable, bonds will be less 
attractive to investors. 
When the income inequality is severe and the consumption market is recessive, 
corporate bonds and government bonds will be unable to pay high interest rates to the 
bond holder. The low interests plus very risky capital gains make the debt unattractive to 
the investors.  
3. Commercial Real Estate 
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Similar to a stock, the price of a piece of commercial real estate is determined by the 
expected rent collected from the real estate before sale and the price at sale. Moreover, 
similar to a stock, the price at sale is essentially determined by expected rents, though it is 
affected by the previous prices of this real estate in the short run. When income inequality 
is severe and the consumption market is recessive, the affordability of consumers and 
companies will go down. As a result, the expected rents from commercial real estate, for 
example, retail, office, and industrial property, will decline. Subsequently, a commercial 
real estate investment will have poor performance. 
Consequently, the return from investment on commercial real estate deteriorates if 
the consumption markets are recessive. When the consumption markets are recessive and 
the savings increase, those savings are not likely to flow into commercial real estate or 
REITs. 
4. Foreign Exchanges 
Exchange rates are the ratios between the currencies of different countries. The 
reasons for an exchange rate change are very complex. 
1) In the short term, only “arbitrage opportunities” are available for the exchange 
market. In reality, arbitrage opportunities are very few because the exchange market is 
very efficient. Even if arbitrage opportunities appear, they disappear very quickly because 
of arbitrage. 
2) In the middle term, there are “speculation opportunities” in the exchange market. 
But the opportunities could only show up in a monetary crisis. Since monetary crises 
appear rarely; thus, speculation opportunities are also rare. 
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3) In the long term, there are “investment opportunities” in exchange markets. When 
the investors expect that one country’s currency will appreciate in the long term, they will 
buy this country’s currency right now and sell them in the future. The reason this 
country’s currency increases is rooted in the real economy or the financial systems. Those 
opportunities are also very few. 
5. Financial Derivatives 
Derivatives are one of the three main categories of financial instruments, with the 
other two being stocks (i.e., equities or shares) and debt (i.e., bonds and mortgages).  
Financial derivatives include forwards, futures, options, and swaps. A derivative is 
essentially a contract that derives its value from the performance of an underlying entity. 
Derivatives can be used for a number of purposes, including insuring against price 
movements (hedging), increasing exposure to price movements for speculation, or getting 
access to otherwise hard-to-trade assets or markets110. 
The prices of the derivatives will be mainly determined by the fluctuations of the 
underlying asset prices. The derivatives are risky because the prices of underlying assets 
change frequently over time. In addition, most derivatives are bought by leverage, which 
adds more risks to derivatives. Therefore, financial derivatives are not preferred by many 
investors.   
6. Gold 
The most distinguished feature of gold is that it has very strong liquidity. In fact, it is 
the one with the strongest liquidity in all assets except currency. Due to the very strong 
                                                             
110 Koehler, Christian. "The Relationship Between the Complexity of Financial Derivatives and Systemic 
Risk". Working Paper: 10–11 
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liquidity, gold will be overpriced than any other assets. So the return of gold is lower than 
many other assets.  
In addition, investment in gold is a pure speculation behavior because investors do 
not get income from holding gold. The only profit the investors get is from the capital 
gains. Due to no periodical returns, the return of gold is much lower than many other 
assets.  
As a result, The purpose of investment on gold is to avoid wealth loss, not to get a 
high return. Gold is preferred only in very uncertain economic environments, say, in a 
period of war, a big economic crisis, or a severe natural disaster, when the risk of wealth 
loss is high.   
7. Funds and Insurances 
An investment fund is a supply of capital belonging to numerous investors used to 
collectively purchase securities while each investor retains ownership and control of his 
own shares111. Mutual funds and hedge funds are the two main types of investment funds. 
Mutual funds pool money from numerous investors to purchase securities and build 
an asset portfolio. There are stocks, bonds, and exchanges in this portfolio. In other 
words, various types of funds and insurances make profits by investing on stocks, bonds, 
and exchanges. Hence, the performance of funds and insurances depends on the 
performance of those assets. A hedge fund is an investment vehicle that is open only to 
investors who are qualified in some way. A hedge fund employs a number of different 
strategies to earn an active return or alpha for their investors. Hedge funds may be 
                                                             
111 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investment-fund.asp 
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aggressively managed or make use of derivatives and leverage in both domestic and 
international markets with the goal of generating high returns112. 
A mutual fund sets its goals as “low risk, reasonable return, and steady growth.” In 
other words, investors can hardly make a big fortune by investing funds. The exception is 
a hedge fund, which sets its goals as “high return and reasonable risk,” but it is only 
accessible to accredited investors. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, very few opportunities are available to make big 
profits from exchanges and gold. There may be opportunities to make big money in stock 
markets and bond markets, but these are very short-term and risky when the market 
fundamentals are poor. 
8. House 
A house is very similar to a commercial property or a stock when it is invested in as 
an asset, but it also has distinct differences.   
1) House purchase is both a consumption decision and an investment decision   
The reason is rooted in the characteristics of houses. A house is not only an 
investment asset but also a consumption good. When a person buys a house, his purpose 
may be to consume, to invest, or to consume and invest. 
When a person conducts a pure investment behavior, for example, buying a stock or 
a retail property, his decision purely relies on the profits he expects to earn. When a 
person makes a consumption purchase, the decision relies on the utility from the 
consumption good. However, if a person buys an object that is both a consumption good 
                                                             
112 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp 
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and an asset, the decision can become very complex. 
On one hand, home buyers may consider the home purchase as an investment 
decision. When they do this, they will consider how much they will expect to earn when 
they sell the house in the future. Even if they are not sure when and if they will sell the 
house, they still consider if the current housing prices are reasonable and if the housing 
prices will rise in the future. In this situation, whether they will accept the current 
housing prices will only depend on the expectation for the price trend. What factors will 
help the buyers build the expectation for the price trend? Those factors could be GDP 
growth, population growth, land supply, monetary supply, and historical housing prices. 
On the other hand, home buyers may also view a home purchase as a consumption 
decision, especially for owner-occupied houses. When they do that, they consider if the 
house meets their living demands. Subsequently, the consumption characteristics, like 
location, area, and decoration, will be emphasized. Furthermore, the freedom to redesign 
the inner space of a house, and the feeling of settlement and identity will also be 
emphasized.113  
2) Housing Prices depend on both rents and non-rent factors    
The freedom to redesign the inner space, and the feeling of settlement and identity, 
are called non-rent factors. The most important characteristics of those non-rent factors is 
that they are difficult to quantify. Therefore, in the eyes of the house buyers, it is very 
possible that those non-rent factors are more valuable than the rent earned from houses. 
In other words, when the non-rent factors are emphasized by the house buyers, the buyers 
                                                             
113 All those factors including the freedom to redesign the inner space of a house, and the feeling of 
settlement and identity will be discussed in detailed in the next chapter.   
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will ignore how much rent they could earn from the houses. As a result, the expected 
rents of the house have a limited influence on their decisions.  
Nonetheless, the rent level reflects the true demand and supply in housing markets 
(market fundamentals). Therefore, the housing prices can become disconnected with the 
market fundamentals.  
What if houses become disconnected from the market fundamentals at some extent? 
The answer is that any change in market fundamentals will have a limited influence on 
housing prices. When the severe income inequality causes weak consumption and factor 
markets, the housing rents will decrease. However, house prices could still increase. If 
houses have been disconnected from the market fundamentals, housing prices will have 
more freedom to rise rapidly or to crash.  
When the weak consumption and factor markets make the market fundamentals of 
all assets weak, the assets whose prices are disconnected from the market fundamentals 
will be preferred by investors. Therefore, houses become more preferred than other kinds 
of assets. This is what has been happening for the past 16 years in China. A more detailed 
analysis on the housing market is presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: ASSET DICHOTOMY, SUPPLY 
ELASTICITY AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT: THE 
PARTICULARITY OF HOUSES 
 
7.1 Asset Dichotomy: Real Assets and Virtual Assets 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, real assets refer directly to the production process 
of assets, including tangible assets (land, raw materials, machinery and equipment, plant, 
human capital, and stock) and intangible assets (patent, trademark, and solid industrial 
secrets, i.e., the intellectual property rights). Real asset users are production units 
(generally refers to enterprises) or persons. These assets may be purchased or leased by 
the enterprises in the form of equity or debt. 
The market for trading real assets is called the real asset market, also called the 
production factor market, including the raw material market, machinery and equipment 
market, and labor market.  
The concept of real assets can actually be expanded to the consumer sector. For 
example, land, houses, cars, and other durable consumer goods can also be considered as  
real assets. These assets can continuously provide consumers with utility for a long 
period in the future, which is the consumers’ return. 
A Virtual Asset is a right to claim return, which is a normally attached to a certain 
real asset (capital, equipment, or intellectual property rights), but it is not the real asset 
itself. Stocks, bonds, fund shares and financial derivatives are purely virtual assets. A 
virtual asset and a real asset have the following differences.  
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First, the same quantity of money or other real assets may not bring investors the 
same right to claim return.    
Second, no stable relationship exists between the value of return claims and the 
value of real assets. Real asset value is determined by current market conditions, namely, 
the demand and the supply. Generally, the value of real assets decreases over time. Virtual 
asset value, or the value of the right to claim return, depends on the present value of the 
expected return, and with the passage of time, its value may not be reduced and may even 
unexpectedly increase.  
Third, a real asset could correspond to multiple virtual assets, and a virtual asset 
could correspond to a number of real assets.  
7. 2 Two Types of Virtual Assets and Their Creation Process 
7.2.1 Two Types of Virtual Assets 
1. Non-pure virtual assets 
Non-pure virtual assets refer to the virtual assets mixed with real assets or embedded 
in real assets. For example, a person uses his own money to set up a family workshop 
specializing in the production of noodles. The money on hand and the money used to 
purchase the equipment, and the processing workshop are all real assets. 
At the same time, as the sole shareholder of the family workshop, he has full right to 
own all profits that are made through the family workshop. This claim is his virtual asset. 
Although he had to spend money buying equipment and setting up the workshop in order 
to obtain the right to claim return (virtual assets), this right to claim return is not 
equivalent to these real assets. The value of the residual claim he has is not necessarily 
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equal to the value of the real assets. Thus, the virtual asset he owns is not the same as the 
real assets he owns.  
Note as well that in this family workshop, his real assets and virtual assets are mixed 
together. In other words, he not only has the ownership of these raw materials, machinery, 
and plant but also has the right to claim the profits of the raw materials, machinery, and 
plant in the future. Although there is a difference between the two, the value of both may 
not always be equal, but the two are mixed together. 
2. Pure virtual assets 
Financial assets, including stocks, bonds, are all pure assets. No one-to-one 
corresponding relationship exists between these virtual assets and real assets. Moreover, 
there is no relationship between these virtual assets and specific production and 
management. Hence, these assets are called pure virtual assets. 
7.2.2 Virtual Asset Creation Process 
1. Non-pure virtual assets: direct creation 
As previously mentioned, non-pure virtual assets refer to those assets that have no 
clear separation of the power to use real assets from the rights to claim the future returns. 
When individuals use their own real assets to make profit, they also have the right to 
claim the return. Therefore, there is no an independent process to create virtual assets, 
because when one person possesses and uses the real asset, he would have the right to 
claim the future returns as while. In other words, non-pure virtual assets are created 
directly from the ownership of real assets.  
2. Pure virtual assets created through equity and debt 
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A company can acquire production factors (real assets) in three ways. First, it can 
spend money in buying those production factors. That is essentially an exchange of one 
kind of real asset “money” for another kind of real asset (production factors). The seller 
does not get the right to claim the returns (virtual assets) but they get the money (real 
assets). Second, it can lease these production factors from the lessor and pay rent to the 
leaser. The lessor loses the power to possess and use the production factors, but gets the 
right to claim the rent during the lease term（virtual assets）. Third, it exchanges its 
equity share for production factors. As a result, the owner of production factors loses its 
real assets, but obtains the right to claim the residual of the enterprise.  In the second way 
and the third way, pure virtual assets are created.  
When the company purchases production factors, pure virtual assets are not created. 
When this company pays rent to lease the real assets or exchanges its shares for real 
assets, the pure virtual asset is created. In other words, virtual assets are created in two 
forms: debt or equity. 
7.2.3 Relation between Virtual Assets and Real Assets 
Real assets must contain virtual assets. If a person has ownership or the power to 
possess or use the real asset, he/she must have the right to claim the future return of the 
asset at the same time. However, in turn, virtual assets may not contain real assets. That is 
to say, owning virtual assets may not entail having the power to possess and use the real 
assets. 
7.3 Virtual Asset Prices and Real Asset Prices 
In this sector, some basic financial models in Finance will be reviewed in order to 
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analyze the relationship between virtual assets and real assets.     
7.3.1 The Price of Virtual Assets: Depending on Future Returns and Discount Rates 
Theoretically, the price of a virtual asset is determined by the total present value of 
all expected returns from the real assets in the future.  
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7.3.2 The Price of Real Assets: Depending on Supply and Demand in Production 
Factor Markets 
As a production factor price, a real asset price is determined by the demand and the 
supply in this factor market (see Figure 7.1).  
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7.3.3 Why Must Virtual Asset Prices and Real Asset Prices Be Equal? 
Regardless of the kind of market structure, the price of virtual assets (Pvirtual) 
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Figure 7.1: Asset Supply and Asset Demand 
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associated with real assets (production factors) is bound to be equal to the price of real 
assets (Preal). That is, virtualreal PP =  (see Figure 7.2).  
 
1. The value of each point on the demand curve of the real asset market (factor 
market) is equal to the marginal product value, which is equal to the sum of all the 
discounted cash flows in the future brought by one added unit of real assets. Namely, the 
value of each point on the demand curve is the marginal value of the virtual assets.  
The value of each point of the supply curve of real assets is the marginal cost of 
producing real assets. The value of each point of the supply curve is the marginal cost of 
the real assets.  
When a factor market attains its equilibrium, the marginal value of virtual asset 
equals the marginal cost of the real asset. Thus the price of virtual asset is equal to the 
price of the real asset.  
2. Non-pure virtual assets: an increase of the virtual asset price will directly increase 
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Figure 7.2: Real Asset Prices is Equal to Virtual Asset Prices 
when market is efficient  
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the demand for real assets. As a result, the price of real assets will increase.  
When one equipment is owned by its user, the user has the right to possess and use 
this equipment as well as having the right to claim the return from this equipment. In this 
situation, the virtual asset is a non-pure virtual assets because it is mixed with real asset.  
In this case, if the owner expects that the future return of real assets will increase, the 
price of virtual assets goes up. Therefore, investors are willing to purchase real assets at a 
higher price. As a result, the price of real assets will increase, eventually making the two 
equal. 
3. Pure virtual assets: the increase of the virtual asset price will increase the demand 
for real assets through Tobin Q,114 thereby increasing the price of real assets. 
When the real assets and virtual assets are separated, how can virtual asset prices 
affect real asset prices?  
Tobin Q is the bridge between a real asset and a virtual asset.  When the asset price 
rises but its replacement cost is fixed, the asset price is greater than replace cost (Tobin 
Q >1), then corporate refinancing is favorable and companies can have capital to 
purchase real assets, so the price of real assets will rise. Eventually, the price of real 
assets will be equal to the price of virtual assets.  
                                                             
114 Tobin's Q, or the Q ratio, is the ratio of the market value of a company's assets (as measured by the 
market value of its outstanding stock and debt) divided by the replacement cost of the company's assets 
(book value). See http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=Tobin%27s-q-ratio  
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7.4 Adjustment of Real Asset Prices under Different Supply 
Elasticity: A Comparative Static Analysis 
7.4.1 Adjustment of Real Asset and Virtual Asset Prices under Elastic Supply 
The supply of physical assets is elastic, which means that when the real asset prices 
rise (fall), the supply will increase (decrease) very soon. 
1. Good news on the demand side of the assets 
When good news comes, the demand curve moves to the right. Within very short 
time, the virtual asset price quickly rises to P1. The price of real assets will rise to the 
same point because the supply cannot increase within very short time. 
 
As time goes by, the supply side of a real asset reacts to rising prices and the market 
supply increases. With the increase of real market supply, marginal return on a real asset 
falls and the virtual asset prices begin to decrease, and the real asset demand is also 
reduced, which leads to the decline of real asset prices. 
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Eventually, the market equilibrium lies at EN; the final equilibrium price is at P2. At 
this point, the equilibrium price of assets and asset quantity are both higher than the 
original equilibrium price of assets and asset quantity (see Figure 7.3). 
The following phenomena are observed:  
First, when good news comes out, the virtual asset prices first rise, which then leads 
to the rise of real asset prices.  
Second, when the supply of real assets cannot respond in an extremely short period, 
real and virtual asset prices rise rapidly to a high level.  
Third, the increase of real asset supply is the force that lowers the high level of asset 
prices. The specific mechanism is as follows: the increase in the supply of real assets will 
reduce the marginal future return of the assets, thereby reducing the price of virtual assets 
and ultimately decreasing the price of real assets.  
Fourth, in summary, the most active variable is virtual asset price. Supply is the force 
that drives virtual and real asset prices up to a new equilibrium level.  
2. Good news on the supply side of the assets 
If some technological improvement happens, the production cost of the real assets 
will be greatly reduced. As a result, the profits of the manufacturing company will be 
improved significantly. Thus, the supply curve shifts to the right. In this case, how do the 
asset prices adjust to the change? 
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In the short term, asset prices will not adjust. Because of the decline in the cost, 
supply rapidly increased to Q1. Along with the supply increases to Q1, real assets’ 
marginal return will decline. When real assets’ marginal return declines, the price of 
virtual assets falls to P1, which will drive the price of real assets to falls to P1. 
Lower market prices will dampen the enthusiasm of the supplier, and the supplier of 
real assets will reduce the supply. With the reduction in supply, the future return of real 
assets rises, and the final price will return to P2, which is a new equilibrium price, with 
the corresponding equilibrium yield of Q2 (see Figure 7.4). 
3. Fake Good News on the Demand Side   
If there is fake good news on the demand side, investors will think that the future 
returns of real assets will rise and that the demand curve will move right from the original 
D to D1, as shown in Figure 7.5.  
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Virtual asset prices will rise, resulting in an increase in demand for real assets. Thus, 
the price of real assets will also rise. Given that the supply of real assets cannot keep up 
with the increase in the very short run, the virtual asset and real asset prices will be 
adjusted to P1. 
Along with the increase in the supply of real assets, asset prices will fall from P1 to 
P2 in the middle run. Nonetheless, P2 is not the ultimate equilibrium. On one hand, the 
future return of real assets did not increase because the good news is false. On the other 
hand, because of the increased supply, the return on real assets will be lower than the 
initial level. When investors observe this, the expectations will be reversed, which drives 
the asset demand curve to the left. In fact, the asset demand curve goes so far that it 
crosses the original demand curve D and arrives at D2. At this time, the new equilibrium 
point is E3, and the new asset price is P3.  
However, E3 is not the ultimate equilibrium point, either. At this point, the price is 
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very low, so the supply of real assets will be reduced. Along with the reduced supply, the 
marginal return on real assets will increase. With the increase of marginal return, the 
price of virtual assets and real assets will also increase, and the final equilibrium will 
return to E, which is the initial equilibrium point. 
We see that a false information will result in sharp fluctuations in the price and 
quantity of the entire factor market (real asset market). The fluctuation follows four 
stages:  
Step 1: Supply is unchanged, and prices rise sharply to the highest point. 
Step 2: Supply increases, and prices decrease slowly. 
Step 3: Increases in supply leads to a decline in returns, a further decline in prices, 
and a sharp decline to a lower level than the original price. 
Step 4: Supply decreases, returns rise, and prices rise slowly to the original 
equilibrium level (see Figure 7.5). 
This phenomenon can be observed in various industries in a economy.  
4. Good news on the demand side is true, but an overreaction (investors are 
overoptimistic) occurs. 
If there is good news in the market and if investors reflect moderately, asset prices 
should rise from P0 to P1 and then fall back to a new level of equilibrium PN. 
However, if investors are overoptimistic about the good news, it means that the 
future return of real assets is overestimated. Therefore, in a very short period of time, the 
asset price is not increased from P0 to P1 but directly up to P2. With the increase in the 
supply of real assets, asset prices fall from P2 to P3. However, at this point, too many real 
155 
 
asset supplies will lead to a decline in return, thereby pushing the asset demand curve to 
shift left sharply toward D2. At this point, asset prices fall to P4. Nonetheless, at this 
point, the supply of assets is too small; hence, the return on assets will increase, and the 
price of assets will rise, eventually returning to the equilibrium price of PN (see Figure 
7.6).  
 
From the analysis of (3) and (4), we see that: 
First, when there is false good news, the virtual asset prices will rise and then cause 
the real asset price to go up.  
Second, when the real asset supply cannot respond in a very short time, asset prices 
will rise rapidly to a very high level. 
Third, the increase of supply in real assets is substantial to the decline in the high 
level asset prices. The specific mechanism is as follows: the increase in the supply of real 
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assets will lead to the decline in returns. As the expected rise in returns is not achieved, 
the return falls to a lower level than the original return. Hence, the false price of the 
assets will fall sharply and lead to a rapid decline in the price of real assets and then to a 
substantial decline in supply. 
Fourth, the low level of supply will increase the return on assets, thereby increasing 
the price of virtual assets and the price of real assets. 
 Fifth, the market fluctuations are caused by the false information, that is, the most 
active variable is virtual asset price, and the return of asset price to equilibrium is caused 
by the supply changes as a result of unit return on asset changes. 
7.4.2 Adjustment of Real Assets and Virtual Assets Prices under Complete 
Inelasticity  
When the supply of real assets is completely inelastic, the supply curve is 
perpendicular to the horizontal axis. 
1. Good news on demand side  
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The demand side of good news means that the future returns will rise, thereby 
pushing the demand’s dotted line to the right. In the absence of any flexibility in supply, 
the price of virtual assets and real assets will increase to PN. For the sake of no new 
supply, asset prices have no incentive to fall (see Figure 7.7). 
This outcome is not surprising, but it is not the focus of our attention. Our focus is 
the following: What If the demand side of good information is false?  
2. Good news on demand side is false 
A. Short term  
When the good news on the demand side is false, investors have the false 
expectations that future returns will increase. Therefore, the real asset demand curve will 
be shifted right to DN. In this case, the price of virtual assets will increase to PN. With the 
rise of virtual asset prices, the price of real assets will also increase to PN.  
When the supply of real assets is elastic, supply as a positive variable will bring the 
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virtual asset prices back to normal levels. In other words, when the supply of real assets is 
elastic, the final price of the asset is determined by the demand and supply together. 
However, in the current situation (the supply is completely inelastic), the supply cannot 
function as a driving force. Consequently, the price of the assets depends entirely on the 
demand. For example, the supply of high-quality human resources is inelastic (such as 
basketball star Yao Ming). Thus, the “price” of Yao Ming as a basketball star depends 
entirely on the club’s expectation of how much profit he will be able to earn for club 
make in the future. When Yao Ming is expected to bring high profits, the “price” of Yao 
Ming will increase. This expectation is not related to the production cost of "Yao Ming" 
which is the cost of living and training costs during the growth of Yao Ming. 
The supply of a premium-located retail estate is also inelastic. The market price of 
this retail shop depends entirely on the expected return this shop can bring to investors. 
The price of the real estate has nothing to do with the production cost (see Figure 7.8).  
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B. Medium term 
In the medium term, investors find that the actual return on assets does not go up and 
thus realize that the previous expectation are wrong. However, this does not necessarily 
cause investors to sell their real assets, thereby pushing the price of real assets back to the 
original level. The reason is that the curve is lower than expected, but it does not mean 
that future earnings are still below the expected level. If investors still believe that the 
real asset prices will increase, the investor’s total return will not be low because the 
earning from increased capital gains will compensate the loss from the reduced holding 
return. In details, investors' rate of return depends not only on each period of income 
(such as rent, dividends) but also on future capital gains. If the current income of each 
period is relatively low but investors expect that the future income will be higher, the 
capital gain will be large. The high capital gains in the future can be used to make up for 
the current loss of income. 
Even if investors find that the original good news is indeed false, they will choose to 
continue to hold the asset as long as investors still believe that the real assets will 
continue to appreciate in the future. Even if the investor himself does not believe that the 
price of the asset will rise, he will think this asset will continue to appreciate as long as 
the investor believes that other investors will expect the asset price to rise. Thus, he will 
continue to hold the assets, and the price of the assets will not fall. He and other investors 
are also likely to continue to purchase the assets; hence, the price of the asset will likely 
to continue to rise from PN1 to PN2.  
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The fundamental reason for this phenomenon is that the supply of real assets is 
inelastic, which disallows the decrease in overvalued asset prices. If the supply of the real 
assets is elastic, the supply will rise as the price of the asset rises and then push the price 
to go down. In this case, investors’ expectation of rising future returns or asset prices will 
be destroyed, so asset prices will return to the original level. In contrast, if the supply of 
the asset is inelastic, the return on assets will not fall when the rate of return is declining. 
In this case, investors can continue to expect that the return of the asset and the asset 
price will continue to rise (see Figure 7.9). Thus, even in the medium term, asset prices 
will not return to their original level. 
We see that when the supply of real assets is not elastic, such that even the increase 
in asset prices is caused by the false good news, it is difficult to return the price to the 
original level because the mediation function of supply to the asset price has disappeared. 
C. Long term 
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In the long run, the false news is finally proved to be false. Any expectations that 
asset prices will continue to rise will not be supported. Hence, asset prices will fall to the 
original level of P1 (see Figure 7.10.)  
 
7.4.3 The Adjustment of the Real Assets and Virtual Assets Under Less Elasticity     
When the real asset supply is lack of elasticity, the slope of the supply asset curve is 
large and close to a vertical line. In this case, the adjustment of real asset and virtual asset 
prices is very similar to the condition of complete inelasticity.  
1. Good news on the demand side:  
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When the return on assets is expected to rise, the demand curve moves right to DN. 
In the short term, the supply cannot react quickly; thus, the price of assets rises to 
P1; see arrow ①.  
In the medium term, the supply will increase a little, which will cause the reduced 
marginal return. Because of the limited supply of assets, however, the decline in return on 
assets is so small that investors will consider it a normal market deviation. Thus, 
investors’ expectations of rising asset prices, which are based on an increase in return on 
assets, will not break. In other words, despite the increase in supply, the price will not be 
reduced to P2 but will be maintained at P1. At this time, the supply will increase to Q1. 
See arrow ②. 
In the long run, because of the considerable supply of Q1, the marginal return on unit 
assets will continue to go down. Therefore, investors will begin to sell the assets. At this 
time, the price will drop to P2, while the supply of assets will decline slowly; see arrow 
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③ (see Figure 7.11). 
2. Good news on the demand side is false 
When there is false good news on the market, according to this news, investors 
expects that future asset returns will increase; hence, the demand curve moves right to 
D1. 
In the short term, the supply cannot immediately increase, so the price of assets will 
rise to P1. 
In the middle term, the supply of assets is so small and thus asset returns fall so 
slightly that investors considered it as normal market bias. Consequently, investors’ 
expectation that asset prices will rise will not be broken. Despite the increase in supply, 
the price will not be reduced to P2 but will be maintained at P1; see arrow ②. (If the 
asset supply is sufficiently elastic, the supply will increase rapidly and thus the asset 
returns will fall very fast. A fast decline in asset return will break expectations on the 
rising return or asset prices, real estate price will go down) 
In the long run, when investors find that the return on assets is relatively low, 
investors will realize that the original good information is false. As a result, prices will 
begin to fall. Because of the increase in the supply of assets, the return of the unit asset is 
relatively low, which makes the demand curve move to the left side of the original 
demand curve. Thus, the price dropped to P3. At this price level, the supply is low; thus, 
the return will begin to rise, and the price and the supply of assets will return to the 
original level, P0 and D0 (see Figure 7.12). 
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In summary, we have: 
1. When the supply is elastic, the overvalued asset prices will be pulled back to 
normal levels regardless of what causes the overvalued asset price.  
2. When the supply is elastic, the supply change can also affect the price of assets. If 
the supply has a substantial increase due to the decline in the cost of the real assets, it will 
certainly lead to a decline in the return of the assets (diminishing marginal rate of return), 
thereby reducing the price of assets. Thus, when supply is elastic, both demand and 
supply will affect the price of the asset. When we valuate assets, the income method and 
cost method can both be used. 
3. The mechanism for regulating the price of assets is as follows: when the expected 
return increases, resulting in asset price rise, the supply of assets will rise. Given the role 
of diminishing marginal returns, when the supply of assets increases, the marginal 
product of the unit assets diminishes, and so the return of the unit assets will inevitably 
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decline. Moreover, the return of asset will eventually reduce asset prices. 
4. When the supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, no matter what causes 
the overvalued assets, this overestimation will be kept not only in the short term but also 
in the middle term. The intuitional reason is the following: the market lack the signal that 
pulls the overvalued price back to normal. 
When the supply cannot increase or hardly increase, the marginal income of the unit 
assets will not fall at all (completely inelastic) or drop very little (lack of flexibility).  
When the marginal income of assets does not change or change very little, asset return is 
still in decline if the asset price increases. Theoretically, declining return should pull the 
overvalued asset prices back to its normal level. In reality, however, even if the return of 
each asset does not rise as expected, investor will still think that the return on investment 
will not decline in the future as long as the return does not decline. As a result, the force 
to pull down the overvalued price does not exist anymore. Overvalued prices will remain 
high for considerably long periods.  
If the supply is elastic, everything will change. As mentioned earlier, when the 
expected return increases and thus cause asset price to rise, the supply of assets will rise. 
Given the role of diminishing marginal returns, the marginal product of the unit assets 
diminishes when the supply of assets increases. Thus, the return of the unit assets will 
inevitably decline, which the investors cannot ignore or deny. With this signal, the 
expectation that the return on the unit asset will be expected to rise in the future cannot be 
established; correspondingly, neither does the rising expectation on future sales price of 
assets. In a word, overvalued asset prices will inevitably fall back to normal. 
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We see that the elastic supply is the force to pull the overvalued asset prices back to 
normal. What’s more, the elastic supply can offer the market a signal that the overvalued 
market price is unlikely to maintain.   
5. When supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, a piece of false 
information can also affect the asset price in a long period of time. Therefore, when 
supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, the cost approach method cannot be 
used to evaluate assets. Income approach will be a suitable appraisal method.  
Inferences from the conclusion above are as follows:   
1. The more inelastic the supply of real assets is, the longer the overvalued price will 
last. The more elastic the supply of real assets is, the shorter the overvalued the price will 
last. This is not the same as in the consumer goods market. For the consumer goods 
market, regardless of the elasticity of the supply of consumer goods, the prices of 
overvalued consumer goods can quickly return to equilibrium. 
2. In the mechanism of asset price adjustment by supply, the key variable is the 
marginal return of asset and the key relationship is that between the return and the price. 
In fact, we have:    
The asset supply increases---the marginal return decreases---the asset price decreases. 
The asset supply decreases---the marginal return increases---the asset price will 
increase.   
Then we could ask such a question: if the relation between asset price and asset 
return does not exist any longer, namely, the price of an asset does not depend on its 
holding period return in the future, what will happen?  
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First at all, we could guess that if the relationship between the price and the marginal 
return is separated, the mechanism of asset price adjustment by supply will not work even 
though the assets are elastic.   
Secondly, we could go further to guess that the asset price can be very high and 
continues to rise even if the asset return is very low.  
But, what is the reason that the price of an asset does not depend on its holding 
period return in the future any more?   
The holding period returns we are talking about above are actually “cash” or 
“monetary” returns.  When owning the real assets could bring the owners something 
much more than monetary returns, namely, some non-monetary returns, the purpose of 
investors in buying this asset will be to get not only monetary returns but also non-
monetary returns. In this case, even if the current monetary returns on assets are very low, 
as long as investors believe their non-monetary returns are high, investors do not feel that 
their returns on investment are very low. What’s more, even if an investor expects that 
the cash returns on the asset in the future are still very low, he still expects that the price 
of the asset will rise as long as the investor believes that the non-monetary returns 
brought by the asset in the future are very high.  
Does such an asset exist? Yes, a house is such an asset. We will discuss houses in 
details later.    
Then we could give some possible answers for such a question: why can the asset 
price be very high and continues to rise when the asset return is very low?     
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First, the asset return is only the monetary return. It does not reflect all the return the 
investors can get from the asset due to the existence of non-monetary return.    
Second, although the current cash returns are very low, investors expect the future 
cash returns might be very high.  
Third, one investor expect the future cash returns are low. Moreover, he/she also 
expect that assets are currently overvalued and will fall sharply one day. However, this 
investor thinks that other investors believe that the asset prices will continue to rise in the 
future. This means that the current assets can be sold to them at higher prices in the future. 
Then this investor would like to buy more assets to make profit.   
Fourth, even if this investor believe that other investors, like himself/herself, also see 
that the assets are overvalued and the asset bubbles are bound to burst one day. However, 
as long as the investor believes that the day is still far away and that he/she can run ahead 
before its arrival, he/she will also continue to buy the assets, thereby boasting the 
appreciation of asset prices. In other words, he believes that a bigger fool exists and this 
fool would be the buyer of his asset.   
7.5 The Consequences of Asset Prices Deviating from Market 
Fundamentals 
1. Asset prices cannot reflect the asset market fundamentals  
When asset prices fully reflect the asset market fundamentals, namely, the holding 
period returns, assets cannot be overpriced for long. Asset markets will function very well 
as a tool to uncover the true price of assets and add value to those assets. In this case, all 
investors can only get the normal returns.  
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Now let’s focus on the welfare effect which asset markets bring to society. When the 
asset market is efficient, very little speculative money will come into this market because 
there are very few opportunities to make profit from speculation. What’s more, because 
investment can only get normal returns, investors are not highly motivated to buy and sell 
assets very frequently.  As a result, the turnover rate is not high.  
Moreover, a virtual asset market can function as a tool of value discovery and value. 
When good news appears, the prices of virtual assets will increase immediately. This is 
the function of price discovery. When virtual asset prices rise but the replacement costs of 
real assets remain the same, enterprises will then expand the scale of production or start 
new projects by issuing new shares. In addition, these virtual assets have such attractive 
returns that market investors are willing to purchase new shares. Subsequently, profitable 
projects are financed through the virtual asset market.  This is the function of value 
creation or wealth creation.  
Note as well that in the process of price discovery and value creation, investors will 
not overreact or underreact to new information. Therefore, the situation is the same as 
previously discussed. First, because price does not rise continuously, money entering the 
capital market does not increase quickly because the speculative opportunities are low. 
Second, although the future returns of real assets rise because of the rapid rise in the price 
of virtual assets, investors can only get a normal return. Therefore, they are not highly 
motivated to buy and sell the assets on a frequent basis. This is the basic feature of 
efficient asset markets: they could discover value and create value, but hardly entails 
excessive speculation and speculation. 
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Case 1: An investor is expected to receive $1 per share from one stock; the discount 
rate is 4%. If the price per share of this stock is equal to the sum of discounted value of 
all future yield per share, the stock price per share should be as follows:  
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(7.3) 
If the market price always reflect market fundamentals, its price is always $25 
whenever the stock is sold.  
25$
%4
1$
==P  
In this case, if the stock is exchanged once, the money newly entering the stock is 
$25. Given that the stock price does not rise, investors also get nothing but the income 
return (4%). Therefore, investors are not highly motivated to buy and sell the stock and 
the turnover rate will be very low. We could assume that it is exchanged four times a 
year, then the total money newly entering into the market is $25 × 4 = $100. 
Three points should be emphasized here. 
First, due to the stable stock price, each transfer does not bring more money to stock 
market. (By contrast, if the stock price keeps going up, each transfer always bring more 
money to this market.)  
Second, because of lack of excess returns, the stock holders are very likely to 
withdraw these funds from the stock market and transfer them to the real economy after 
they sell the stock. In any case, the money taken out from real economy and spent on 
speculation is not large. Thus, the real economy will be well supported by enough 
working capitals. 
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Third, since every investor can only get a normal return, no redistribution of wealth 
happens and income inequality will not be worsened.  
Case 2: A stock is the same as in case 1. Each share of this stock is expected to bring 
$1 to its investor and the discount rate is 4%. By flow discounted model, the stock price 
per share should be $25 because of: 
25$
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==P  
In the next one year, we assume good news appears at the end of each quarter. For 
example, the government announces that it will loosen some regulation on some. Assume 
that the appearance of every piece of good news can upgrade the yield per share by $0.2, 
and there will be no good news in one year. If the market is efficient, the price of the 
stock will react quickly after the good news appears. At the end of each quarter, the stock 
price is as follows: 
30$
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Assume that the stock is sold after each price rise. The following table lists the price, 
the holder, the dividend, and the capital gain of the stock in the year.  
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Table 7.1  Price, Holder, Dividend and Capital Gain 
Season Beginning 
of  
1st Season 
End of  
1st   
Season 
End of  
 2nd 
Season 
End of  
3rd  
Season 
End of  
4th Season 
After 4th 
Season  
Stock Price 25 30 35 40 45 45 
Holder Holder A Holder A Holder B Holder C Holder D Holder D 
Dividends  - 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Capital Gains  0 5 5 5 5 0 
 
Total money newly coming into the stock market is: 30 + 35 + 40 + 45 = $150 
The following are what we can observe.  
First, the stock price experienced a rise before transfer at the end of every quarter. 
Because stock price was not caused by the false information or overly optimistic 
investors but by the changing of market fundamentals, the stock price rose reasonably.  
Hence, the times of transfers did not significantly increase. Although funds into stocks 
now are more than the previous example, the rise is not large. 
Second, because the stock price rose quickly after the good news came, the 
opportunity to excess returns is fleeting. In addition, after an excess return appears, it is 
difficult to predict when the next excess return will come. Thus, after selling shares to 
obtain excess return, each stockholder will withdraw these funds from the stock market 
and transfer them to the real economy or for consumption. In this case, the development 
of the real economy can be well supported. 
Third, in addition to dividends, holders A, B, C, and D obtained the excess return 
because of the capital gains. The capital gains are asset price appreciations brought about 
by the ascension of expected returns. They are parts of investor benefits and also one of 
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the purposes of investors. Consequently, no redistribution of wealth occurs because no 
one loses. 
2. Virtual assets deviate from market fundamentals 
When virtual assets deviates from market fundamentals, virtual markets will attract 
more and funds for speculation and eventually lead to a changed wealth distribution. 
Meanwhile, virtual markets will not function as a tool of value discovery and value 
creation. 
When virtual assets deviate from market fundamentals, the asset price could rise 
continuously even though the market has poor fundamentals. In this situation, the main 
purpose of the investors in buying assets is not to get holding period returns but rather the 
future price appreciation, namely, capital gains. Therefore, although more money flows 
into the market accompanied by rising asset prices, most of the money cannot be 
transferred effectively to the real economy as production factors because investors are 
pursuing after the assets with high price appreciation, not the assets with high holding 
period return. The virtual asset market becomes a big casino: assets are swapped very 
frequently, but the new value created is zero. Money are not working as production 
factors, but as a tool to take money from other investors. To sum up, in such an asset 
market, there is not value discovery and value creation, but the wealth redistribution and 
wealth waste.  
Case 3: A stock is the same as before. When an IPO is offered, the issue price of 
stock should be as follows: 
25$
%4
1$
==P
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Assume the dividend does not change within one year but the asset price keeps going 
up. Also, assume that stocks are transferred 12 times in a year and stock price rises by $3 
at the end of each month when the transfer happens. Since the rising prices are not 
supported by market fundamentals, asset prices will fall to the original level. Assume that 
stock prices fall to the original level ($25 per share) in the 13th month. 
The holders, prices, dividends, and capital gains of this stock at the end of each 
month in the whole year will be as follows.  
Table 7.2  Price, Holder, Dividend and Capital Gain 
Month Before 
1st 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
 
7th 8th 
 
9th 
 
10th 
 
11th 
 
12th 13th 
Investor A A B C D E F G H I J K L L 
Dividends - $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 
Prices $25 $28 $31 $34 $37 $40 $43 $46 $49 $52 $55 $58 $61 $25 
Source: Author 
Here, three points should also be emphasized. 
First, the market fundamentals have not changed, but for some reason, the asset price 
rises away from fundamentals. Rising asset prices will lead to more-rapidly-increasing 
asset prices, asset prices will be deviating from fundamentals. Driven by rising 
expectations, turnover increases. With the increasing turnover rate and asset prices, more 
and more funds flow into the asset market to buy this stock. 
Within 12 months, new funds pouring into the stock market to buy the stock are as 
follows: 28 + 31 + 34 +…………+61 = $523 
In case 1, the funds pouring into the stock market to buy the stock is only $100 in a 
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year; in case 2, it increases to $150. Compared with case 1, there is $423 more flowing 
into the stock market in case 3; compared with case 2, there is $375 flowing into the 
stock market in case 3. 
Second, much money flows into the stock market and but it rarely come out. In cases 
1 and 2, the seller will very likely put the money received into the real economy after 
selling the stock because the opportunities for excess returns in the stock market are very 
limited. In current case, investors will not invest the money into the real economy after 
they sell the stock. They will continue to wait and look for opportunities of obtain 
excessive returns in the stock market. 
With so much money pouring into the virtual asset market and remaining there, we 
have the following consequences. First, funds originally invested in the real economy are 
tied up in virtual assets market. Second, funds originally intended for consumption are 
also tied up in virtual assets market. As a result, aggregate demand for consumptions and 
aggregate output will be reduced.  
Third, when stocks are swapped, wealth is redistributed. In other words, the process 
of stock swapping is the process of wealth distribution. As previously mentioned, the 
rising prices are not supported by market fundamentals; hence, asset prices are bound to 
fall to the original level. Suppose that stock prices fall to the original level ($25 per share) 
in the 13th month. Thus, the net loss of holder L at then end of a year is as follows: 
Loss of L = 61 − 25 – 3 = $33 
We can also calculate the total gains of other investors. Obviously, 
GainA = GainB = …… = GainK = $3, and 
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GainA + GainB + …… + GainK = $33 
Subsequently, our results confirmed that the loss of L is equal to the sum of the gain 
of A, B, …… D.  
LossL= GainA+GainB+……+GainK                                (7.4) 
This means that the wealth of investor L is redistributed to the other 11 investors. 
However, the total wealth they created in this economy is zero. 
Fourth, the rise of asset prices will attract a large sum of money to buy these assets. 
If the asset is a real asset, the rise of asset prices will directly promote its supply 
increases, even far beyond social demands, and result in an enormous waste of resources. 
If the asset is a pure virtual asset, the increase of the asset prices will increase demand for 
real assets and then increase the supply of real assets. Similarly, it will exceed social 
demand and cause a huge waste of social resources. 
Generally, when the price of pure virtual assets is deviating from market 
fundamentals and the price is rising, the following will occur.  
First, new funds would flow into virtual asset markets to purchase the assets, which 
means money constantly escapes from the real economy.  
Second, continuously-rising asset prices would prompt investors to build the 
expectations that the prices will go higher. Under such an expectation, investors are 
unwilling to leave the asset market and return the money to the real economy after they 
have sold their assets and taken large profit. Hence, increasing amounts of money are 
detained in asset market merely for speculation but not for real economy production.  
Third, the virtual asset market becomes a casino. Social wealth redistribution 
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happens and the income inequality worsens. Nevertheless, no new social wealth is 
created because all returns sum to zero. 
Fourth, the sharp rise of virtual asset prices would promote the demand for real 
assets.  Eventually, the real asset will be oversupplied, which cause the big waste of 
social resources.  
7.6 Real Estate: A Special Asset 
7.6.1 Real Estate as a Real Asset and a Virtual Asset 
The category of real estate is, first and foremost, a consumer good, and one of the 
most fundamental of such goods. There is a common Chinese saying: clothing, food, 
housing, and transportation are indispensable! 
Land, factory buildings, and real estate offices are important to production. 
Additionally, shops, apartments, hotels, entertainment properties, airports, stations, and 
gas stations are crucial elements in the provision of for-profit services. Conversely, 
government office buildings, school buildings, museums, hospitals, and churches, are 
vital for the delivery of non-profit services. Hence, real estate matters.  
Every real asset contains a virtual asset. That is to say, possessing a real asset 
involves simultaneous right to claim returns from this assets. When an enterprise 
purchases a piece of land or a house and puts them into the production process, 
simultaneously, the purchaser obtained the right to claim the return from the real asset. In 
other words, the enterprise also acquired virtual assets, which are the claims on the future 
profits of the land or real estate. Similarly, when a family bought a piece of land or real 
estate, the family possessed the real assets. Meanwhile, they also had claims (namely, 
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virtual assets) on the future utility of the land or real estate. 
The current selling price of the house is exactly the price of real assets. Furthermore, 
the total discounted value of the future utility brought by the housing is the price of the 
residential virtual asset. Investors do not wish to buy a house only until the price of 
virtual assets is higher than that of the real assets. As for society, the marginal price of 
virtual assets is equal to those of real assets.  
Real assets can be disconnected with virtual assets. The real assets and virtual assets 
of real estate can also be disconnected. When real estate is exchanged for shares or leased 
to an enterprise for rent, the owner loses the real assets but gains virtual assets, namely, 
the claims for the residual of the enterprise or the claims for the rent and the principal. 
Similarly, when real estate were leased to a family, the owner also acquired the virtual 
assets, specifically, the claims on the rent. 
When real estate is sold to an enterprise, the owner obtains another real asset 
(money) but does not acquire the virtual assets. Likewise, when lands or real estates were 
sold to a family, the owner gained another real asset (money) but did not secure the 
virtual assets.  
When real assets and virtual assets of real estate are separated from each other, 
virtual assets of real estate are pure virtual assets. 
7.6.2 Supply Elasticity of Real Estate 
When real assets and virtual assets of real estate are disconnected to one another, 
virtual assets of real estate are pure virtual assets. The supply of real estate is inelastic 
because of the limited supply of land.  
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1. Real estate with a special location or extensive historical and cultural value: 
supply is completely inelastic. 
Many cities possess a single landmark. Buildings on that landmark are unique. They 
can neither be replaced nor reproduced. Real estate with special cultural value, in most 
cases, is unique. As a result, its supply is fully inelastic. 
2. Real estate in developed areas: supply lacks elasticity. 
Real estate in developed areas could be replaced by surrounding real estate. 
However, given that no two identical space positions exist, any location is essentially 
unique. The surrounding real estate could be approximately substituted for this kind of 
real estate but cannot completely replace it. 
Therefore, the supply of real estate in developed area is less elastic. The more 
developed this area is, the more inelastic the supply is. Therefore, the closer to the city 
center the real estate is, the more inelastic the supply because the central area of a city is 
the most developed areas.  
3. Real estate in developing areas: supply has elasticity 
        In developing areas (for example, in emerging cities), there is much space available 
for the real estate development. When real estate prices increase, supply will rises very 
rapidly.  Real estate supply is more elastic in those areas.  
7.6.3. The Elasticity of Supply and the Adjustment of Real Estate Prices 
1. Real estate with complete inelasticity  
When real estate is completely inelastic, the overly high price is hard to come back 
to the normal level because the signals of market fundamentals can rarely appear.  
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If false good news appeared in real estate market (for example, a new subway will 
go through a place), the rent will rise. Real estate prices will also rise accordingly.  
However, no new supply appears because the supply is completely inelastic. Hence, 
real estate rents have not fallen. Real estate rent-to-price ratio will be decreasing because 
of the rising housing prices and fixed rents. Even so, the real estate price will not 
necessarily fall if investors expect future price increases.  
Therefore, when real estate prices rise because of false information, house prices will 
not fall for a considerable time. In fact, house prices will not fall but rise instead for an 
extended time because of the lack of signals.  
2. Real estate with not complete inelasticity.   
In this situation, given that the signal of market fundamentals provided by supply is 
unclear, once the price is overvalued, it would be difficult for the price to fall as well. 
If false news appears on the market, then real estate prices will rise. Moreover, if the 
supply of the real estate increases heavily, then the rent of the real estate market will be 
reduced by the increased supply. As an important signal, dropping rent will break the 
market expectations about house prices rising continually, and then the high housing 
prices will return to normal.  
Consequently, owing to the lack of supply elasticity, few supply increases shall occur 
despite the overvaluation of house prices. Thus, rent decline is not obvious and cannot 
provide investors with a strong signal that housing prices will drop significantly. 
When the supply rises very little, the rents fall slightly. Falling rents will lead to the 
fall of the housing rent-to-price ratio. However, if investors expect future prices to rise, 
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then the decrease of the rents will be offset by the rise of capital gains. In conclusion, due 
to the inelasticity, the market does not provide the signals that are strong enough to pull 
the real estate’s price down.  
 Therefore, even if real estate prices rise owing to false information, house prices 
will not fall for a considerable time. In fact, because of the unapparent signal about 
housing price decline and the expectations about housing price rising continually, house 
prices will not fall but rise for extended period. Of course, such time is shorter than when 
supply is completely inelastic. 
3. Real estate with high elasticity: rapidly increased supply drives overvalued real 
estate prices back to normal level very quickly 
In this case, once the real estate prices were overvalued, the supply would increase 
quickly. With such increase, real estate rents would decline very fast. As an important 
signal, rent decline could break the expectations that real estate prices will rise 
continually, and thus the real estate prices would begin to fall. 
Therefore, real estate prices fluctuate more frequently in developing areas. 
Specifically, prices cannot remain overvalued when false good news appears.  
7.7 Houses and their Uniqueness 
7.7.1 The Essential Difference between a House and a Commercial Property 
Purchasing commercial property is similar to purchasing stocks. Rents represent the 
holding period returns from commercial property. By the Discounted Flow Model, the 
theoretical value of a commercial property is equal to the sum of discounted value of all 
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future rents. In practice, the total returns of a commercial property consist of the rents 
before sales and purchase-resale differences (capital gains). 
Is the theoretical value of a house also equal to the discounted value of the total 
future rents? If the answer is yes, then no essential difference would exist between a 
commercial property and a house. However, the answer is no. Given that most of houses 
are self-occupied, the theoretical value of a house should be the sum of discounted value 
of all returns that its owner receives from its self-occupied house. However, the total 
returns that the owner receives from his/her self-occupied house are not equal to the rents 
of the house. The utility that the owner obtains from his self-occupied house is much 
greater than the rents if this house is leased.  
In fact, owners can obtain at least five types of utilities from their self-occupied 
houses. Residence is only one of those utilities. However, “residence” is all the utility 
that tenants can acquire from their rented houses, so the rent is actually the price of 
“residence”.  The following are the five types of utilities the owner can obtain from their 
self-occupied houses.  
1. Residence. It is one of the basic needs of people, because it is a vital condition for 
all kinds of human activities, such as sleep, leisure, diet, and party. The utility that tenants 
gain from their rented houses is residence.  
2. The Right of Free Arrangement. People have personalized demands for their own 
living space, such as space design and decoration style. If the house is rented, the tenant 
is not allowed to freely rearrange and decorate the space according to his/her own needs. 
However, the owner has the free right to arrange and decorate his own space according to 
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his preference. In fact, the need fulfilled from the right of free arrangement also belongs 
to the needs of the living, which can be raised to the personalized level. 
3. The Feeling of Settlement. This is a psychological need that is essentially equal to 
a sense of security plus a sense of belonging. 
First, it is impossible for rented houses to provide tenants with an adequate sense of 
security because tenants cannot live in a rented house as long as they want. In China, 
lease agreement is an obligatory-right contract. The house owner can dissolve the 
contract at any time before termination date as long as the owner compensates the tenants. 
This means the tenants can be evicted out of the house at any time during the lease term. 
(In many western countries, tenant’s right from the lease contract is not obligatory right 
but a property right. Under this condition, the owner cannot end the lease contract until 
the termination date, so the tenants could have more of a feeling of security and 
settlement during the lease term. Even if so, being evicted at the end of the lease remains 
possible.) By contrast, owning a house is a property right, people’s ownership of houses 
completely eliminates the possibility of being evicted and thus ensure the feeling of 
security. In addition to the sense of security of not being evicted, ownership fosters the 
feeling of security at other aspects. A house can protect a family from the risk of rapidly-
increasing rent, various emergency, accidents, economic pressure and family bankrupt. In 
this sense, owning a house is very similar to buying a insurance for the whole family. 
Second, a house is an immovable property. When people acquire the sense of 
security from this immovable property, they would also acquire the sense of belonging to 
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its area. When people own a house, they will psychologically feel that they are residents 
of the area.  
4. Proud Identity. It is a “higher level” of psychological need. For an upscale 
property, ownership of such a property can have a function of flaunting due to its unique 
location value, historic value or other cultural value. For an ordinary property, although it 
does not have the function of flaunting, ownership of such a property can improve the 
credit rating in banks and other financial intermediaries. This ownership can also upgrade 
the trust level from business partner and promote the trust level from the prospective 
spouse and his/her family. Hence, while ordinary property cannot provide the function of 
flaunting, it can offer a certain degree of “sense of identity.” 
 By Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory, "physiological needs", "safety or security 
needs", "belonging" and "love" needs, "esteem" needs, "self-actualization" needs are the 
pattern that human motivations generally move through. Owning a house meets the needs 
of the first four. 
5. Economic benefits. When house prices rise, the owners of self-occupied houses 
can potentially increase their wealth through. Such benefits are unavailable for tenants. In 
addition, when rents rise, self-occupied owners are not affected, but tenants have to pay 
more rent. 
7.7.2 The Price-To-Rent Ratio of a House will be Higher than That of a commercial 
Property  
As shown by the above analysis, compared with renting, purchasing a house has the 
following advantages: free arrangement, the feeling of settlement and the feeling of proud 
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identity. When the economy is in a rising cycle, and therefore both house prices and rents 
rise, purchasing a house can represent a fourth advantage: economic benefits. 
Thus, the profits that an owner receives from his self-occupied house extend far 
beyond those from renting out his house. Therefore, the profits that an owner obtains 
from his self-occupied house can be divided into two parts: rental income and non-rental 
income. The latter includes the feeling of settlement, the right of free arrangement, 
identity, and the possibility of gaining economic benefits. 
As stated, the theoretical value of a house is based on the total gains that its owner 
receives from the self-occupied house. Given that the rent from this house is only a part 
of the total gains, the theoretical value based on total gains must be more than the value 
based only on rents.  
Therefore, the price-to-rent ratio of a house is higher than that of the commercial 
property and higher than the Price/Earning Ratio (P/E Ratio)115 of the stock.  
A simple comparison can be made here. A large retail chain company intends to 
open a new branch in a commercial street. It has two ways to open this branch: buying a 
store or renting a store. Those two ways present no difference. Even if the owner bought 
the store, he could not obtain the feeling of settlement, which could be acquired from 
buying a house. Certainly, buying the store can generate the right of free arrangement. 
However, renting the store also involves this right due to the particularity of retail store. 
If the store is located in a well-known street (such as Shanghai’s Nanjing Road and 
                                                             
115 The price-earnings ratio (P/E Ratio) is the ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share 
price relative to its per-share earnings. The price-earnings ratio can be calculated as: Market Value per 
Share / Earnings per Share.  
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Xujiahui and Beijing’s Xidan, Wangfujing), buying it can bring popularity to the 
enterprise, but renting it can also have the same popularity. 
Similarly, if an enterprise wishes to set up a new office in a city, the enterprise also 
has two means to acquire the office: buying or renting. No matter which means is chosen, 
the function remains indifferent. When the enterprise decides to buy an office, it could 
not obtain the feeling of settlement that could be acquired from buying a house. Buying 
an office involves acquiring the right of free arrangement. However, similar to the retail 
store, renting the office involves this right, too. If the office is located in a well-known 
area (such as Shanghai’s Lujiazui, People's Square and Beijing’s China World Trade 
Center, Dongdan), buying it can add popularity to the enterprise, but renting it can also 
achieve the same effect. 
To sum up, the utilities acquired from renting and purchasing are the same for stores 
and office buildings. The same is true for hotels, storage properties, and tourism 
properties. As a result, the rent could reflect the total return from those commercial 
properties. Hence, the prices and rents of commercial properties are closely related. 
However, in China, lease and residence are not interchangeable, because the total 
benefits of owning a house is very different from the benefits of renting a house. In fact, 
this difference is so big that the link between prices and rents of house is cut off. Thus, 
the prices can be separated from the rents, and they free rise or fall under the influence of 
other factors. 
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7.7.3 Why Are Housing Prices Increasing Faster than Commercial Property and 
Other Assets? 
The advantages noted above only suggest that house prices are overvalued but do not 
answer the following question: compared to commercial property and other assets, why 
do house prices rise so rapidly?  
First, purchasing a house has the same characteristics as the investing in investment 
vehicles, because buying a house is also an act of investment. As an investment, the price 
of a house is not the same as that of a pure consumption good.  The prices of 
consumption goods merely depend on their marginal utilities and theirs marginal 
production costs, but the housing prices depend on market fundamentals (the rents) and 
expectations for future price movements, which is affected by the trend of historical 
house prices.  
Second, compared with investment in commercial property, stocks, bonds and funds, 
purchasing a house has a characteristic that these assets do not have: market 
fundamentals (rents) that have minimal influence on house prices, or the link between the 
price and its fundamentals is cut off. Hence, compared with other types of assets, house 
prices can go up more freely, quickly and longer. Besides the consumption attribute of 
residence, which can be acquired from renting, buying a house also presents three types 
of additional consumption attributes. The three attributes include the right of free 
arrangement, the feeling of settlement, and identity. These three consumption attributes, 
which cannot be received from renting, create the effect whereby house prices are 
minimally affected from rents and the link between house prices and rents is severed. 
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If house buyers are purchasing houses not for living in, will that affect the above 
conclusions? In other words, at this time, are houses similar to commercial properties 
wherein the prices and rents have a close relationship? 
The answer is no. Even if the buyers are not purchasing houses for living in, it 
remains difficult for a connection between house prices and rents to exist. The 
fundamental reason is that most of the houses are self-occupied. Hence, the house price 
depends on the total benefits that the owner received from the self-occupied house, rather 
than on the returns (rents) that the house lessors obtained from lessees. Purchasing a 
house has the advantages which renting a house does not have, such that the total benefits 
that the owner received from the self-occupied house is higher those from rent. Thus, the 
price of a house based on the benefits from the self-occupied house is higher than that 
based on the rents. 
Therefore, the price-to-rent ratio of a house is higher than that of commercial 
property and higher than the P/E ratio of other assets as well. Conversely, when buying a 
house to obtain rent, the investment return measured by rent/price is lower than from 
commercial property and other assets. 
It is emphasized that the total benefits from self-occupied houses are bigger than 
those from rented houses. We cannot, however, conclude that the higher housing prices 
are always resulting from the bigger benefits. In fact, in many situations, the soaring-up 
housing prices cannot be explained by the bigger benefits at all. In other words, the 
reason why the investors buy a house at a very high price, is not because they can acquire 
the big benefits (residence, self-arrangement, security, settlement and identity) from 
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living in those houses, but because they expect that they get big capital gains from rapidly 
increasing prices. The existence of non-monetary benefits from houses cut off the 
relationship between housing prices and rents, then letting the housing prices can go up 
freely.     
Overtime, house prices rose so rapidly that investors with many houses did not care 
about the trivial rental incomes, and left the house empty. Typical to speculative behavior, 
the wait until prices rise to an ideal level and then sell the houses. This is why there are so 
many vacant houses and ghost cities in China. 
7.7.4 Why Do There Exist House Rental Markets? 
The residential utility obtained from purchasing a house and renting a house are not 
interchangeable. This condition, therefore, leads to the relatively high price-to-rent ratio 
of a house. Conversely, that ratio means that the rate of return of a house is relatively low. 
Given this relatively rate of return of a house (due to the relatively high price-to-rent 
ratio), why is the house rental market still widespread? Or, why would some companies 
like to run houses renting business?   
The answers can only be found in transaction and service costs. 
1. The transaction costs of buying a house are far greater than that of renting one. 
When someone comes to a city, he can solve the problem of living only by two ways: 
renting and buying. If he chooses to rent, the costs of moving to another area include the 
search costs, contract negotiation costs, brokerage commission s, and the cost of 
termination of the lease (default) when renting a house. However, if he chooses to buy, 
the costs of moving to another area entail house searching costs, contract negotiation 
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costs, taxes, brokerage commission, as well as the buyer's search costs when the house is 
sold, the contract negotiation costs, taxes, and brokerage commission. Clearly, the 
transaction costs of buying a house are far greater than that of renting one. Consequently, 
house owners can charge higher rents. Higher rents indicate that the lessor of a house can 
obtain higher incomes, which makes house rental business profitable. Therefore, the 
house rental markets can exist. 
If the time that a person lives somewhere is shorter (such as within 15 days), even 
the cost of renting a house is too high. Thus, staying in a hotel becomes a better choice. 
Therefore, the following market segmentation was formed: people who live for a very 
short term choose to stay in hotels, those for a short and medium term choose to rent a 
house, and those for the long term choose to buy a house. All these choices results from 
transaction costs. 
2. Aside from the advantage of transaction costs, renting a house also presents 
another advantage: the low service costs brought about by scale economy. When a 
company specializing in house rental services operates numerous apartments, it needs 
only to hire a few people to provide many apartments with cleaning, maintenance, and 
other services (including emergency services). Thus, tenants can enjoy these services at a 
very low cost. However, if a person chooses to buy rather than to rent, the cost of 
obtaining these services will be extremely high. Therefore, lessors can further improve 
the rents. Higher rents make the house rental business more profitable, and therefore the 
house rental markets can exist.   
191 
 
7.8 Housing Bubbles can Last in the Long Run Because 
Housing Prices and Rents are Separated 
Previous analysis shows that when housing is overvalued, supply is the crucial factor 
in pulling back prices. The reason supply was able to play this role is that increasing 
supply will lower rents. The smaller the supply elasticity, the lesser the supply increases 
when housing prices are overvalued. Additionally, more supply cannot provide the signal 
of breaking the aforementioned expectation. Hence, there is minimal possibility of 
overvalued housing prices declining. The least possibility of overvalued prices declining 
occurs for the real estate with completely inelastic supply, followed by that with inelastic 
supply. However, for the real estate with elastic supply, the reduction space of overvalued 
real estate price is extremely large. 
The above analysis is primarily used in commercial real estate and is unsuitable for 
housing. Given the difference between utilities provided by leased houses and those 
provided by self-occupied, housing rent cannot fully reflect the total benefits of self-
occupied houses. Specifically, housing rent cannot indicate the housing market 
fundamentals. In this situation, capitalization of housing rent will be far less than the 
price of the house.  
Such difference is crucial because it means that the relationship between housing 
price and housing rent is cut off. Given that rent is a core variable, the signal effects rent 
has on house prices disappear. Therefore, even for an emerging urban residential market 
with elastic supply, housing prices will hardly drop not only in the short and middle term 
but also in the long term. In conclusion, the particularity of houses likewise enables 
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overvalued prices to persist in the short, medium, and long term, whether the housing 
supply is completely inelastic, partially inelastic, or elastic. 
1. When good news appears on the residential market, it is not necessarily 
manifested as the rise of rent, because when buying houses, investors aim not only at 
rent, but also at other non-rental utilities, such as right of freedom to decorate, sense of 
stability, and identity recognition. Even though the rent stays low in the long run, as long 
as investors find that other returns are on the rise, they do not consider that returns 
provided by the house are shrinking.  
When good news appears on the commercial real estate market, the good news must 
be reflected in the rent very soon, because rents are the only return from commercial real 
estate investors. If the rent of commercial real estate remains extremely low, it will prove 
that the good news about commercial real estate is false. Hence, the price of commercial 
real estate cannot remain overvalued but must fall. 
2. Related to the first point, if the housing investors focus not only on rent but also 
on the non-rent benefits, what they care is not the rental return, but the total return 
Therefore, expectations of rising asset prices cannot be broken even if rental return is low 
in the long run. If the rent is extremely low but investors consider the total returns is very 
high, overvalued housing prices will be maintained. If investors think the total returns 
will be rising, then overvalued housing prices could be further overvalued. 
For commercial real estate (or other kinds of financial assets such as stocks), because 
investors are concerned about the rent, the relative return measured by investors must be 
the rental return, that is, rent-to-price ratio. For commercial real estate with inelastic 
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supply, when prices are overvalued, supply will not increase and the rent will not drop. 
Expectations that the prices commercial real estate will be rising cannot be broken in the 
short and medium term. However, in the long run, the rental return will falls because the 
rent is the same but the price is overvalued. It will eventually break the expectation of 
rising prices and cause a decline in commercial real estate prices.  
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CHAPTER 8: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
It is very clear that “Housing Prices” is the dependent variable and “Income 
Inequality” is one of independent variable. In addition to Income Inequality, independent 
variables also include Aggregate Products, Population, Housing Prices, Money Supply 
and Stock Market Index. The reasons why those variables were chosen and the measures 
for them will be illustrated one by one.  
The data of Housing Prices, Aggregated Product, Population, Housing Prices and 
Income Inequality are quarterly data collected from the first Quarter of 2000 to the third 
Quarter of 2016, for China’s 70 different cities. The data of Money Supply and Stock 
Market are quarterly data collected from the first Quarter of 2000 to the third Quarter, 
2016, at national level, not for different 70 cities.   
8.1 Dependent Variables and Independent Variable 
8.1.1 Dependent Variable: Housing Prices  
1. Measure: Quarterly Average Housing Prices（Y） 
2. Data Source 
Quarterly Housing Prices for 70 different cities from the first Quarter of 2000 to the 
third Quarter of 2016 are from 2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China 
R&D Institute (Authorized Access), 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of 
Statistics of Republic of China.  
8.1.2 Independent Variables 
1. Aggregate Product of an Economy   
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(1) Measure: Quarterly Gross Domestic Product（X1）  
GDP will certainly affect such prices. There are two ways in which GDP or GDI 
influences housing prices. One is by increasing demand in the capital market, and another 
is by increasing demand in the rental market.   
The basic economic model tells us that asset prices are driven by rent, which is then 
driven by space demand. Thus, the first path in which GDP affects housing prices is 
“high GDP, high space demand, high rent, leading to high housing prices.” 
However, in many situations, housing prices are separate from housing rents. They 
are directly driven by GDP. Thus, the second path in which GDP influences housing 
prices is “high GDP, high assets demand, resulting in high housing prices.” 
When there is no speculation demand in a housing market, the housing prices are 
mainly driven by the first path. Conversely, when there is high speculation demand in a 
housing market, the housing prices are primarily driven by the second path. The demand 
in the first path is for consumption, while the demand in the second path is for assets. 
(2) Data Source 
Quarterly Gross Domestic Product for 70 different cities from the first Quarter of 
2000 to the third Quarter of 2016 are from Wind Database, iFinD Database, CEInet 
Statistics Database and 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of 
Republic of China.  
2. Population 
(1) Measure: Quarterly Permanent Residential Population（X2） 
Population also influences housing prices. Population increase comes from two 
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sources: the self-increase of this city’s population and immigrants from other cities. In the 
short and middle term, immigrants cause the population increase.  
In China, there are two definitions of population. One is called “HUKOU” 
population, which is very similar to “citizens.” Another one is called Permanent Resident 
Population, which includes the people with “HUKOU” and the people who work and live 
here but do not have “HUKOU.”   
“HUKOU” residents (citizens) and “Non-HUKOU” residents have very different 
“welfare profits.” For example, in Beijing, Non-HUKOU residents are not eligible to buy 
houses unless they have worked and paid social insurance for five consecutive years. 
Non-HUKOU residents are ineligible to attend the Beijing vehicle-license-plate lottery. 
Moreover, children from Non-HUKOU families are disqualified from enrolling in all 
elementary, middle, and high schools in Beijing but are allowed in some assigned 
schools, which are usually very poor schools. Non-HUKOU residents are also ineligible 
for medical insurance, endowment insurance, unemployment insurance, home loans from 
housing accumulation fund, and affordable housing policies. Consequently, Non-
HUKOU residents are seen as “second-class citizens.” They have their own name, that is, 
“Beijing Drifters.”   
While governments always use HUKOU residents in statistical work, permanent 
residents population is used instead in this study. The Non-HUKOU residents work, live, 
and consume various kinds of goods in this city despite being overlooked and 
discriminated against by governments. They represent an important part of the total 
demand for homes. Hence, both Non-HUKOU residents and HUKOU residents are 
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participants in the home markets.  
(2) Data Source 
Quarterly Permanent Residential Population for 70 different cities from the first 
Quarter of 2000 to the third Quarter of 2016 are from 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, 
National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of China and Wind Database.   
3. Housing Policy  
(1) Measure: Quarterly Housing Policy Dummy Variable（X3）. When there are 
housing policies, X3=1; when there are not housing policies, X3=0.  
In China, various types of housing policies have emerged since 2005. They include:  
1) Home Loan Policies. These include:  
A. Increasing the interest rate by 10% for the second home 
B. Increasing the down payment rate from 30% to 70% for the second home 
C. Prohibiting a loan for the third home 
D. Changing the definition of “Second Home Loan.” Normally, the second home 
is defined as the second home a family buys when this family has already owned one.  
2) Purchase Constraint Policies. These include: 
A. One citizen family in this city can buy a maximum of two new houses after the 
policy came out. In other words, one citizen in one city cannot buy a third home.  
B. An unmarried adult citizen (over 18 years) can only buy one new house after 
the policy came out. Thus, said adult citizen cannot buy a second home. 
C. An adult (over 18 years) without “HUKOU”(citizenship) but who has worked 
and paid social insurance in a city for five consecutive years can buy only one new house 
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after the policy came out. Said adult cannot buy a second home.  
3) Transaction Tax Policies  
 A. Adjusting contract tax 
 B. Adjusting income tax  
 C. Adjusting Value-added tax 
 (2) Data Source  
   Quarterly Housing Policies for 70 cities from the first Quarter of 2000 through the 
third Quarter of 2016 are from 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of 
Statistics of Republic of China, 2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China 
R&D Institute, and Wind Database.      
4. Money Supply  
(1) Measure: Quarterly M2 (X4) 
Why does money supply have influence on housing prices? First, more money 
supply means more home loans available for home buyers. Second, more money will lead 
to low interest rate, and then the home buyer would like to borrow more money to buy 
houses. Third, more money supply will lead to inflation, then the demand for houses will 
be strong because home purchase will become a good strategy to offset inflation.   
People’s Bank of China defined M0, M1 and M2 as follows: 116   
M0: currency in circulation 
M1: M0 + Demand Deposits  
M2: M1+ Quasi-Money (Time Deposits + Saving Deposits + Other Deposits).  
                                                             
116 https://seekingalpha.com/article/4049854-interpreting-chinas-monetary-aggregates-relation-shadow-
banking-business April 4th, 2017  
199 
 
In monetary aggregates (M0,M1,M2,and M3), the most widely used in literature is 
M2. Hence, M2 was selected as the index for money supply.  
(2) Data Source  
Quarterly M2 from the first Quarter of 2000 through the third Quarter of 2016 at 
national level are from Wind Database. All those data does not vary by city.    
5. Stock Market  
(1) Measure: Shanghai Stock Market Index (X5)  
Various types of assets exist in markets, including stocks, houses, funds, real estate 
investment trusts, exchanges, and gold. However, houses and stocks are often regarded as 
two of the most important assets. According to portfolio theory, these two important 
assets should be considered in the investment portfolio. They are often interchangeable 
with each other.   
Consequently, housing prices and asset prices should have an extremely close 
relationship. For example, if the stock prices have been increasing and investors expect 
that it will keep going up, significantly more money will flow into the stock market from 
all other kinds of asset markets, such as housing markets. If the money comes out of the 
housing market, then the housing prices will decrease. That is called the replacement 
effect.  
Therefore, the stock market should be taken into account. There are two stock 
market index in China. One is Shanghai Stock Market Index, the other is Shenzhen Stock 
Market Index. The first one is more widely used, so Shanghai Stock Market is selected as 
the measure for China stock market.  
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(2) Data Source  
Quarterly Shanghai Stock Market Index from the first Quarter of 2000 through the 
third Quarter of 2016 at national level  is from Wind Database and iFinD Database. 
Those data do not vary by city.  
6. Income Inequality   
(1) Measure:  Ration of Gross Domestic Income and Gross Domestic Product(RRG) 
(X6) . We frequently discuss this variable in the entire study because the relationship 
between income inequality and housing policies is the topic of this research.  
(2) Data Source 
 Quarterly RGG for 70 cities from the first Quarter of 2000 through the third Quarter 
of 2016 is calculated from GDP, Population and Per Capita Disposable Income, which are 
come from Wind Database, iFinD Database and CEInet Statistics Database(2000-2017), 
2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of China and   
Income Research Report, China Income Institute for Income Distribution.  
8.2 Panel Data Analysis Models  
8.2.1 The Constant Coefficient Pooled Data Model  
The simplest model for this analysis is Constant Coefficient Pooled Data Model. 
This model is also called the Pooled Regression Model because neither the time-series 
effects nor the cross-section effects are taken into account. In other words, all data is 
pooled into a simple regression model given where both the intercept and the coefficient 
are constant for the sample.  
The model can be expressed by:   
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 itititititititit RGGSSIMHOPPOPGDPHP εβββββββ +++++++= 6543210 2          (8.1) 
Or, 
itititititititit XXXXXXY εβββββββ +++++++= 6655443322110                        (8.2) 
where:  
Y or HP: Housing Prices  
X1 or GDP: Gross Domestic Product   
X2 or  POP: Population 
X3 or HOP: Housing Policy（Dummy Variable）  
X4 or M2: Money Supply  
X5 or SSI: Shanghai Stock Market Index   
X6  or RGG:  Income Inequality  
),0(..~ 2σε diiit  
8.2.2 The Fixed Effects Panel Data Model 
Fixed Effects Panel Data Model or Fixed Effects Model is obtained when the assumption 
that the intercept is constant for all cities is removed. In other words, Fixed Effects Model 
has constant slopes and different intercepts by cross-sectional unit. In this model, 
temporal effects are not taken into account, but individual-specific features (intercept, 
denoted by iu ) are emphasized. Different cities have different intercepts, but the 
intercepts remains constant during all periods. It is emphasized that iu  is correlated with 
some independent variables because iu includes all the individual-specific features. The 
model can be expressed by:  
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itititititititiit RGGSSIMHOPPOPGDPuHP εββββββ +++++++= 654321 2
   (8.3) 
Or  
itititititititiit XXXXXXuY εββββββ +++++++= 665544332211
       (8.4) 
Where 
),0(..~ 2εσε diiit    and it is independent of all itX   
),0(~ 2ui Nu σ    but it is correlated with some itX   
Another way:  
itkkit GDPCityCityCityHP 12211 βααα +++= 
itititititit RGGSSIMHOPPOP εβββββ ++++++ 65432 2                                 (8.5) 
Or 
itkkit XCCCY 112211 βααα +++=   
itititititit XXXXX εβββββ ++++++ 665544332                                                   (8.6) 
With the variables as previously describes.  
8.2.3 Random Effects Panel Data Model 
The Random Effects Panel Data Model is a regression model with random 
intercepts and constant coefficients. Precisely, the intercept is assumed to be a random 
variable in order to take errors into account. This cross-specific error term iu  should be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables because the intercepts are not individual-
specific. In addition, the random error iε  of the whole model is assumed to have 
temporal effects, that is, follow some auto regression (n) process.  
The model can be expressed by:   
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itititititititiit RGGSSIMHOPPOPGDPuHP εββββββ +++++++= 654321 2  
Or  
itititititititiit XXXXXXuY εββββββ +++++++= 665544332211  
 Where ii vu += 0β  
So  
itiitititititititit vIXXXXXXY εβββββββ ++++++++= 655443322110  
where,  
),0(~ 2ii Nv σ  but it is independent of all itX   
)1(~ ARitε  or ittiit ηrεε += −1,  
with variables as described above.   
8.3 Data 
As a summary of 8.2, all data sources are listed here.    
8.3.1 Main Sources 
Wind Database (Authorized Access) 
iFinD Database (Authorized Access) 
CEInet Statistics Database (Authorized Access) 
2000-2017 Income Research Report, China Income Institute for Income 
Distribution (Private Access )  
2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China R&D Institute 
(Authorized Access) 
2000-2017 Internal Reports of National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of 
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China(Private Access)  
 8.3.2 Reference Source 
2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of 
China (Public)  
8.4 Results and Discussion    
8.4.1 Putting 70 Cities with 67 Quarters Together  
In this section, 70 medium and large cities with 67 quarterly data from the first quarter of 
2000 to the third quarter of 2016 are taken as a whole sample.  
1. Pooled Regression Model 
As said above, neither time-series effects nor cross-section effects are taken into 
account in pooled regression. All data is run in a simple regression model.  The results are 
shown in Table 8.1    
Table 8.1 Results of Pooled Regression Model 
Linear Regression 
  
Number of Obs.   =   4,690 
    
F(6, 69)=42.78 
    
Prob > F = 0.0000 
    
R-squared         =     0.6843 
    
Root MSE          =     2510.6 
   
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities  
Y Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. T P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 3.552575 0.596295 5.96 0 2.362999 4.742151 
X2 -1.971045 0.494902 -3.98 0 -2.958346 -0.9837429 
X3 991.582 371.1852 2.67 0.009 251.0878 1732.076 
X4 0.0256562 0.00524 4.9 0 0.015202 0.0361105 
X5 0.0350784 0.063811 0.55 0.584 -0.0922218 0.1623785 
X6 -7470.654 2221.687 -3.36 0.001 -11902.8 -3038.511 
_cons 6652.292 1699.884 3.91 0 3261.116 10043.47 
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Without time-series effects and cross-section effects, the results show that housing 
prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), Population(X2), Housing Policies(X3), 
M2(X4) and RGG(X6) at 99% level. The fitting degree (R2) is also good, which is 
0.6843. 
The coefficients of GDP(X1), Population(X2) and M2(X4) are all positive. This is 
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply 
increases, housing prices should also increase.   
At first, it is a confusing that the coefficient of RGG（X6）is negative because 
what this study tries to show is the positive correlation between income inequality and 
housing prices, in other words, when income inequality is more severe, housing prices 
will be higher. The reason why the coefficient of RGG（X6）is negative is because the 
relationship between RGG and income inequality is negative, that is, a lower RGG means 
more severe income inequality. As a result, the coefficient of RGG（X6）should be 
negative, as showed by table 8.1.       
  It is also confusing that the coefficient of Housing Polies(X3) is negative 
because the purpose of all housing policies is to suppress rapidly increasing housing 
prices. Therefore, the expectation for this coefficient is a negative sign. In other words, 
when housing policies came out(Dummy variable X3=1), the housing prices were 
supposed to decrease; when housing policies did not come out or were 
terminated(Dummy variable X3=0), the housing prices were supposed to increase.  
However, the reason why housing Policies came out is because housing prices 
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increased too fast and the housing markets were too “hot” over past 16 years in China. 
Correspondingly, the reason why housing prices didn’t come out or were terminated is 
because housing prices were very stable or decreased slightly.117In details, the following 
facts can be observed in China:  
When housing prices were stable, housing policies did not come out (X3=0) ; 
When housing prices increased very quickly, housing policies came out (X3=1);  
After housing policies came out, housing prices still increased although they 
increased not as fast as before. When housing prices were stagnant or began to decease 
slightly, housing policies were then terminated. That is the reason why the coefficient of 
Housing Policies(X3) is positive.     
2. Fixed Effects Panel Data Model 
As said before, then fixed Effects Panel Data Model has constant slope with 
different intercepts by cross-sectional unit. In this model, temporal effects are not taken 
into account, but individual-specific features (intercept) are emphasized.     
                                                             
117 Housing prices in all cities in China have never experienced quick decrease since 2000 except every few 
cities, like Ordos, Inner Mongolia.     
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When individual effects (cross-section effects) are taken into account, the results 
show that housing prices(Y) are significantly affected by GDP(X1),Population(X2), 
M2(X4) at 99% level, and Housing Policies(X3) and RGG(X6) at the 95% level.  
The overall degree of fit (R2) is 0.3347, which is not as good as that of pooled 
regression model because cross-sectional effects are taken into account. But the R-square 
within groups is 0.7377, which is very good.  
The coefficient for GDP(X1), Population(X2) and M2(X4) are all positive. This is 
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply 
increases, housing prices will increases.  
within  = 0.7377 min =67
between = 0.2979 avg =67.0
overall = 0.3347 max =67
Y Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval]
X1 2.298844 0.528963 4.35 0 1.243592 3.354095
X2 12.52721 2.775459 4.51 0 6.990318 18.0641
X3 560.6446 245.4185 2.28 0.025 71.04815 1050.241
X4 0.0232382 0.003308 7.03 0 0.0166396 0.0298369
X5 0.1061664 0.041329 2.57 0.012 0.0237167 0.1886162
X6 -6072.098 2549.337 -2.38 0.02 -11157.89 -986.3096
_cons -2651.217 2461.628 -1.08 0.285 -7562.031 2259.597
sigma u 5977.1485
sigma e 1735.5054
rho
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression  Number of Obs.     =      4,690
R-sq: Obs per group
F(6,69)     =48.70
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                        Prob>F    =0.000
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities 
Table 8.2a Results of Fixed Effects Model (Part) 
0.922248     (fraction of variance due to u_i)
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The coefficient for Housing Policies(X3) is positive. As pointed out above, this 
result indicates housing policies have not stopped rapidly increasing housing prices in the 
past 16 years. The reason why housing policies were mandated was because housing 
prices increased very fast. Mandating housing policies is actually a reaction to rapidly 
rising housing prices. In a contrast, when housing prices were very stable or decrease 
slightly, housing policies were terminated or never came out. As a result, housing policies 
are positively correlated with increasing housing prices, and the positive coefficient on 
Housing Policies(X3) makes better sense.   
 The coefficient of RGG（X6）is negative. As pointed out above, the reason is 
because the relationship between RGG and income inequality is negative, that is, a lower 
RGG means more severe income inequality. As a result, when the coefficient of RGG
（X6）is negative as shown by the results, it indicates more severe income inequality, 
which will lead to higher housing prices.   
The Fixed Effects Model takes individual features into accounts. So the model 
must produce the data about for different individuals. The results with individual 
intercepts are shown in table 8.2b.  
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Table 8.2b Results of Fixed Effects Model (Complete)  
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression   
 
Number of Obs.     =      4,690 
R-sq: 
 
Obs per group 
within  = 0.7377  
 
min =67   
between = 0.2979  
 
avg =67.0   
overall = 0.3347  
 
max =67   
    
F(6,69)     =48.70 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                         
 
Prob>F    =0.000 
   
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities  
Y Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 2.298844 0.528963 4.35 0 1.243592 3.354095 
X2 12.52721 2.775459 4.51 0 6.990318 18.0641 
X3 560.6446 245.4185 2.28 0.025 71.04815 1050.241 
X4 0.023238 0.003308 7.03 0 0.01664 0.0298369 
X5 0.106166 0.041329 2.57 0.012 0.023717 0.1886162 
X6 -6072.1 2549.337 -2.38 0.02 -11157.9 -986.3096 
_cons -2651.22 2461.628 -1.08 0.285 -7562.03 2259.597 
_Icity_2 -2959.66 689.1677 -4.29 0 -4310.4 -1608.911 
_Icity_3 2713.157 237.696 11.41 0 2247.281 3179.032 
_Icity_4 2198.202 285.8247 7.69 0 1637.996 2758.409 
_Icity_5 2578.076 304.8157 8.46 0 1980.649 3175.504 
_Icity_6 3238.071 330.411 9.8 0 2590.477 3885.665 
_Icity_7 5009.093 206.5606 24.25 0 4604.241 5413.944 
_Icity_8 11682.64 1434.74 8.14 0 8870.602 14494.68 
_Icity_9 5646.411 776.0573 7.28 0 4125.366 7167.455 
_Icity_10 1883.53 294.2159 6.4 0 1306.877 2460.182 
_Icity_11 -5942.77 2382.534 -2.49 0.013 -10612.5 -1273.094 
_Icity_12 -1061.85 242.1298 -4.39 0 -1536.41 -587.279 
_Icity_13 14.44229 176.4595 0.08 0.935 -331.412 360.2966 
_Icity_14 -2876.18 413.6772 -6.95 0 -3686.97 -2065.389 
_Icity_15 1480.828 490.3047 3.02 0.003 519.8484 2441.808 
_Icity_16 -5637.07 914.9196 -6.16 0 -7430.28 -3843.862 
_Icity_17 4072.436 762.306 5.34 0 2578.343 5566.528 
_Icity_18 4799.337 435.8162 11.01 0 3945.153 5653.521 
_Icity_19 10388.9 1524.682 6.81 0 7400.579 13377.22 
_Icity_20 -8123.27 1418.884 -5.73 0 -10904.2 -5342.312 
_Icity_21 5454.026 891.8917 6.12 0 3705.95 7202.101 
_Icity_22 -6300.57 1129.507 -5.58 0 -8514.36 -4086.772 
210 
 
_Icity_23 2347.714 439.0404 5.35 0 1487.211 3208.218 
_Icity_24 -25.7882 189.7551 -0.14 0.892 -397.701 346.1249 
_Icity_25 6250.709 1198.407 5.22 0 3901.874 8599.545 
_Icity_26 8579.161 1453.989 5.9 0 5729.395 11428.93 
_Icity_27 9555.047 1649.484 5.79 0 6322.118 12787.98 
_Icity_28 6493.613 1294.702 5.02 0 3956.044 9031.183 
_Icity_29 -811.335 159.6601 -5.08 0 -1124.26 -498.4073 
_Icity_30 6582.845 1284.173 5.13 0 4065.913 9099.777 
_Icity_31 7019.831 1358.077 5.17 0 4358.05 9681.613 
_Icity_32 7477.457 1358.627 5.5 0 4814.597 10140.32 
_Icity_33 -10456.5 3123.494 -3.35 0.001 -16578.5 -4334.582 
_Icity_34 6699.721 1154.487 5.8 0 4436.967 8962.475 
_Icity_35 4578.764 818.8213 5.59 0 2973.903 6183.624 
_Icity_36 7748.982 1238.692 6.26 0 5321.191 10176.77 
_Icity_37 1937.064 574.4802 3.37 0.001 811.1038 3063.025 
_Icity_38 5015.829 838.8169 5.98 0 3371.778 6659.879 
_Icity_39 -1469.09 319.7578 -4.59 0 -2095.8 -842.3745 
_Icity_40 4220.691 292.217 14.44 0 3647.956 4793.426 
_Icity_41 7001.899 661.1104 10.59 0 5706.146 8297.652 
_Icity_42 6703.401 1150.463 5.83 0 4448.535 8958.267 
_Icity_43 4112.546 547.7605 7.51 0 3038.955 5186.137 
_Icity_44 -28005.5 5746.184 -4.87 0 -39267.8 -16743.18 
_Icity_45 -64.0113 120.932 -0.53 0.597 -301.034 173.0111 
_Icity_46 4371.058 755.56 5.79 0 2890.188 5851.929 
_Icity_47 802.3604 320.3844 2.5 0.012 174.4185 1430.302 
_Icity_48 376.1265 216.0455 1.74 0.082 -47.315 799.5679 
_Icity_49 -567.983 205.876 -2.76 0.006 -971.493 -164.4739 
_Icity_50 1940.324 309.7267 6.26 0 1333.271 2547.377 
_Icity_51 4126.582 724.7792 5.69 0 2706.041 5547.124 
_Icity_52 5322.184 925.1696 5.75 0 3508.885 7135.484 
_Icity_53 4211.299 572.6927 7.35 0 3088.842 5333.757 
_Icity_54 3819.372 603.572 6.33 0 2636.392 5002.351 
_Icity_55 -2561.55 594.2437 -4.31 0 -3726.25 -1396.856 
_Icity_56 3809.017 556.5121 6.84 0 2718.273 4899.76 
_Icity_57 5762.778 922.1826 6.25 0 3955.333 7570.222 
_Icity_58 2892.3 271.5237 10.65 0 2360.123 3424.476 
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_Icity_59 6875.104 1225.413 5.61 0 4473.338 9276.87 
_Icity_60 4546.444 725.2232 6.27 0 3125.033 5967.855 
_Icity_61 9594.029 1588.818 6.04 0 6480.004 12708.06 
_Icity_62 17095.64 1901.657 8.99 0 13368.46 20822.82 
_Icity_63 6594.082 865.489 7.62 0 4897.755 8290.41 
_Icity_64 3354.896 351.1205 9.55 0 2666.712 4043.079 
_Icity_65 2668.238 332.0981 8.03 0 2017.338 3319.138 
_Icity_66 6203.781 1028.711 6.03 0 4187.544 8220.018 
_Icity_67 8927.506 1975.752 4.52 0 5055.104 12799.91 
_Icity_68 7373.742 1317.966 5.59 0 4790.577 9956.908 
_Icity_69 -167.731 332.9335 -0.5 0.614 -820.268 484.8069 
_Icity_70 3467.986 463.4558 7.48 0 2559.629 4376.342 
sigma u 5977.149           
sigma e 1735.505 
     
rho 
0.49874484 (fraction of variance 
due to u_i)     
 
As shown from table 8.2b, the intercepts for all cities are significant except city 
11, 13, 24, 45 and 69. Therefore, cross section effects do exist for most cities.    
3. Random Effects Panel Data Model 
As pointed out above, the Random Effects Panel Data Model is a regression model 
with random intercepts and constant coefficients. Precisely, the intercept iu  is assumed to 
be a random variable in order to take random errors iv  into account, that is, ii vu += 0β . 
This error term should be uncorrelated with the independent variables because the 
intercepts are not individual-specific. In addition, the residual iε  of the model is assumed 
to have temporal effects, that is, it follows auto regression process.  
Although 0),( =jicor εε for ji ≠ , but 0),(
2 ≠=++ vjjii vvcor σεε , so Generalized 
Least Squares(GLS) Regression, not Ordinary Least Squares should be taken.  Moreover, 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation is another widely used regression method that can be 
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used with Random Effects Models.  So both Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
Random-effects Model (FGLS) and Maximum Likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE) 
are used to run the models.  
(1) Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model (FGLS) 
Table 8.3 Results of Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model (FGLS) 
Random-effects GLS Regression   
 
Number of Obs.         =      4,690 
Group Variable: city 
 
Number of Groups    =      70 
R-sq: 
 
Obs per group 
within  = 0.7274   
 
min =67   
between = 0.4357  
 
avg =67.0   
overall = 0.5100   
 
max =67   
Wald chi2(6)      =     284.13 
 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                     
    
Prob > chi2    = 0.0000 
   
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities  
Y Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 3.018567 0.458382 6.59 0 2.120155 3.916979 
X2 4.948447 1.996788 2.48 0.013 1.034814 8.86208 
X3 714.3962 260.5309 2.74 0.006 203.765 1225.027 
X4 0.0249505 0.003351 7.45 0 0.0183824 0.0315186 
X5 0.0811522 0.041207 1.97 0.049 0.0003874 0.1619169 
X6 
-6317.907 2504.919 -2.52 0.012 -11227.46 -1408.356 
_cons 1858.576 2334.925 0.8 0.426 -2717.794 6434.946 
sigma u 1731.1542           
sigma e 1735.5054 
     
rho 
0.49874484(fraction of variance  
due to u _i)     
 
The results from the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model 
show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), Housing Policies(X3), 
M2(X4) at the 99% level and Population(X2) and RGG(X6) at the 95% level. Those 
results are similar to those of the Fixed Effects Model.  
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What is different from Fixed Effects Models is that the coefficient for the stock 
market index X5 is also significant at 95% level. The Fixed Effects Model emphasizes 
individual differences, but the Random Effects Model emphasizes the temporal 
correlation. On one hand, the stock market is not a “local” market but a “global” market 
because the whole country shares one stock market. As a result, the stock market variable 
will show the impact of global financial market effects on all cities. On the other hand, as 
many studies shows, China’s stock market does not follow a “random walk”, that is, the 
times series effect or “unit root” can be detected in China’s stock market. Because the 
Random Effects Model emphasizes the times series effects and “ignores” the cross 
section effects, the stock market variable produces a significant effect to housing markets.               
The overall degree (R2) is 0.5100, again not as good as pooled regression models. 
But the R-square within groups is 0.7274, which is very good.   
The coefficients of GDP(X1), Population(X2) and M2(X4) are all positive. This is 
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply 
increases, housing prices will increases.  
The coefficient of Housing Policies（X3）is positive and the coefficient of RGG
（X6）is negative. The reason is the same as previously stated for the pooled regression 
model and fixed effects model.        
(2) Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE) 
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8.4 Results of Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE) 
Random-effects ML Regression   
 
Number of Obs.         =      4,690 
Group Variable: city 
 
Number of Groups    =      70 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian 
 
Obs per group 
Log likelihood  = -41864.844 
 
min =67   
  
avg =67.0   
  
max =67   
    
LR chi2(6)        =    6090.40 
Log likelihood  = -41864.844 
 
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
   
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities  
Y Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. T P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 2.437899 0.080379 30.33 0 2.280359 2.59544 
X2 11.06521 0.586528 18.87 0 9.915639 12.21479 
X3 590.1132 69.77953 8.46 0 453.3479 726.8786 
X4 0.0235747 0.00194 12.15 0 0.0197717 0.0273776 
X5 0.101413 0.032474 3.12 0.002 0.0377647 0.1650612 
X6 -6115.956 414.7444 -14.75 0 -6928.84 -5303.072 
_cons -1783.762 791.142 -2.25 0.024 -3334.372 -233.1522 
sigma u 5394.321 503.6986     4492.16 6477.663 
sigma e 1735.677 18.08617   1700.588 1771.49 
rho 0.9061832 0.016018   0.8707912 0.9338489 
LR test of sigma_u=0 : chibar2(01) = 3002.25          Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000 
 
The results for the Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model show that 
Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by all independent variables at the 99% level. 
Those effects are much stronger than the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-
effects Model.   
The coefficients of GDP(X1), Population(X2) and M2(X4) are all positive. This is 
consistent with economic fundamentals. Also, similar to previous models, the coefficient 
for Housing Policies（X3）is positive and the coefficient for RGG（X6）is negative.  
4. Models Selection 
215 
 
Three panel date models have been used to estimate the models. Which one is the 
best?  Which one has best fit? To compare the models, a model selection test was done.   
1) Choose Pooled Regression Model or Fixed Effects Model 
Ho：all 0=iu  
Ha：at least one 0≠iu   
Table 8.5 Selection between Pooled Regression Model and Fixed Effects Model 
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression   
 
Number of Obs.         =      4,690 
Group Variable: city 
 
Number of Groups    =      70 
R-sq:    
 
Obs per group:  
within  = 0.7274 
 
min =67   
between = 0.4357 
 
avg =67.0   
overall = 0.5100 
 
max =67   
F(6,4614)=2162.52 
 
Prob > F       =     0.0000 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8411                         
  
   
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities  
Y Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. T P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 2.298844 0.078638 29.23 0 2.144676 2.453012 
X2 12.52721 0.55952 22.39 0 11.43028 13.62413 
X3 560.6446 69.68425 8.05 0 424.0301 697.259 
X4 0.0232382 0.001941 11.97 0 0.0194335 0.027043 
X5 0.1061664 0.03247 3.27 0.001 0.0425101 0.1698228 
X6 -6072.098 415.3957 -14.62 0 -6886.473 -5257.724 
_cons -2651.217 446.7416 -5.93 0 -3527.045 -1775.39 
sigma u 5977.1485           
sigma e 1735.5054      
rho 0.922248      
F test that all u_i=0: F(69, 4614) = 75.16                   Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
The test results show that the null hypothesis is refused and the fixed effects model is 
obvious better than pooled regression model. Thus, using a panel data approach is better 
than pooling the data.  
2) Choose Pooled Regression Model or Random Effects Model 
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Ho: There is no random effect 
Ha: There exists random effect 
Table 8.6 Selection between Pooled Regression Model and Random 
Effects Model 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange  Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
Y[city,t]=Xb+u[city]+e[City,t] 
Estimated Results  
  Var sd=sqrt(Var) 
 Y 1.99E+07 4465.691 
 e 3011979 1735.505 
 u 2996895 1731.154 
 test var(u)=0 
   chibar2(01)=31268.14 
  Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
 The Lagrangian multiplier test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, and that the  
Random Effects Model is better than pooled regression model. Again, using a panel data 
approach is better than pooling the data.  
3) Choose Fixed Effects Model or Random Effects Model 
Ho: Difference in coefficients is not systematic 
Ha: Difference in coefficients is systematic 
Table 8.7 Selection between Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model 
 
——coefficient—— 
  
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
sqrt(Diag(v_b-
v_B)) 
Y FE RE Difference  S.E. 
X1 2.298844 3.018567 -0.7197235 0.0396886 
X2 12.52721 4.948447 7.57876 0.4130498 
X3 560.6446 714.3962 -153.7516 8.540647 
X4 0.0232382 0.024951 -0.0017123 0.0002218 
X5 0.1061664 0.081152 0.0250143 0.002096 
X6 -6072.098 -6317.907 245.809 78.75582 
_cons -2651.217 1858.576 -4509.793 129.3131 
  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
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chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                    =337.89 
Prob>chi2 =0.0000 
(v_b-v_B is not positive definite)  
The test results show that the null hypothesis is refused, and that it is statistically 
better to use fixed effects model rather than random effects model. 
8.4.2 Grouped by Size of GDP 
 The variable “Income inequality” is a “relative value”, but the variable “Housing 
Price” is an “absolute value”.  So Income Inequality might have a different influence on 
Housing Price in different cities with different Characteristics. In order to test the 
correlation between Income Inequality and Housing Price, 70 cities are divided into 5 
groups by GDP.  Next, a model selection test is done between the Fixed Effects Model 
and the Random Effects Model. The result shows that it is better to use the Random 
Effects Model than the Fixed Effects Model for all 5 GDP-Ranked groups. Since the 
Random Effects Model does not emphasize individual-specific effects, this result 
confirms that the cities with similar GDP do not have statistically significant intercepts. 
Precisely, Income Inequality might have a similar influence on Housing Price in the cities 
with similar GDP.  
1. The Highest-GDP  Group  (Random Effects Model) 
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Table 8.8 Results of Random Effects Model on the Highest-GDP Group 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all 
panels(0.7704)   
  
       Estimated Covariance= 21       
 
Number of Obs.        =    402   
Estimated Autocorrelations= 1       
 
Number of Groups   =  6     
Estimated Coefficient= 8        
 
Time Period                =67 
    
Wald Chi2(14)            =443.94 
    
Prob > Chi2                  =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. Z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.2885488 0.082079 3.52 0 0.1276779 0.4494197 
X2 -1.107709 0.164165 -6.75 0 -1.429466 -0.7859513 
X3 636.9573 160.1565 3.98 0 323.0564 950.8582 
X4 -0.0035042 0.006129 -0.57 0.567 -0.0155165 0.008508 
X5 -0.0377956 0.219047 -0.17 0.863 -0.4671192 0.3915281 
X6 -1066.834 340.0649 -3.14 0.002 -1733.349 -400.3194 
t 290.7348 19.4241 14.97 0 252.6643 328.8054 
_cons 2477.769 824.4764 3.01 0.003 861.8253 4093.713 
   
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
Population(X2), Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level. The effect of 
M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
It is very confusing here that the coefficient of Population(X2) is negative, which is 
opposite to our intuition. Although the high population is positively correlated with high 
housing prices for 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is negative for some of 
those 70 cities. For example, in the first group, although the population of Beijing was 
less than Shanghai, but the housing prices of Beijing are higher than those of Shanghai.   
2. The Second-Highest Group (Random Effects Model) 
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Table 8.9 Results of Random Effects Model on the Second Group 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all 
panels(0.9078)   
  Estimated covariance =36           
 
Number of obs =536  
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =8  
Estimated coefficients=8          
 
Time periods=67  
    
Wald chi2(7)=438.03  
    
Prob > chi2 =0  
Y Coef. Std. Err. Z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 -0.0058556 0.011137 -0.53 0.599 -0.0276844 0.0159731 
X2 -1.029399 0.141333 -7.28 0 -1.306406 -0.7523923 
X3 51.20238 24.96223 2.05 0.04 2.277301 100.1275 
X4 -0.0012469 0.001068 -1.17 0.243 -0.0033395 0.0008457 
X5 0.0607393 0.040958 1.48 0.138 -0.0195375 0.141016 
X6 -213.3064 104.4187 -2.04 0.041 -417.9634 -8.649514 
t 124.8402 6.45917 19.33 0 112.1805 137.4999 
_cons 1133.242 320.2413 3.54 0 505.5805 1760.903 
 
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X2), 
Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 95% level. The effect of 
GDP(X1), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is GDP insignificant? Although the correlation between GDP and housing prices is 
significant for all 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is not significant for some 
cities. For example, in group 2, although Wuhan’s GDP was much higher than 
Zhengzhou in 2016, the housing prices in Wuhan was much lower than Zhengzhou. 
3. The Middle-GDP Group (Random Effects Model) 
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Table 8.10 Results of Random Effects Model on the Third Group 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9200)  
 Estimated covariance =105           
 
Number of obs =936  
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =14  
Estimated coefficients=8          
 
Time periods=67  
    
Wald chi2(7)=520.33  
    
Prob > chi2 =0  
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0069128 0.005091 1.36 0.174 -0.0030645 0.01689 
X2 -1.568134 0.18426 -8.51 0 -1.929278 -1.206991 
X3 39.32095 10.63348 3.7 0 18.47971 60.16218 
X4 -0.0013157 0.00066 -1.99 0.046 -0.0026093 -0.000022 
X5 0.0586522 0.025371 2.31 0.021 0.0089269 0.1083774 
X6 56.12087 39.85236 1.41 0.089 -21.98832 134.2301 
t 93.64965 4.411629 21.23 0 85.00301 102.2963 
_cons 1539.668 244.4701 6.3 0 1060.515 2018.82 
 
The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X2), 
Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of 
GDP(X1), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant. The reason why the 
coefficient of GDP(X1) is not significant is the same to that for Group 2.  
4. The Fourth Group (Random Effects Model)  
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Table 8.11 Results of Random Effects Model on the Fourth Group 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8077)  
 
       Estimated covariance =190         
 
Number of obs =1273 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =19 
Estimated coefficients=8          
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=1373.21 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0402989 0.022324 1.81 0.071 -0.0034545 0.0840523 
X2 0.9847672 0.068921 14.29 0 0.8496845 1.11985 
X3 53.11829 19.93798 2.66 0.008 14.04057 92.19601 
X4 -0.0008077 0.000817 -0.99 0.323 -0.0024098 0.0007943 
X5 0.0372898 0.029861 1.25 0.212 -0.0212368 0.0958164 
X6 -810.3798 82.06169 -9.88 0 -971.2177 -649.5418 
t 88.24315 2.759474 31.98 0 82.83468 93.65162 
_cons 619.2786 123.5382 5.01 0 377.1482 861.409 
 
The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
Population(X2), Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% or 90% level. The effect 
of M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
5. The fifth group （Random effects model） 
Table 8.12 Results of Random Effects Model on the Fifth Group 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8910)  
 Estimated covariance =276       
 
Number of obs =1541 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =23 
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Estimated coefficients=8          
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=999.79 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 -0.0368613 0.012919 -2.85 0.004 -0.0621814 -0.0115412 
X2 -1.712392 0.101712 -16.84 0 -1.911743 -1.513041 
X3 74.34254 9.903108 7.51 0 54.9328 93.75227 
X4 -0.0001497 0.000534 -0.28 0.779 -0.001197 0.0008977 
X5 0.0335428 0.020506 1.64 0.102 -0.0066482 0.0737339 
X6 -275.5787 32.42964 -8.5 0 -339.1397 -212.0178 
t 71.13436 2.873862 24.75 0 65.50169 76.76702 
_cons 1340.761 130.6088 10.27 0 1084.773 1596.75 
 
The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
Population(X2), Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level. The effect of 
M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
 
8.4.3 Grouped by Regions   
Theoretically, housing prices are spatially correlated, which means that the housing prices 
of neighboring cities might be closely related even though they have differences in GDP, 
Population and other economic characteristics. In order to prove this argument, 70 cities 
are divided into 9 groups according to their geographic location. Next, the model 
selection test is conducted. The results show that the Fixed Effects Model is statistically 
more supportive than the Random Effects Model for seven of the nine groups. Since the 
Fixed Effects Model emphasizes the individual-specific effects (different intercepts), the 
results confirm the arguments that individual-specific effects cannot be ignored within the 
same geographic group despite economic differences. Interestingly, it is better to use the 
Random Effects Model for two groups, Southwest Region and Northwest Region. 
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However, it is not hard to understand because the cities in those two group not only have 
the close location but also have the similar GDPs.  
 
1. Northeast China Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
Table 8.13 Results of Fixed Effects Model on North-China Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city8 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients:  Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8627)  
 Estimated covariance =36       
 
Number of obs =536 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =8 
Estimated coefficients=15          
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=889.43 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. Z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0096496 0.0166 0.58 0.561 -0.0228851 0.0421843 
X2 8.258907 0.743194 11.11 0 6.802274 9.71554 
X3 23.23013 14.88306 1.56 0.119 -5.940119 52.40039 
X4 -0.0006726 0.000639 -1.05 0.292 -0.0019244 0.0005792 
X5 0.0366375 0.024187 1.51 0.13 -0.0107674 0.0840425 
X6 -106.8699 114.8008 -0.93 0.042 -331.8753 118.1355 
City2 -1712.943 190.5855 -8.99 0 -2086.483 -1339.402 
City3 3687.2 388.042 9.5 0 2926.651 4447.748 
City4 3340.777 335.2248 9.97 0 2683.748 3997.805 
City5 2210.036 240.4507 9.19 0 1738.761 2681.311 
City6 4011.578 366.2576 10.95 0 3293.726 4729.429 
City7 104.9652 104.1366 1.01 0.313 -99.13875 309.0692 
City8 3749.913 265.0876 14.15 0 3230.351 4269.475 
t 63.77763 2.965946 21.5 0 57.96448 69.59078 
_cons -5520.148 613.885 -8.99 0 -6723.34 -4316.955 
 
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by 
Population(X2), and RGG(X6) at the 99% or 90% level. The effect of GDP(X1), Housing 
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Policies(X3), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? Northeast China 
Region has been experiencing recession since 2000. When the housing prices in other 
regions increased very quickly, the housing prices here increased very slowly. As a result, 
when housing policies came out, the local governments in this region often refuse those 
policies. As a result, many policies had no influence on housing prices.   
Why is GDP insignificant? Although the correlation between GDP and housing 
prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is not significant 
for the cities in this region.      
2.Bohai Rim Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
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Table 8.14 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Bohai Rim Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8416)  
 Estimated covariance =45      
 
Number of obs =603 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =9 
Estimated coefficients=16          
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=2498.73 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0062424 0.009105 0.69 0.493 -0.0116039 0.0240887 
X2 19.32339 0.677258 28.53 0 17.99599 20.65079 
X3 53.94223 16.21 3.33 0.001 22.17121 85.71325 
X4 0.0000228 0.000668 0.03 0.973 -0.0012856 0.0013313 
X5 -0.0141827 0.025003 -0.57 0.571 -0.0631868 0.0348213 
X6 41.40309 92.49603 0.45 0.084 -139.8858 222.692 
City2 -6958.897 1259.905 -5.52 0 -9428.266 -4489.529 
City3 -3067.813 153.5812 -19.98 0 -3368.826 -2766.799 
City4 -8833.393 508.6521 -17.37 0 -9830.333 -7836.453 
City5 -2863.58 129.4978 -22.11 0 -3117.391 -2609.769 
City6 6130.576 254.6431 24.08 0 5631.485 6629.668 
City7 -1553.838 57.40124 -27.07 0 -1666.342 -1441.334 
City8 -4118.655 164.4756 -25.04 0 -4441.021 -3796.289 
City9 -6936.951 275.8434 -25.15 0 -7477.595 -6396.308 
T 52.03886 2.75288 18.9 0 46.64332 57.43441 
_cons -10601.95 489.8593 -21.64 0 -11562.06 -9641.843 
  
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X2), 
Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of 
GDP(X1), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast China: although the 
correlation between GDP and housing prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole 
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sample, the correlation is not significant for the cities in this region.     
 
3. Central China Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
Table 8.15 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Central-China Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city5 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9050)  
 
       Estimated covariance =15      
 
Number of obs =335 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =5 
Estimated coefficients=12       
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=717.92 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0403399 0.025822 1.56 0.118 -0.0102703 0.0909501 
X2 8.740203 0.900536 9.71 0 6.975185 10.50522 
X3 59.47196 21.16744 2.81 0.005 17.98454 100.9594 
X4 -0.0001368 0.000525 -0.26 0.794 -0.001166 0.0008924 
X5 0.0257744 0.020224 1.27 0.202 -0.0138631 0.0654119 
X6 -141.0427 144.4678 -0.98 0.059 -424.1944 142.109 
City2 -1011.843 152.7115 -6.63 0 -1311.152 -712.5343 
City3 -519.9831 211.9454 -2.45 0.014 -935.3885 -104.5778 
City4 777.4406 321.7971 2.42 0.016 146.73 1408.151 
City5 2963.271 397.0344 7.46 0 2185.098 3741.445 
t 55.12822 3.135208 17.58 0 48.98333 61.27312 
_cons -4475.581 730.2388 -6.13 0 -5906.823 -3044.34 
 
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X2), 
Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of 
GDP(X1), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast China Region: although 
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the correlation between GDP and housing prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole 
sample, the correlation is not significant for the cities in this region.     
4.South-central China Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
Table 8.16 Results of Fixed Effects Model on South-Central China Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city12 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels : Heteroskedastic  with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9050)  
 Estimated covariance =78    
 
Number of obs =804 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =12 
Estimated coefficients=19     
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=1187.80 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. Z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.073261 0.011226 6.53 0 0.0512591 0.0952628 
X2 4.090371 0.296835 13.78 0 3.508585 4.672157 
X3 39.5198 15.35664 2.57 0.01 9.421336 69.61826 
X4 -0.0002011 0.000432 -0.47 0.642 -0.0010484 0.0006462 
X5 0.0131587 0.016611 0.79 0.428 -0.0193988 0.0457163 
X6 -15.7822 46.12885 -0.34 0.01 -106.1931 74.62868 
City2 759.3354 261.9904 2.9 0.004 245.8436 1272.827 
City3 -1501.096 287.8496 -5.21 0 -2065.271 -936.9208 
City4 -1538.112 335.8615 -4.58 0 -2196.389 -879.8358 
City5 -496.83 361.9137 -1.37 0.17 -1206.168 212.5077 
City6 -1550.883 337.0973 -4.6 0 -2211.581 -890.1841 
City7 -1228.698 360.1125 -3.41 0.001 -1934.506 -522.8907 
City8 -2041.198 320.8708 -6.36 0 -2670.093 -1412.303 
City9 -800.4689 361.3635 -2.22 0.027 -1508.728 -92.2095 
City10 -1156.2 334.2462 -3.46 0.001 -1811.31 -501.0895 
City11 -1883.007 382.0034 -4.93 0 -2631.72 -1134.294 
City12 -1814.633 370.6143 -4.9 0 -2541.024 -1088.243 
t 60.85082 2.396773 25.39 0 56.15323 65.54841 
_cons -279.7389 405.8353 -0.69 0.491 -1075.162 515.6837 
 
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
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Population(X2), Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 90% level. The 
effect of M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
5.Yangtze River Delta Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
Table 8.17 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Yangtze River Delta Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9414)  
 Estimated covariance =45   
 
Number of obs =603 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =9 
Estimated coefficients=16     
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=432.90 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 -0.0059841 0.025813 -0.23 0.817 -0.0565771 0.044609 
X2 9.370445 1.233205 7.6 0 6.953407 11.78748 
X3 169.2337 26.76105 6.32 0 116.783 221.6844 
X4 -0.0008751 0.001051 -0.83 0.405 -0.0029348 0.0011847 
X5 0.0501175 0.040817 1.23 0.22 -0.0298827 0.1301178 
X6 -46.38316 63.43359 -0.73 0.045 -170.7107 77.94439 
City2 625.5107 258.0649 2.42 0.015 119.7127 1131.309 
City3 -286.9426 384.9912 -0.75 0.456 -1041.512 467.6263 
City4 -338.9069 2048.749 -0.17 0.869 -4354.381 3676.568 
City5 -1921.951 452.7781 -4.24 0 -2809.38 -1034.522 
City6 -857.5475 593.0024 -1.45 0.148 -2019.811 304.7158 
City7 -5662.358 572.1185 -9.9 0 -6783.689 -4541.026 
City8 131.9307 515.8666 0.26 0.798 -879.1493 1143.011 
City9 524.8131 497.1092 1.06 0.291 -449.5031 1499.129 
t 100.7989 8.335147 12.09 0 84.46236 117.1355 
_cons -3234.729 1063.741 -3.04 0.002 -5319.624 -1149.834 
 
The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X2), 
Housing Policies(X3), and RGG(X6) at the 99% level or 95% level. The effect of 
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GDP(X1), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant. Why is GDP insignificant? 
The reason is the same to Northeast China Region.     
6．Pearl River Delta Region (Fixed Effects Model) 
Fixed effects model 
Table 8.18 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Pearl River Delta Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients:  Generalize least Squares   
  Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9189)  
 Estimated covariance =55   
 
Number of obs =670 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =10 
Estimated coefficients=17  
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=696.77 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0422698 0.019314 2.19 0.029 0.0044149 0.0801248 
X2 16.17982 1.304728 12.4 0 13.6226 18.73704 
X3 24.95064 47.93793 0.52 0.603 -69.00597 118.9073 
X4 -0.0002828 0.000695 -0.41 0.684 -0.0016451 0.0010795 
X5 -0.0148077 0.026961 -0.55 0.583 -0.0676495 0.038034 
X6 -134.3716 71.4994 -1.88 0.06 -274.5078 5.764662 
City2 9230.084 782.442 11.8 0 7696.525 10763.64 
City3 -6751.855 857.2399 -7.88 0 -8432.015 -5071.696 
City4 5880.967 1423.78 4.13 0 3090.41 8671.524 
City5 5423.464 830.2201 6.53 0 3796.262 7050.665 
City6 -5690.886 555.6391 -10.24 0 -6779.919 -4601.853 
City7 163.2946 710.6658 0.23 0.818 -1229.585 1556.174 
City8 -4335.688 560.029 -7.74 0 -5433.324 -3238.051 
City9 1230.816 739.464 1.66 0.096 -218.5068 2680.139 
City10 13289.38 1075.96 12.35 0 11180.53 15398.22 
t 87.31964 5.172923 16.88 0 77.18089 97.45838 
_cons -6439.606 1080.928 -5.96 0 -8558.187 -4321.026 
 
The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
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Population(X2), and RGG(X6) at 99% or 90% level. The effect of Housing Policies(X3), 
M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? Pearl River Delta 
Region is a highly developed area China. Hence, the housing prices in many cities in this 
region are supported by the demand to live, not demand to invest. No matter if the 
housing policies came out, the demand to live can always support the housing prices. 
This is the reason why housing policies cannot affect housing prices significantly.    
7. Sichuan-Chongqing Region (Fixed effects model) 
Table 8.20 Results of Random Effects Model on Sichuan-Chongqing Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city4 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8516)  
 Estimated covariance =10  
 
Number of obs =268 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =4 
Estimated coefficients=11 
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=709.10 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. Z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0145608 0.008702 1.67 0.094 -0.002495 0.0316166 
X2 0.2523392 0.133047 1.9 0.058 -0.0084281 0.5131065 
X3 9.390067 29.4467 0.32 0.75 -48.3244 67.10453 
X4 -0.0004591 0.000778 -0.59 0.555 -0.0019843 0.0010661 
X5 0.0637867 0.029297 2.18 0.029 0.0063663 0.1212072 
X6 19.08068 72.38976 0.26 0.085 -122.8006 160.962 
City2 -312.6817 214.1167 -1.46 0.144 -732.3427 106.9793 
City3 305.9166 124.7611 2.45 0.014 61.38928 550.4439 
City4 -255.5238 113.4953 -2.25 0.024 -477.9704 -33.07715 
T 79.99652 3.370833 23.73 0 73.38981 86.60323 
_cons 32.14095 254.2044 0.13 0.899 -466.0906 530.3725 
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The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
Population(X2), Stock Market(X5) and RGG(X6) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of 
Housing Policies(X3), M2(X4) are not significant.  
In all 9 group divided by regions, Sichuan-Chongqing Region is the only one 
where the coefficient of Stock Market is significant. Furthermore, the coefficient is 
positive. Chongqing and Sichuan is the most developed area in West China. The medium 
and big cities in this area are characteristic by a great number of list companies. And the 
economy of the cities in this area is driven mainly by those list companies. When the 
stock prices go up, the economy in this area will be very good, then the housing prices 
will go up. That is the reason why the correlation between stock market and housing 
market are positive.       
8. Southwest China Region (Random effects model) 
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Table 8.19 Results of Random Effects Model on Southwest-China Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.8245)  
 Estimated covariance =28  
 
Number of obs =469 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =7 
Estimated coefficients=8 
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=618.92 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.1527708 0.038357 3.98 0 0.0775924 0.2279493 
X2 0.6451201 0.084733 7.61 0 0.4790458 0.8111945 
X3 4.945682 21.73405 0.23 0.82 -37.65227 47.54363 
X4 -0.0001595 0.000903 -0.18 0.86 -0.0019293 0.0016102 
X5 0.0112436 0.033473 0.34 0.737 -0.054362 0.0768491 
X6 -85.77822 59.87018 -1.43 0.019 -203.1216 31.56518 
t 73.01279 3.368942 21.67 0 66.40978 79.61579 
_cons 134.1225 148.3822 0.9 0.366 -156.7013 424.9462 
       The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X1), 
Population(X2), and RGG(X6) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of Housing Policies(X3), 
M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? The reason is the same 
to Northeast China Region. Southwest China Region is an underdeveloped area in China.  
When the housing prices in other regions increased very quickly, the housing prices here 
increased very slowly. As a result, when some housing policies came out, the local 
governments in this area often refuse to take those policies. As a result, many policies had 
no influences on housing prices.   
9. Northwest China Region (Random effects model) 
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Table 8.21 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Northwest-China Region 
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1) 
  Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression  
  Coefficients: Generalize least Squares   
  Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation 
  Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  
(0.9322)  
 Estimated covariance =21 
 
Number of obs =402 
Estimated autocorrelations =1           
 
Number of groups =6 
Estimated coefficients=8 
 
Time periods=67 
    
Wald chi2(7)=271.22 
    
Prob > chi2 =0 
Y Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI [95% Conf. Interval] 
X1 0.0050757 0.026292 0.19 0.847 -0.046455 0.0566064 
X2 0.8143479 0.264642 3.08 0.002 0.2956586 1.333037 
X3 35.73762 15.47377 2.31 0.021 5.409577 66.06566 
X4 -0.0001573 0.000566 -0.28 0.781 -0.0012657 0.0009511 
X5 0.0229022 0.021836 1.05 0.294 -0.0198952 0.0656995 
X6 -290.2001 109.6357 -2.65 0.008 -505.0821 -75.31808 
t 62.49739 4.112732 15.2 0 54.43658 70.5582 
_cons 472.9708 207.3314 2.28 0.023 66.60871 879.333 
 
The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by 
Population(X2), and RGG(X6) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of GDP(X1), Housing 
Policies(X3), M2(X4) and Stock Market(X5) are not significant.  
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? The reason is the same 
to South China Region.  Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast 
China Region.      
8.4.4 R-Square Comparison  
In order to show how important income inequality is to housing prices, the fitting degree 
(R2) is checked after the independent variable is removed one by one. 
 
1. Pooled Regression Analysis  
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Table 8.24a  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed  in Pooled Regression 
Model 
 
By the table above，we could draw another table. 
 
Table 8.24b  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed  in Pooled Regression Model 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
R2 before this variable is removed  0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 
R2  after this variable is removed 0.51 0.665 0.677 0.677 0.684 0.453 
How much R2 drops  0.174 0.019 0.007 0.007 0 0.231 
 
Table 8.24b  shows R2 drops most when RGG is removed(X6).  
 
2. Fixed Effect Panel Data Analysis 
 
 
Table 8.25a  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Fixed Effects Model  
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By the table above，we could draw another table. 
Table 8.25b  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Fixed Effects Model  
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
R2 before this variable is removed  0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 
R2  after this variable is removed 0.3024 0.6566 0.3215 0.326 0.3278 0.1967 
How much R2 drops  0.0323 -0.322 0.0132 0.0087 0.0069 0.138 
 
Table 8.25b shows R2 drops most when RGG(X6) is removed.   
 
3. Random Effect Panel Data Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.26a  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Random Effects Model 
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By the table above，we could draw another table. 
Table 8.26b  R2  Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Random Effects Model 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
R2 before this variable is removed  0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2  after this variable is removed 0.4588 0.6571 0.4921 0.4136 0.4125 0.25 
How much R2 drops  0.0512 -0.147 0.0179 0.0964 0.0975 0.26 
 
Table 8.26b shows R2 drops most when RGG(X6) is removed  
In all three models, we find that the fitting degree drops the most when RGG is removed. 
This shows that income inequality plays the most import role in housing prices. 
8.5 Results Summary   
To sum up, we have the following results.  
No matter the model and no matter the grouping of the 70 cities, the coefficient of 
RGG, the measure for income inequality, is consistently negative. Since a high RGG 
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implies severe income inequality, the negative coefficient shows that the correlation 
between income inequality and housing prices is positive. Precisely, more severe income 
inequality leads to higher housing prices. 
 Furthermore, no matter the model and no matter the grouping of the 70 cities, 
housing prices are always significantly affected by RGG. The positive correlation 
between income inequality and housing prices is confirmed statistically, which is exactly 
what is intended to show in this study.   
Also, in order to show how important income inequality is to the determination of 
housing prices, the degree of fit (R2) is checked after the independent variables are 
removed one by one. In all models, we find that the goodness of fit drops the most when 
RGG is removed. This again shows that income inequality plays the most important role 
in housing prices.  
Next, when the 70 cities are grouped by their GDPs, model selection testing 
shows that it is better to use the Random Effects Model than the Fixed Effects Model. 
When the 70 cities are grouped by region, model selection testing shows that it is better 
to use the Fixed Effects Model than the Random Effects Model. Since the Fixed Effects 
Model emphasizes individual features but the Random Effects Model assumes that the 
individual features are important, the results imply that the individual features are 
insignificant when the cities with similar GDP are put together. That further implies that 
the GDP of one city is the unique feature of this city and income inequality might 
influence housing prices of this city through its GDP. Those results are consistent to our 
intuition that the same level of income inequality will cause much higher savings in a city 
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with high GDP than a city with low GDP, and then will lead to much higher housing 
prices in high-GDP cities compared to low-GDP cities.  
Also, the coefficient of RGG is more significant when the 70 cities are grouped 
by GDP than when 70 cities are grouped by region. The influence of income inequality 
on housing prices will be similar, and is very evident within the group of cities with the 
similar GDPs. For the group of different GDPs, the influence will decline as GDPs 
decline. This is why the coefficient of RGG is more significant when 70 cities are 
grouped by GDP than that when 70 cities are grouped by region.  
Finally, the coefficient of Housing Policies（X3）is positive, which means the 
enactment of housing policies is correlated with the high housing prices. This result is 
counterintuitive because the purpose of the housing policies is to suppress housing prices. 
But this result is reasonable. On one hand, it is the fact that all housing policies could 
rarely suppress housing prices in past 16 years in China. On the other hand, releasing 
housing policies was actually a reaction to the rapidly rising housing prices, and 
terminating housing Policies is a response the stagnant or slightly decreasing housing 
prices. In other words, when housing prices increased rapidly, the housing policies were 
enacted but rarely serve to stop the increasing housing prices; when housing prices were 
stagnant or decreasing slightly for some reason, the housing policies were not enacted or 
were terminated. As a result, the relationship between housing prices and housing policies  
is positive.   
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
9.1 Conclusion 
The conclusion is that all the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3 are confirmed.  
First, at a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower proportion of its 
income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other words, the higher 
the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the lower the proportion 
of its consumption accounted for in its income. 
As a result, severe income inequality will lead to overly-high aggregate savings rate 
and over-low aggregate consumption rate. 
Second, an overly-high aggregate savings rate and overly-low aggregate 
consumption rate caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment 
demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the virtual 
sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.  
Third, in the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to other types 
of assets in the virtual sector owing to unique the features of houses. Thus, housing prices 
will increase despite the high vacancy rate, the high new construction and the quick sale 
of houses. Those phenomena are “weird” but can be observed everywhere in current 
China.   
9.2 Discussion 
In addition to the factors in the models in Chapter 7, there are also other reasons why 
do Chinese people prefer houses so much.    
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9.2.1 Cultural Factors 
Several scholars attribute the rapidly rising housing prices to Chinese cultural 
tradition. It is believed that Chinese people love owning houses more deeply than any 
other nation in the world. Although there is no empirical evidence supporting this claim, 
some Chinese traditions do play important roles in the housing market.   
1. Parents remain central in the marriage decision-making process of their children.  
In China, there is a current saying, “Mothers-in-law boost housing markets.” When a 
boy wishes to marry a girl, the girl’s mother will tell the man, “No house, no marriage!” 
A house becomes a necessary condition for marriage.  Therefore, this tradition will drive 
housing prices to speed up.  
Before 1910, parents in China made the marriage decisions for their children. As the 
Chinese saying goes, “Marriage is arranged by the order of the parents and the 
matchmaker's word.” That situation has changed remarkably since 1910. Nowadays, 
many people independently choose their spouses. However, a considerable proportion of 
the youth still have marriages arranged by their parents. Furthermore, although many 
young people independently decide on their marriage, parental suggestions are highly 
vital to their decision.  
As numerous studies have shown, factors that influence parents’ choice about their 
children’s marriage entirely differ from those that influence their children’s decision 
about their own marriage. When children make their own choices, they value the 
potential spouse’s physical appearance, whether the prospect is genuinely in love with 
them, and whether he/she has the unique capability, personality, potentials, or 
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achievements they consider attractive. When parents decide for their children, they care if 
the potential son-in-law or daughter-in-law is currently rich and if he/she has rich parents. 
As housing prices are increasing, the number of houses owned becomes the signal 
whether this person is rich or not. Hence, parents often consider houses as the most 
important factor for their choice about their children’s marriage. Consequently, a boy and 
his family have to try their utmost to buy a house in order to obtain a “wife” or a 
“daughter-in-law.” Therefore, the cultural tradition of parents making marriage decisions 
for their children is pushing the housing prices up. 
Why do Chinese parents often want to make decisions about their children’s 
marriage? Chinese parents make not only such choices about their children’s marriage, 
but also about which university their children should attend, which major they should 
study, what kinds of job they should pursue after graduation, when their children should 
produce a grandchild, and how many grandchildren they should have. This is Chinese 
culture, which rarely values independent will and personalities of children even when 
they have become adults.  
2. Owning a house in a city means settling down in that city.  
There is an old saying in China, “Only upon having a comfortable house can you 
start your enjoyable career!” Ancient China is an agricultural country. Therefore, land, as 
the most important productive and living factor, has been given foremost value for 
thousands of years. A family is deemed a settled family only if they own a piece of land 
and a house. Although China is now a modern country with manufacturing and service 
industries, Chinese continue to think that owning a house is the most important thing in 
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life. Hence, a person will likely spend all his/her current savingss and future income (via 
loans) to acquire a house. It is highly popular for many families to spend over 80% of 
their monthly income on the monthly payment of home loans. That notion is incredible 
for many families in western countries.  
3. Homeownership has become a symbol of social status and social class  
Owing to the rapid ascent of housing prices, the value of one regular condominium 
is now equal to 60 years’ worth of income of a regular family in most cities in China. 
This means that most regular families cannot afford a condominium in a city at all. 
Correspondingly, a family owning such unit will belong to the upper class. Conversely, a 
family without a condo unit will likely belong to the lower or middle class, no matter 
how much income this family earns. In order to be a member of upper class, an individual 
are always trying to buy houses as many as possible and as early as possible.     
9.2.2 Non-cultural factors 
1. Immature Housing Rental Market  
China’s rental market is immature for the following two reasons.  
First, Most condominiums are rented by individual owners. Very few companies own 
numerous condominiums and lease them to tenants. Given that the demand for rental 
services is sporadic, it is extremely difficult for an individual owner to provide good 
rental services to tenants. As the purpose of renting a condominium unit for a tenant is to 
enjoy satisfactory services from the owner, renting a house is not as good an option as 
buying a house.      
B. The rental right of a tenant is an obligation right, not a property right, according to 
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current law in China. An obligation right is a relative right, whereas a property right is an 
absolute one. When tenants only have a relative right, the owner has the privilege to 
terminate the rental contract at any time before its expiration date. Consequently, it is 
very possible for a tenant to be evicted from the rental condominiums at any time. Such 
possibility will cause a tenant to feel extremely unsecure. In this situation, tenants will 
not be allowed, also not motivated to redecorate and rearrange the space, and refurniture 
the condo. (On the contrary, they would have decorated the condo, arranged the space, 
and bought good furniture and equipment if they bought the condo.) Then the living 
quality from a rental condo will be not as good as that from a self-occupied condo.           
2. Marriage Law   
According to the marriage law of the United States and of most European countries, 
all properties of the husband and wife become common wealth after they get married. 
Unlike those laws, China’s marriage law states that the pre-marriage property of the 
husband or wife still belongs to the husband and the wife after marriage. Thus, the 
husband will retain the pre-marriage property if they are divorced in the future. However, 
it is challenging for the husband or the wife to prove that his/her pre-marriage money 
belongs to him/her after marriage. Consequently, a reasonable way to prevent such 
difficulty is to change “cash money” to houses before marriage. Under this law, the 
parent will buy a house for their children before marriage even if their children already 
own one or two condominiums and do not need more.    
3. Continuous inflation 
China has been experiencing persistent inflation since 2000. Economists inform us 
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that real estate is the safest asset against inflation. Consequently, it is very reasonable for 
a family to invest their money on a house. The more severe the inflation is, the stronger 
the motivation of a family to buy houses.   
4. Long-term persistent quickly rising of housing prices  
We know that the strong preference for houses boosts housing prices. However, 
housing prices also promote the preference for houses, thus continuing the increase in 
housing prices. When the housing prices are rapidly ascending, the return from investing 
in houses will be extremely high. Houses become the foremost assets among various 
kinds of assets. When the house prices have been increasing persistently in the long term, 
investors will deem houses as low-risk or risk-free assets. Consequently, they will 
continue to spend much more money on houses, which will further boost housing prices.   
5. Fake Divorce 
As stated, the purchase constraint policy in Shanghai include the following.  
1) One HUKOU family in Shanghai can buy a maximum of two new houses after 
the policy came out on January 31, 2011. Such family cannot buy a third house. 
“HUKOU” is a unique demographical or political term in China. Although some 
scholars translate it to “registration” or “local citizenship,” it differs from both terms. An 
individual or family with HUKOU of a specific city enjoys many privileges in that city, 
which an individual or family without HUKOU does not. Those privileges include house 
purchase, vehicle registration, school enrollment, and medical and pension insurance. A 
family with HUKOU (HUKOU family) is the authentic resident family, while a family 
without HUKOU (Non-HUKOU family) is always considered the floating family in the 
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city.  
According to the purchase constraint policy, “one family” is defined as “husband and 
wife” or “husband, wife, and their children under 18 years.” If one young couple still 
lives with the wife’s or husband’s parents in one condo, they will be seen as two families. 
An adult who is unmarried, or divorced, or a widow or widower, will be seen as an 
individual even if he/she lives with his/her children under 18 years. A couple living with 
their adult child will be considered as a family and one individual. An individual living 
with their adult child will be seen as two individuals.   
2) A HUKOU individual can only buy one new house after the enactment of the 
policy. He/she cannot buy a second house.  
3) One non-HUKOU individual or one family that has worked and paid social 
insurance in the city for five consecutive years or more can only buy one new house after 
the policy came out. They cannot buy a second home.           
It is not hard to find out the big loophole in this policy. Given that one HUKOU 
individual can always buy a new house, one couple who already owns two houses can 
develop a “strategy” to buy a third house. The strategy has three steps.  
Step 1: The husband gives his house to his wife (or his wife gives her house to the 
husband). According to the current law in China, this behavior is entirely tax free. 
Afterwards, they can get divorced. Thus, the wife owns all the properties, but the husband 
owns nothing.  
Step 2: The man buys a new house because he eligible to do so. 
Step 3: After the transaction is finished and the man acquires the property title, they 
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get remarried. Then, they own a new house (the third house).    
Notice that the strategy could be repeated if this couple wants a fourth house. 
Furthermore, they could repeat the strategy to obtain a fifth house. In fact, we have the 
following formula: One-time Divorce = One More House. 
In reality, even if one HUKOU family only owns one house and is eligible for 
buying a second one, the couple will still choose to divorce. The reason for that is 
because the house they buy will be seen as the first home by government if they divorce. 
Nevertheless, the house they buy will be the second one if they do not divorce. A major 
difference exists between “the first house” and “the second house.” Compared with the 
second houses, buyers will have the following advantages if the house he/she buys is the 
FIRST house.  
First, the contract tax will be reduced to 1.5% (3% for the second house). 
Second, the down payment is 30% (70% for the second house). 
Third, the interest rate of the loan will be reduced to 90% of the benchmark lending 
rate (1.1 times the benchmark lending rate).  
Fourth, no property tax will be charged. Thus, for the second house, annual property 
tax = the appraisal value×70%×0.6%.  
Consequently, the couple will choose to divorce in order to ensure that the house 
they want to buy will be their first house. Then, they will save much from the contract 
tax, interest rate, and property tax. They can also borrow much more money to buy the 
house from the bank.  
6. Fake marriage 
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What should an single person with HUKOU do when he owns one house and wants 
a second house? The only way that he could buy the second house is through a fake 
marriage. The strategy is as follows: 
Step 1: Find a woman who would like to enter into a fake marriage with him. After 
they marry, their “family” owns one house, so this family is eligible to buy a second one. 
Step 2: Buy the second house.  
Step 3: Get divorced. Based on the marital settlement agreement, the man will keep 
both houses. To thank the woman, the man will pay her a fee.    
9.3 Consequences of Housing Bubble Caused by Income 
Inequality  
9.3.1 Consequences for Built Environment  
1. Housing overdevelopment will cause loss and misallocation of resources, 
including land, construction material, building equipment, labor, and capital.  
Products can provide individuals with the utility/satisfaction only if they are 
consumed by those individuals. Quickly rising housing prices result in housing 
overdevelopment, suggesting that a considerable number of buildings are constructed but 
never “consumed.” As a consequence, substantial resources such as land, construction 
material, building equipment, labor, and capital are wasted. Those resources could have 
been used to generate useful products or services that could have been used in other 
economic sectors.  
2. Housing overdevelopment will lead to low quality of properties, including 
improper planning, unsound design in functions and arts, high energy consumption, and 
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low construction quality. Furthermore, those problems are shared by both high-level or 
expensive housing properties and low-level or cheap properties.  
“The quality of buildings developed in [the] past 10 years is very worrying. Many 
housing projects are severely short of supporting facilities, the design is improper, the 
construction quality is very low, let alone the environment-friendly requirement. But it is 
very weird that the quality is very low while the price is quickly rising up.”118 “Due to the 
erroneous planning and low quality, the average life of buildings in China is only 30 
years,” claimed by Baoxing Qiu, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development of the People's Republic of China, in 2011119. 
It is a basic principle in economics that both low price and high-quality of products 
inherently come from intense competition between firms, especially in a buyer’s market. 
Skyrocketing housing prices indicate a strong demand for buildings and a seller’s market. 
When buyers are scrambling for condominiums and new condominiums can always be 
sold at a good price, whether the quality is good or bad, housing developers hardly have 
incentives to improve the quality of the property.  
3. Housing overdevelopment will lead to high economic cost and significant harm to 
the environment. When low-quality buildings are removed, removing the buildings and 
recovering the land use also require enormous amounts of labor and money. Moreover, 
removing the buildings will generate considerable construction waste and dust, which are 
extremely harmful to the environment.  
                                                             
118 http://house.ifeng.com/column/news/jianzhushouming/index.shtml 
119 http://house.ifeng.com/column/news/jianzhushouming/index.shtml 
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9.3.2 Consequences for the Economy   
1.  Housing bubbles will lead to the instability of the financial system. 
2. Housing bubbles will not only make the funds not to enter the real economy, but 
also stimulate the funds to escape from the weak economy. In the short run, weak real 
economy will result in high unemployment and low economic growth. In the long run, 
weak real economy will reduce the whole country's economic strength, innovation ability, 
and will drive the country into recession and depression. 
3. Housing Bubbles will result in “Income Distribution Trap”.  
The trouble that developing countries encounter owing to the polarization of income 
should be named “Income Distribution Trap.” It differs from “Middle Income Trap” 
and “Inequality Trap,” although some connections exist among them.  
In the history of development economics, various scholars have emphasized the 
policy that upgrades capital accumulation on developing countries. However, when a 
country falls into the “Income Distribution Trap,” greater capital accelerates the recessed 
consumer market and further overheats the asset market. The same holds for foreign 
exchange, which has been emphasized by certain scholars because it can be used to 
purchase machinery and technology from foreign countries that developing countries 
urgently need.  
Some scholars value the policies with the purpose of offering credit and technology 
support to enterprises in a substantial economy. However, these measurements not only 
fail to help enterprises rise above the predicament, but also further deteriorate the 
situation because only the productivity of the enterprises can be improved. The extreme 
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shortage in enterprises in substantial economy involves strong market demand rather than 
high productivity. 
Certain scholars believed in the policy that cultivates human capital because such 
capital is of importance to the progress of developing countries aside from its physical 
capital. However, enterprises do not require high human capital and are unwilling to 
conduct human capital investment because of the lack of market demand in the “income 
distribution trap.” In this case, is it still useful to improve human capital?  
Some scholars highlight policy that could accelerate the industrialization process in 
developing countries. Industrialization is certainly an inevitable path for most of these 
countries. However, if a country falls into the trap after stepping into industrialization, its 
industrialization process can no longer continue because its consumer market would be 
under persistent recession.  
The policy of international trade advocated by other scholars is significant to 
countries caught in the trap, because international trade, especially export, can effectively 
support a consumer market in recession when domestic demand is insufficient. However, 
international trade fails to alleviate the recession of the consumer market if the 
consumption department lacks export competitiveness or the export competitiveness 
disappears due to lost comparative advantage in international trade.  
4. Housing Bubble will deepen income inequality.  Housing bubbles make the 
demand for consumption goods and production factors further decline. The declining real 
economy will reduce the income of the working class, and thus deepen income inequality. 
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In summary, only the policy that could decrease income inequality will be crucial 
to fix the problems faced by those countries. In other words, polarization of income and 
wealth over-concentration are not only the results of existing economic problems in 
developing countries, such as real estate overdevelopment and quickly rising real estate 
prices, but also the main, probably the most, crucial causes of a host of new, complicated, 
and dangerous economic problems. Therefore, the fair distribution of income is not only 
the goal for national welfare, but also the imperative condition that guarantees the 
development of a country.  
9.4 Innovations  
1. Finding an economic relationship between income level and propensity to consume.   
2.  Establishing a new measure as a substitute for Gini Coefficient.   
3. Revealing a unique feature of houses and explaining why this feature makes houses be 
a special asset preferred by high savings.   
9.5 Contributions  
9.5.1 Theoretical Level  
1. Providing empirical evidences that soaring-up housing prices are positive related to 
income inequality.   
2. Adding a new explanation for housing bubbles by uncovering the linkage from income 
inequality to the housing bubble  
Three primary explanations for housing bubbles are extant in literature: rational 
expectation, irrational or psychological factors, and stimulating housing policies. Very 
few studies have connected housing bubbles with income inequality and examined the 
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relation between them. This dissertation would uncover the inherent linkage between 
income inequality and the housing bubble. As a result, a new reason for housing bubbles 
might be identified, namely, income inequality.  
3. Showing a novel channel through which income inequality will damage the 
sustainability of economic growth in developing and developed countries, thus 
highlighting the importance of income inequality in developing economics and economic 
growth theories.  
Apart from the overheated housing market, severe income inequality also results in a 
weak consumption market and recessive real sector in a country. The risk of the financial 
market accumulates while the productivity and the competitive capacity of such country 
decrease. Finally, the economy would become more unstable and unsustainable. In my 
opinion, the challenge that developing countries encounter because of the polarization of 
income should be called “Income Distribution Trap.”  
Numerous scholars emphasize the importance of industrialization, capital 
accumulation, human capital, technological innovations, and international trade to the 
economic growth of countries. However, all those will be rendered ineffective when a 
country falls into the Income Distribution Trap. Therefore, this dissertation shows that the 
fair distribution of income is not only the national welfare goal but also the imperative 
condition that guarantees the healthy housing market, the stable finance market, and the 
sustainable economic growth of a country.  
Those listed items are possible theoretical innovations in the field of economics, 
finance, and real estate development. Thus, this work has intellectual merit in those 
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fields.  
9.5.2 Practical Level  
1. Highlighting the negative consequences for built environment and providing the 
professionals in this field with original thoughts to deal with the issues  
In addition, my project would also reveal the consequences of housing bubbles for 
planning, design, and the built environment. In the field of economics and finance, the 
instability in the finance system, the risk to the entire national economy, and the unfair 
wealth redistribution are regarded as the entire aftermath caused by housing bubbles. 
According to my studies, such aftermath should also include (a) loss and misallocation of 
resources, including land, construction material, building equipment, labor, and capital; 
(b) low quality of properties, including improper planning, unsound design in functions 
and arts, high energy consumption, and low construction quality; and (c) substantial harm 
to the environment. This is also a possible innovation in the field of PDBE, and thus has 
intellectual merit in this field.  
2. Offering developing countries the policy advice to avoid or emerge from the “Income 
Inequality Trap” and warning developed nations of this problem.   
Therefore, if this research is completely successful, it will deepen the understanding 
in academic circles about income inequality and housing bubbles. It shall also add novel 
ideas about housing overdevelopment and other problems in planning, design, and the 
built environment to practitioners. Furthermore, it would remind the policy-makers to 
consider income distribution when they draft policies tackling problems such as low-
quality housing buildings, housing overdevelopment, housing bubble, finance market 
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instability, and unsustainable economic growth in China. Given that numerous countries, 
including the US, have been experiencing increasing income inequality and the housing 
bubble, this research will also have a bearing on the policy-making process in other 
countries. 
9.6 Limitations 
1. Correlation is not causation. I also faced this same problem encountered by
economics studies. 
2. After income inequality is proved to be a crucial determinant for quickly rising
housing prices and housing overdevelopment, it remains unclear how important it is 
compared with rational expectation, psychological factors, and relevant policies.  
3. Similar to severe income inequality, perfect income equality and the efforts to
pursue the perfect income equality can also be very harmful to the entire economy. An 
optimal state between absolute income inequality and perfect income equality must exist. 
This research has not cast light on this optimal level.   
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